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the fall” in terms of responsibility for another’s exploits.
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“Rotten Apples” from the Military Police
shift for 1A (10 years in prison, released after six and a half years on August 
6, 2011).
night shift at the hard site (eight years prison, released October 2007).
prison).
Private First Class Lynndie England (three years prison).
“Rotten Apples” from the Military Intelligence
Specialist Armin Cruz, 325th Military Intelligence Battalion (sentenced to 
one year).
Specialist Roman Krol, 325th Military Intelligence Battalion (sentenced to 
10 months).
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Sergeant Ken Davis, 372nd Military Police Company.
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Commanders at Abu Ghraib and in Iraq
Captain Donald J. Reese, Company Commander at Abu Ghraib, 372nd MP.
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Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the General who was Commander of 
all military units in Iraq.
Major General Barbara Fast, in charge of Military Intelligence in Iraq.
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Major General Geoffrey Miller, the General who was Commander of 
Guantanamo and who came to Abu Ghraib in order to “Gitmoize” the prison 
in the fall of 2003.
Colonel Thomas Pappas, Brigadier Commander, one of the disputed 
Commanders at Abu Ghraib.
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Jordan, one of the disputed Commanders at Abu 
Ghraib.
Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, one of the disputed Commanders at 
Abu Ghraib.
came from Afghanistan.
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prisons in Iraq.
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exchange for immunity).
shift at Abu Ghraib.
Most people think they know all that there is to know about the Abu Ghraib torture 
scandal: the “bad apples” (referring to a handful of allegedly corrupt soldiers) 
allegedly had fair trials; they went to jail for allegedly committing acts of torture; 
and as far as the public, law, and academia are concerned—the case is closed. But 
as my friend and colleague in philosophy, Professor John McDermott is fond of 
saying: “The world does not speak in Aristotelian clarity.” Clarity is dangerous, 
because it closes the doors of perception. Genuine perception of an event or an 
issue must include the elements which lie on the fringes of consciousness and on 
the peripheries of what is seemingly known. Dr. Ryan Ashley Caldwell researched, 
analyzed, and wrote this book on Abu Ghraib in the spirit McDermott describes, 
as he was, and remains one of her mentors. McDermott’s approach is a remnant 
of a distinguished tradition in philosophy and sociology that dates back to the late 
1880s, the era of William James, Emile Durkheim, and other classical theorists 
who laid the groundwork for discovering and re-discovering the social world. My 
own mentor, David Riesman, similarly advised his students that the social world 
as well as social theory must be re-discovered continuously.
This is because the bulk of our “discoveries” about the social world and 
which are disseminated by the information media and the Internet more quickly 
and thoroughly than previous generations could have imagined. Discussions are 
thereby closed before they have a chance to be opened. The moment that the White 
House labeled the accused soldiers in the Abu Ghraib drama as “rotten apples”—
the designation that made its way around the world in a matter of seconds—their 
fates were sealed, and the full horizon of possible explanations for the scandal 
was closed with the exclusive focus on them, and not their superiors or their 
social environment. One must re-discover the original truths, which the media’s 
“discovery” of the scandal obfuscated for generations to come. Thus, Dr. Caldwell 
analyzes court documents and the ROT for the accused soldiers. This seemingly 
obvious step in the research process—to examine the actual, sworn testimonies 
of the accused and of witnesses—is not obvious at all. It is shocking that in our 
digitalized, information-laden age, there is no central repository in existence for 
the ROT. By law, the ROT are public documents, but are not truly accessible 
Caldwell was a member of the defense teams of two of the soldiers charged in the 
Abu Ghraib scandal, Sabrina Harman and Lynndie England. In this role, she had 
access to them and to other witnesses, as well as their attorneys, their trials, and 
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to precious information such as the ROT which eluded the media and society’s 
opinion-makers. 
I shall not review here the genuine discoveries Dr. Caldwell makes and shares 
in this book. What is striking is her curiosity, scrupulous attention to detail, and 
sensitivity to what various actors actually said about the abuse, command climate, 
and social climate at Abu Ghraib—as well as how they said what they said. The 
facts she lays out challenge existing preconceptions which have been frozen into 
dogma: The court-martialed female soldiers did not strike anyone, and did not 
torture anyone. They were convicted mainly for taking and posing in photographs, 
under the direction of male superiors. In sum, the convicted female soldiers were 
the “fallgirls” or scapegoats for abuse that was orchestrated at the White House and 
the chain of command above them. These real architects of the evils at Abu Ghraib 
will most likely never be charged with any crimes. 
Worse yet, the center versus the periphery of the Abu Ghraib saga have been 
inverted. The government and the media would have one believe that the fallgirls, 
and other low-ranking soldiers at Abu Ghraib, were at the center of the abuse, 
while the high-level architects remained passive, helpless, and unknowing on the 
fringes of the story. The truth is that the seemingly peripheral and high-ranking 
characters in this story are the real protagonists and bear the real responsibility not 
only for the abuse, but for creating the dysfunctional social climate at Abu Ghraib 
which led to and maintained the abuse.
In addition to documenting the full, contextual account of what happened 
at Abu Ghraib—including the fringes, margins, and periphery of the received 
story—Dr. Caldwell re-discovers the social theories necessary to comprehend 
what happened at Abu Ghraib. One should keep in mind that social scientists 
do not hold a monopoly on theories for explaining events. Lawyers, journalists, 
politicians and other professional groups all draw upon or develop theories to 
explain this and other events. Indeed, the prosecution and defense attorneys had 
their own, opposing theories at the Abu Ghraib trials regarding key concepts such 
as choice, responsibility, procedure, and so on. Lawyers routinely concoct ad hoc 
sociologies and psychologies of their own, which would never be accepted without 
discussion in academia. Dr. Caldwell’s unique contribution in this volume falls 
under the broad umbrella of theories known as feminism and gender studies—
looks to the neglected margins and periphery of social theory for concepts which 
could capture the complexity of the Abu Ghraib drama in a meaningful way. 
Thus, she begins with the nearly forgotten distinction made by Talcott Parsons 
between instrumental, goals-means functions (ascribed to males) and expressive 
functions (ascribed to females). Most contemporary feminists seem to assume that 
this is a sexist distinction which no longer applies to contemporary society. But 
Dr. Caldwell argues convincingly that this distinction still operates in the U.S. 
military, and thereby opens up new vistas for understanding. A brief summary of 
her discoveries would be that the fallgirls were exploited by the male commanders 
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precisely because they were female, and would thereby heighten the shame 
experienced by male Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib. She calls this the instrumental 
use of expressive torture.
In her analysis as a whole, she invents many new concepts to capture the 
twisted use of homoerotic, sexual, and gender-based, expressive themes in 
theoretical perspective is that the sexual perversion at Abu Ghraib can no longer 
be dismissed as the aberrant behavior of a few individuals. Rather, this climate of 
perversion was the product of carefully-crafted interrogation “techniques” which 
aimed at the misuse of gender, expressive functions, and sexuality for the purposes 
of torture. Additionally, Dr. Caldwell walks the reader through other peripheries of 
social thought, including that of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Jean Baudrillard, 
among others, in an attempt to understand the spectacle of Abu Ghraib.
Theory Series. It is an exemplar of the kind of sociological theorizing which put 
Caldwell seeks the truth about Abu Ghraib, and in the process, demonstrates that 
this truth is complex, ambiguous, and deserving of our attention and discussion. 
The reader should be prepared for discoveries in this book which will be surprising 
and disturbing, as all discoveries are.
Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Texas A&M University

Our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves 
all mankind.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (1957)
I wrote this book based on my experiences as a researcher in sociology for the trials 
of Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman, and as a co-expert witness and researcher 
for the defense. As I participated in these trials with Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic, 
many different themes became apparent to me. Issues of power, gender, control, 
punishment, deceit, to name a few, were manifest in both the trials and the stories 
that were shared with me about Abu Ghraib. I knew then that there was more to 
Abu Ghraib then was being reported in the media and that it was my job to further 
convey these stories in ways that I knew how. I knew almost immediately that my 
reading of this abuse would apply a critical power perspective that used gender as 
a primary point of departure. This I could do.
So, why? Well I am interested in both justice and the sociology of knowledge, 
and how truth is created within culture, the courtroom, through dialog, and within 
institutions, such as the military. I found it fascinating that a huge institution such 
as the U.S. military could blame the events of Abu Ghraib on seven low-ranking 
soldiers, and claim no responsibility, no knowledge of these happenings going on 
whatsoever. Something did not seem right. (And then came the Levin-McCain 
Report in 2008.)
I am trained as a social and cultural theorist, and also as a feminist philosopher, 
and so, the focus of this book is a social and cultural theoretical analysis of the 
empirical data regarding the prison abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq by American forces. The empirical data provided is drawn primarily from my 
England’s and Sabrina Harman’s courts-martials, interaction with soldiers and 
of abuse themselves, among other things.1,2 Few, if any, have looked at the mass 
of empirical data surrounding Abu Ghraib through the lens of social theory and 
for the abuse at Abu Ghraib, in other publications I apply additional theoretical viewpoints, 
and consider for instance the anomic social climate as well as the varied experiences 
of Reisman’s lacking moral compass. This line of thinking is best laid out in Stjepan 
Mestrovic’s book The Trials of Abu Ghraib (2007) and other joint publications with him.
2 I was the only female, feminist, academic who was not only in the courtroom at the 
England and Harman trials, but who ate meals with the defendants, sat through conferences 
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gender. Fallgirls provides the following: an examination of the photographs of 
both Lynndie England’s and Sabrina Harman’s courts-martial (two of the “rotten 
apples”); a discussion of the body associated with punishment and torture, and also 
My approach to understanding gender is that gender as a sociological concept is 
multifaceted, based on power relations, and has to do with performances of individual, 
cultural and symbolic meaning constructions, where identity is constituted through 
these performances. Gendering is something that is “done” (either something we 
do, or something that is done to us), it is a process and an action, and a metaphysical 
transformation so to speak. Gendering is always in reference to a “code” such as 
a context, a culture, or a symbol rich with meaning, and these “codes” have to 
do with power. Bodies can be gendered, so can roles, expectations, spaces and 
environments, commands, organizations and institutions, fashions, theoretical 
viewpoints, and advertisements, to name a few. In this way, gender is a process 
metaphysics,3 a system of becoming, a performance process, an adjective of sorts, 
a means for identity construction, as well as a tool or thematic for analysis. Gender 
functions as code with power infused within its understandings—where even the 
analysis of power itself can be examined and understood as “gendered.”4 What 
I think is most important within discussions of gender is not only theoretically 
important conversations about gender (its “code”) rich with detail and example, but 
also critical engagement and thought about how gender is policed, produced by and 
for us, consumed, and other ways power makes complex the relations of gender.
Although this book deals with sensitive and emotionally disturbing issues—
torture, abuse, sadism, abandonment, and other distressing topics—I make sense 
of Abu Ghraib through the lens of a social scientist, a sociologist, a feminist and a 
philosopher. This approach does, however, have its unique aspects. First, I view the 
“rotten apples” as persons, and not as they have been characterized in the media—
as “poisoned apples.” Like most people, I do not condone the abuse, and actually 
deplore it; nonetheless, I am trying to understand the circumstances surrounding the 
with attorneys, talked to relatives, talked to other soldiers, read sworn statements that were 
never made public, reviewed court martial transcripts, etc.
3 This notion of ‘process metaphysics’ is inspired by William James’ philosophical 
metaphysics, where he describes reality as literally states of becoming—hence, a process. I 
argue that gender works similarly. 
4 Social construction is a theoretical concept used to understand and explain social 
reality, and I take it as a theoretical presupposition that individuals experience a shared 
sense of reality that is itself socially constructed in terms of power differentials. By 
this, I mean that what individuals and society perceive and understand as “reality” is a 
product of the social interactions of individuals and groups with others, as well as with 
these interactions, people continually create a shared reality experience, thereby ultimately 
establishing a shared social epistemology.
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abuse. Second, I favor the approach of looking at a social climate, environment and 
context above and beyond simply a lone individual for responsibility. Third, I look at 
laws as social constructions that might not always be applied in practice (such as the 
Geneva Conventions should have applied in Iraq, but there was confusion). Fourth, 
I discuss gender and social theory throughout, and as a means of understanding 
Abu Ghraib. Given that the U.S. military is not a bastion of feminism, this analysis 
is important for several reasons: showing how power functions within Abu Ghraib 
and also for interpreting and illuminating the gendered and homoerotic torture that 
took place there as well. 
I am grateful to the soldiers for sharing with me their experiences of what 
happened at Abu Ghraib. I am most thankful to Sabrina Harman for allowing me 
to interview her and also for sharing photographs for this book with me. Harman 
is a down-to-earth individual with a sacred bond to animals (which I share!). 
Additionally, the professionalism of the legal teams was quite impressive and I am 
Takemura, Captain Catherine Krull, and Captain Jonathan Crisp. In my limited 
experience with all of you it was an absolute honor and pleasure. 
I would like to personally thank the following individuals for discussions and 
help pertaining to this book: Keith Kerr, Kristi Wilson, Tomas Crowder-Taraborrelli, 
John McDermott, Alex McIntosh, Don Albrecht, Cletus Dalglish-Schommer, James 
Spady, Orin Kirshner, Aneil Rallin, Enrico Mariotti, James Chouinard, Rachel 
Romero, and my fantastic student research assistant Mohammad Ali Ahsan for his 
I appreciate greatly the previous mentorship I have received from Alice Sowaal, 
Mark Webb, Joseph Ransdell, Ed Averill, Karann Durland, Rod Stewart, and Mark 
Hebert. I am also grateful to my family and friends, and especially Lucy Ransdell, 
for all of their support throughout this project. Additionally, many thanks to Diana 
Phillip and Will Harrell of the ACLU, Texas who taught me very early on in my 
academic career (during an internship and then later, as a member of the Texas 
State Board of Directors) about justice and accountability within the prison and 
jail system of Texas. It is so strange to look backward in time and have it all make 
perfect sense! Also, many thanks to Neil Jordan and Philip Stirups for all of their 
assistance with this project. 
The most important inspiration and absolute support for this project comes 
from my friend, mentor and dissertation chair, Stjepan G. Mestrovic. He has always 
taught me to believe in myself, to ask questions of situations, to never take the 
obvious explanation as truth, to seek for deeper analysis, and to push myself further. 
Mestrovic also taught me to love social theory and to readily engage theorists in 
conversation within my very own head—and I do! I am forever indebted to him 
for revealing to me how to use social theory in a constructive way in order to help 
others. I appreciate your help, Mestrovic. I fashion myself after you as a professor 
each day. 

Prologue: So What Really Happened at  
Abu Ghraib? 
After viewing the photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib at the hands of American soldiers, 
over 16,000 of which have never been seen by the public, I remember thinking 
things would never be the same from this point forward. What had happened? 
How could this behavior be explained? What would be the aftereffects of this 
abuse and these photographs, knowing that from this moment on the world would 
good” in Iraq.1 I remember trying to imagine myself actually at Abu Ghraib prison 
in the fall of 2003, turning my head to see past the physical abuse and into the 
faces of the onlookers in their cells, envisaging their fear, dread and anxiety. I 
also tried to imagine what it must have been like for the soldiers there, how the 
social environment was experienced at Abu Ghraib by all, and what day to day life 
must have been like given the horrible surroundings of the prison I have come to 
understand. I am still trying to make sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and to tell 
a story of Abu Ghraib that has not readily been told. It is this endeavor to fully 
understand the whys and hows that drives my sociological research in war crimes, 
in order to understand how power operates within military institutions, and the 
associated contextualized experiences of all members involved within the social 
environment. So what really happened at Abu Ghraib?
Media depictions, popular perception, and academic explanations for the 
infamous torture at Abu Ghraib at the hands of American soldiers have utilized 
conceptions of chaos as a means to describe and explain the abuse. For this reason, 
many read and understand the abuse and torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib as 
being about the actions of a handful of rogue soldiers, namely the “rotten apples” 
operating in an environment of chaos. The government’s own theory of the abuse 
is that there were originally seven rogue soldiers with moral failures, who just went 
out on their own and engaged in misconduct. In fact, former defense secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld’s 800-page book Known and Unknown (2011) argues that 
the abuse at Abu Ghraib was isolated and uses the “rogue soldier” approach for 
understanding the abuse itself, claiming that soldiers went outside of the bounds of 
approved policy. However, Rumsfeld’s book has drawn scrutiny from the ACLU 
who claims that Rumsfeld is “rewriting history” in his approach, and that abuses 
pertinent to the courts-martials associated with the “rotten apples” (Special Agent Brent 
Pack, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, U.S. Army, Harman CM, May 13, 2005).
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were not only widespread in Iraq, but also that “government documents show the 
methods used at Abu Ghraib were the same ones that Mr. Rumsfeld approved”.2 
Looking at the U.S. government’s own reports (for example see the Levin-
McCain report)3 shows that the U.S. government deals with conspiracy, deception 
and intrigue, and suggests that we should not blindly accept the characterizations 
of these so-called “rotten apple” soldiers without question (Danner 2004, Strasser 
2004). These reports state that the abuse was not at the hands of a few rogue 
soldiers, and was instead ordered and orchestrated from much higher in the chain 
of command—all of the way up to the White House itself. 
An expert witness in sociology, Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic, points out at several 
of the “rotten apple” trials that there were leadership, training, discipline, chain 
of command, resource, environmental and socio-cultural issues that need to be 
considered in order to get a full picture of the context of Abu Ghraib, and how 
some abuse was inevitable given these conditions. In this way, I and others argue 
that the “rogue soldier” explanation for abuse is demonstratively false—magical 
thinking in fact—even though it was used by the government’s prosecutors at 
each and every “rotten apple” trial, and is still put forward today by some as a 
4 Says the defense counsel at the Harman trial, “you don’t 
have seven soldiers who were basically out there on their own like a bunch of 
cowboys just having their way with Iraqi detainees” (SHCM). Consequently, I 
think that we should be more critical of what happened at Abu Ghraib. Instead of 
pinning the abuse on lower-level soldiers, arguing that they acted alone and with 
no direction, I offer an alternative reading of this abuse in terms of gender and 
power to describe what caused these events so as to provide an additional narrative 
about what happened at Abu Ghraib. 
Abu Ghraib Prison
Abu Ghraib prison is known as Saddam Hussein’s infamous torture chamber and 
was the site of weekly executions under his regime where political dissidents were 
tortured. Located about 20 miles west of Baghdad, Amnesty International has 
2 See “Rumsfeld Memoir Draws Criticism from ACLU Over Abu Ghraib Depiction,” 
FoxNews.com, February 3, 2011. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/02/03/rumsfeld-
memoir-draws-criticism-aclu-abu-ghraib-depiction/
3 http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=305735
Northern District of Illinois (Ali et al., vs. Rumsfeld) that Rumsfeld personally approved 
unlawful interrogation techniques and failed to stop torture at Abu Ghraib, therefore 
abdicating his legal duties and violating the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes and 
international law. See “ACLU and Human Rights Sue Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Over 
U.S. Torture Policies” at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-and-human-rights-
3
repeatedly documented human rights violations at this huge prison (about the size of 
an average airport), which was described as having vile living conditions. In October 
of 2002, Hussein declared a general amnesty for all prisoners in Abu Ghraib and they 
were subsequently released. When American occupation forces invaded Iraq in 2003 
and overthrew the Iraqi regime, like most other places around Bagdad during that 
time period, the prison too was ransacked, looted, and abandoned. Soon afterward 
however, the American military took over the prison itself and continued running 
it, albeit not a common tactic, in the middle of an active war zone as a holding 
Facility. In June of 2003, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was ordered to restore 
Hussein’s prison, and in her words: 
We did our best to marginalize the old hellhole. While we rehabilitated Abu Ghraib 
in stages, starting with cellblocks 1A and 1B, we kept most of our Iraqi inmates in 
compounds of tents … We started to draw down our biggest facility at Abu Ghraib, 
with the 800th who had died on 9/11) … The commanders had created a monster 
at Abu Ghraib, but they felt no real need to bolster our resources for dealing with 
these thousands of incarcerated Iraqi citizens, most of them innocent bystanders 
swept up by the attempts to stop a growing insurgency. (Karpinski 2005: 183-191)
Figure P.1 Abu Ghraib Prison
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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The hard site of Abu Ghraib, or the actual hard standing building with a foundation 
is built with brick and concrete. The hard site housed tier 1A and 1B and the 
rest of the regular prison wings; however, it was tier 1A where the MI and CID 
holds were located, as these were the prisoners who were supposed to be high 
value detainees. Interestingly, we now know that none of these prisoners had any 
actionable intelligence whatsoever, and that these prisoners were mostly local 
criminals that were picked up in street sweeps during raids. 
Captain Donald J. Reese, the 372nd Military Police Commander since 
December 2002, stated in court that one wing of the hard site had Military 
Intelligence, and the other had Military Police who were responsible for taking 
care of the prisoners and transporting them within the compound. It was tier 1A 
where the “rotten apples,” most of whom were from the 372nd Military Police 
Company, were assigned to work the night shift—a curious assignment for the 
372nd, as their training was as a combat support unit for supply route and convey 
security escorts, and not at all as prison guards. Says Reese, “The Iraqi detainees 
were there for different reasons. Some inmates were there as MI holds, CID 
holds, and Iraqi on Iraqi criminals. There was a mix of detainees” (June 24, 2002, 
SHCM). However, this “mix” also included women and children detained at Abu 
Ghraib in tier 1B, a crime that is explicit in the Geneva Conventions. In addition, 
there were tent and fence prisons surrounded with Constantine wire around the 
prison compound that extended the prison itself. Camp Ganci housed common, 
general population prisoners, such as Iraqi on Iraqi crimes, who are not believed 
to have military intelligence value. The other tent prison within Abu Ghraib was 
Camp Vigilant and this area housed high value/priority detainees (“insurgents”). 
However, Abu Ghraib was not just a prison—it was an Army base called FOB 
(Forward Operating Base) Abu Ghraib, and contained non-prison related troops 
and services. 
Although it was the spring of 2004 when the photos of abuse at the hands of 
American military soldiers were leaked to the media, the abuse itself (and thus the 
infamous photographs) took place in the fall of 2003. By the spring of 2004, several 
military investigations into the abuse were under way. In May of 2004, United 
States President George W. Bush announced plans to demolish Abu Ghraib prison. 
However, Attorney Paul Bergrin (viewed as the lead defense attorney in the pool 
of attorneys representing the “rotten apples”) objected to this closure, claiming that 
the prison was a crime scene and could not be demolished. Judge Colonel James 
Pohl, the judge for all of the “rotten apple” companion cases, agreed and stopped 
the demolition of Abu Ghraib, contrary to the wishes of President George W. Bush 
and his request to destroy Abu Ghraib prison. Also in the summer of 2003, Major 
General Geoffrey Miller came to Abu Ghraib from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for 
the expressed purpose to make the prison more like Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Camp, or to “Gitmoize” Abu Ghraib (Mestrovic 2007). Between May of 2004 and 
September 2005, seven soldiers (the so-called “rotten apples”) were charged and 
convicted with various violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
such as dereliction of duty, maltreatment of prisoners, and conspiracy, among other 
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charged or prosecuted with a crime, and in fact several were promoted. Indeed, Abu 
Ghraib is one of the world’s most notorious prisons, where memories of terror and 
torture at the hands of not only Saddam Hussein, but also American occupation 
forces and other interrogators reveals the history of suffering within its walls. 
The obvious two questions that surface are: How did American occupation forces 
perpetuate suffering at this notorious prison? And why?
Gender Categories as Code 
Over the last 20-30 years, gender has become an important focus for analysis in 
the social sciences. Feminists, gender and social theorists, those concerned with 
women’s issues, and others, have analyzed society and culture using gender as a 
focus for understanding many different phenomena. In order to show how different 
social theorists come to interrogate gender in different ways concerning Abu 
Ghraib, I present my notion of gender in order to provide a theoretical mechanism 
of comparison and entry into discussions about gender and power within social 
theory. Throughout this discussion, what is clear is that sociologically, gender has 
been, and continues to be socially constructed in different ways throughout our 
Figure P.2 Abu Ghraib prison cell
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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social-theoretical cannon, and I am quick to point out that the reality of these social 
constructions has always been about power. I draw out the gender suppositions of 
social theorists such as Talcott Parsons, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, Judith 
Butler, and Philip Zimbardo—some of the most well-known names in social theory, 
yet many of who are not really considered gender theorists at all (except of course 
Judith Butler). However, I argue that all of these theorists conceptualize power and 
gender in different ways given their theories of the social and cultural world and 
my project aims to outline the gender variations within these theories, and also 
the consequences that these understandings have for explaining the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. In addition, coupling these social theorists’ ideas with the gendered nature 
of the military, it is possible to obtain a new perspective and thus explanation 
for what happened at Abu Ghraib and the associated courts-martials. Gender thus 
remains an important means for analysis within this project, woven through social 
theory and accounts of power, as gender is the vehicle I use to explain the abuse at 
Abu Ghraib and the events of the courts-martials themselves.
I view gender as something that we are socialized to within a culture, where 
social and cultural norms prescribe the boundaries for categorical understandings 
of “masculinity” and “femininity.” These gender norms, or the socially constructed 
rules of “masculinity” and “femininity,” are basically the set of conventions that 
I call these conventions “gender code” as they supply the cultural translations or 
shared set of meanings that a culture uses to make sense of gender performances. 
(Literally, these normative gender codes “de-code” the meanings associated with 
gender so as to inform and prescribe for the larger dominant culture.) 
These gender rules or codes are not natural, in that they did not derive from 
biology or divine law. Instead, they are a shared, symbolic, and agreed upon set 
culture—that is, they are socially constructed.5 In this way, we imagine categories 
as a certain general measure for conceptualizing gender, and we pass this kind of 
knowledge on through our social interactions and socialization practices, as our 
gender code is thus conceived of as a process that we learn from our culture. This 
process informs our behavior (how we act), our viewpoint (how we see the world 
and others), and our perspective (our outlook or how we think). This gender code 
gets inside of our minds and starts to function such that it might begin to feel 
like something natural, normal, or even like it has always somehow continuously 
been there informing our every move, decision and way of seeing. Some say 
prescription, in that this pair of glasses causes us to see the world in a certain 
way. After a while, with these culturally informed gender glasses on, gender itself 
becomes unquestioned and assumed correct, such that the normative assumptions 
5 Social constructionists work to document and analyze the processes through which 
social reality is constructed, and how that constructed reality begins to work back upon 
society itself.
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and socializations that we use, inscribe, share with others, etc., is actually the 
“truth” of gender. In some ways, gendering can be conceived of as a ritual practice 
associated with categorizing, cultural meaning creation, and identity. 
However, understanding gender is not just as easy as understanding a rule book 
of norms associated with culture; in fact, it gets even more confusing, because 
all of these gender divisions and gender rules—or the politics of gender—are 
time periods, or contexts, and are imbued with power such as hierarchies and 
understanding gender might be different, or even completely opposite, from 
another cultural understanding of gender. Hence, it is quite possible then to have 
varied, different, and opposing systematic cultural approaches to gender. What one 
culture views as feminine or masculine might be socially constructed differently in 
dissimilar cultures. This mostly applies to gender roles, where what is considered 
versa. Second, even varied time periods within same cultures may have different 
conceptions of gender, which can be seen with changing concerns over women’s 
rights in different waves of feminism, as well as changing gendered fashions, to 
name a few. Third, gender can be understood in certain contexts as either strictly 
such as within stereotypes, fantasy, or archetypes; or, gender can be critically 
challenged as conforming to a certain law (such as heterosexuality) or in reference 
to some dominant standard for value (such as patriarchy), where it is claimed that 
this law or standard constrains the ability to render certain projects of gender viable 
or valuable (Butler 1993b; Rubin [1975(2002)]). Finally, one thing that is certain 
about gender is that it does indeed become entangled with power differentials and 
structures, such that how we locate ourselves within the geography of feminist 
theory and in terms of gender is political.6 Indeed, we should not assume that all 
women of the same culture experience that culture in exactly the same way, even 
though they are all women existing within the same cultural context. Drawing 
from the idea that the “personal is political,” I think that viewing gender as one 
component of an intersected identity is important, where race and ethnicity, class, 
sexual orientation, nationality, religion, among other identities are considered 
when determining the level of subordination a person will experience in any 
culture. These identities function as additional schema intersecting with gender to 
7 What is actually different 
for each individual in any gender performance is the subjective experience within 
their context that creates a differing gendered epistemology, as an individual’s 
6 I am indebted to Victoria Rosner for this notion of feminist theory and gender 
theory as geography.
7 Another way to understand this is in terms of “gender capital,” where reward and 
social status or value follows what is viewed as the legitimate empirical cash value for 
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gender identity is affected by their other and varied identities, which thus impacts 
8 In this way, gender 
yet also has a 
staged and referenced standard. One could go so far as to say that the code for 
gender is thus so malleable to the point of theoretical inconsistency (being that 
it culminates in the actual lack of a code at all), as it seems to represent nothing 
stable. Gender is both performatively and radically constructed, but is also socially 
understood according to rules, norms, discourse, and power, as these provide the 
basis for social value within the larger population. These social constructions of 
normative gender codes are basically the language of gender that allows for gender 
translations to be made at the cultural level so that conversations about gender can 
exist; however, these norms are and should be critically questioned. 
a valuable starting point for understanding gender, as it allows for the varied 
conceptualizations of gender to be brought forth, I also add that a critical power 
analysis that outlines how power functions to determine or limit conceptualizations 
of gender is also imperative to theorize in that it shows that, within different 
perspectives, cultural or otherwise, the possibilities for thinking (or not thinking) 
about gender exist.9 So, for example, when we consider the many places that 
gender codes exist, such as the marketplace (where we shop for things like toys, 
clothing, and fragrances), we realize that from a very early age ideas about gender 
socialization occurs based on how we treat our children differently, how we 
interact with them, how we encourage them to interact with others, the kinds of 
toys we purchase for our children to play with, the activities we encourage them 
to engage in, and so forth. As Cynthia Enloe (2000) rightly points out regarding 
Jane female version is not called a soldier, but instead is described as a doll “in 
a tremendous socially constructed message regarding gender, and one that is based 
in social value (doll versus soldier) that deserves an analysis focused on power.
So, I looked into the toys that even I played with as a youth with my brother, 
and I found that Hasbro toys is commemorating the G.I. Joe series with a 25th 
8 Although it is the case that we all have the freedom to conceive of our gender 
performances in the existentially free and authentic way Sartre would have approved of, 
it is not the case that we can all freely realize these conceptions given the constraints of 
our own material world and contextual surroundings. Sometimes it is the case that we are 
limited by our very circumstances themselves (Davenport 1980).
9 This is especially important for conceiving of gender queer categories, discussions 
revolving around intersexed identities, transgender identities, drag identities of all kinds, 
and others.
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the original G.I. Joe series—Scarlett and Lady Jaye. I remember both sexy females 
from my childhood—both are members of counter intelligence, but Scarlett was 
looks, as she is notably quoted as saying “Beauty may only be skin deep, but lethal 
is to the bone.”10 Lady Jaye, like Scarlett, is a busty covert operations specialist, 
who also has a degree from a prominent university, and whose special skill is 
impersonation of all kinds. (Given the description used by Hasbro of female soldier 
toys, one might ask if Lady Jaye’s skill is to impersonate a masculine toy soldier.) 
We can learn a lot from these toys and perhaps the messages that children learn 
about their gendered toys translate into larger cultural beliefs about gender such 
as the following: females are not soldiers but are instead dressing-up in costume 
so as to impersonate soldiers; the authenticity about female soldiers such as G.I. 
in military gear are in “military” drag, performing a constituted identity illusion; 
sexualized females use their looks as weapons (even if they are intelligent); and 
lastly because G.I. Jane is labeled as a doll and not a soldier, it is unlikely that she 
will be taken seriously either within the military or on the playground (as we all 
know that boys do not play with dolls in the narrowly socially constructed world 
of U.S. gender code). I think this is what Enloe (2000) means when she argues that 
American’s relationship with the U.S. military is of “women soldiers,” where this 
means soldiers in lipstick and high heels—as feminine but militarized (Barbie in 
with guns. This is where our narrow versions of gender socializations lead—to 
G.I. Jane being subjugated on the merry-go-round and beyond.
It is now possible to see that with the added analysis of power, in addition to 
theoretical social construction, the intricate workings of oppression, domination, 
subordination, and control associated with gender become comprehensible. 
Another example that is even more lucid is that even cultural gender norms 
sometimes function as oppressing mechanisms within “genderscaping”11 (or 
the individual’s construction of gender), for within culture, gender is policed by 
reference to cultural norms, and these norms function to both make sense of the 
world, and also to give value to those individuals who perform gender in such a 
enforced norms of a given culture. (In a sense, this is a form of “gender capital” in 
the sense of Bourdieu’s [1980] ‘social capital’.) The individuals who “do” gender 
correctly and according to the norms or code of the culture to which they belong 
10 http://www.yojoe.com/action/93/scarlett2.shtml
11 I came up with this notion of “genderscaping” after considering Veblen and his 
work Theory of the Leisure Class ([1899]1994) and his idea that social value comes to 
the individual via the well-manicured lawn. In the same way, the well-formed gender 
garners social recognition and thus value by being “landscaped” in the correct and socially 
approved way as well.
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are given admittance into the larger and “dominant group,” while those who do 
not “do” gender according to the norms are seen as “other” or are out-group 
individuals with regard to dominant culture’s understanding of gender, and thus 
value, reward, etc. How is cultural gender status decided and assigned? So you 
may ask, who gets to determine how gender is socially constructed within society, 
and why would this matter? Who is the architect and provides the blueprints for 
socially approved and socially valued “genderscaping”? This question has to do 
with power structures and power differentials, which is a major focus of analysis 
in Fallgirls. 
A system of social control thus springs out of these cultural norms for gender, 
where those with the ability to garner social power (the social elites or members 
and although this “reality” is itself shared among the members of a culture, it is 
of gender options, or bias, instead of leaving gender possibilities open to creative 
conceptualizations.12
and prescriptions for gender are given social value and social reward in the form 
We receive cues from our social surroundings, peers, and other members of our 
shared culture if we are doing gender correctly in the form of positive and negative 
sanctions. This can be in the form of a positive wink of the eye, a negative name-
calling, or something even more drastic such as a negative physical attack or even 
hate crime. In this way, there are positive and negative consequences for performing 
gender, and with respect to cultural gender norms, or the “code” for gender.13 
But what about individuals who “do” gender differently than the norms 
of their culture? Or, what if the reverse is true in that gender is “done” to us, 
in that we are forced into normative cultural categories or gendered boxes for 
understanding by others? After all, sometimes it is these norms alone that limit 
gender conceptualizations—such as the case with transgender individuals, drag 
queens and kings, intersexed, gender queer, or those who understand their gender 
outside of a heterosexual matrix or who have their gender forced upon them.14 
12 Some theorists such as Jean-Paul Sartre’s keyhole example in Nausea ([1938]1964) 
and Audre Lorde’s (1984) example in “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the 
Master’s House” point out that it is the oppressed that truly understand this system of norms 
best which thereby dictate their own gender domination.
13 You can see for yourself, have a male friend wear a skirt in public to see the 
reactions of others for not performing “masculine fashion” correctly or as a female, hold the 
door for a large group of men (especially men over 30) and insist that they all go through 
14 One really important thing to remember is that the term ‘heterosexual’ also has a 
genealogical history, and Foucault project in the History of Sexuality (1978) reminds us of that.
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Those who push back at gender normative categories view these categories as 
away with totally. Assuming these individuals have gender performances that are 
outside of the cultural norms for gender, we can say that their gender productions 
have the possibility to transform normative and limiting standards of gender in 
that they reconceptualize the limits and boundaries for gender understandings. 
However, prior to these reconceptualizations, it is usually the case that these 
individuals are not given value within the existing cultural schema of gender value 
and representation (Caldwell 2009).15  
This brings up the tension that keeps reappearing—
inspection that it should be one or the other, but what is happening here is that 
larger cultural picture and the smaller level of individual analysis. 
 Hence, power here too 
is the variable that aids in explaining this anomaly vis-à-vis gender identity. Does 
this mean that gender is meaningless? Absolutely not! Indeed, the very fact that 
gender is something that is contested, policed, and based in power differentials 
shows its very importance!
Gender therefore is about constitutively performing a certain part of identity 
that for some gives admittance and value into dominant culture’s system of worth; 
nonetheless, gender becomes something that we all “do” each day in order to establish 
identity (Caldwell 2009). Each of us “genders” ourselves everyday through our 
actions of subscribing, performing, associating, and reifying the established gender 
norms of our culture, or questioning these norms by establishing an alternative 
model. This happens when we put certain clothing on our bodies, when we perform 
certain roles, when we symbolically fashion our bodies in a way to denote a gendered 
identity, when we enter into power relationships with one another, among many 
other social interactions that can be described as gendered or in gendered terms. 
Gender is thus something we “do,” a process metaphysics—we put it on, all of us, 
each day, just like a costume or symbol that we identify with, in order to belong, 
to make sense of ourselves and others, or to question the very system of gender 
itself. I suppose we can say that the notion of gender norms and rules are somewhat 
Perhaps the only norm that gender does have is that when thinking gender (queer or 
otherwise), power relations are involved. These are the aspects of gender that I hope 
to bring out in Fallgirls, so as to make evident how power works both subtly and not 
so subtly in discussions about gender, and in order to show the multiple meanings 
associated with gender and Abu Ghraib.16
15 Judith Butler calls these “abjects,” as these individuals are literally not theorized 
within the normative gender paradigm (1993b).
16 I see this project located at the intersection of sociology, social and cultural theory, 
women’s studies, and critical theory. Consequently, I incorporate cultural studies, feminist 
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Social Value and Representation
Simone de Beauvoir, in her iconic book The Second Sex ([1949]1952), writes that 
means is that “man” and “woman” are binary categories, and that “man” is set up 
qualities and generally seen as lacking all that is “man” or “masculine.” Beauvoir’s 
entire discussion centers around the topic of how to constitute “subjecthood” given 
really provides a key insight into an understanding of oppressive modes of identity 
group, social inequalities arise regarding value, autonomy, cultural representation 
and worth, to name a few. So for instance, Laura Sjoberg claims that “women 
soldiers were not soldiers but women soldiers; their gender marked their identity 
for them, 
as they are marked in terms of a lack, and thus do not have the power to instantiate 
their gender identity as such. In this way, gender is done to these female soldiers 
instead of these soldiers having the ability to gender themselves, thereby marking 
their identity autonomously and free of coercive power. (This is along the same 
lines as Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism (Said 1978), where he argues that the 
Orient is represented, constructed by, and in relation to the West, where the Orient 
is all that is inferior, alien and “other”.)17
Given the problem of this kind of biased social construction of reality, feminists 
aim to understand and uncover the ways in which members of society come to 
know and simultaneously create “social reality,” so as to identify and expand on 
the ways in which women come to be represented within society. Feminists argue 
against a phallocentric (or male dominated) ordering of society, which privileges 
the socially powerful male subjectivity, and argue instead for the equality of the 
feminists make a case for the realization and representations of women’s diverse 
and sociological theory (modern and postmodern), and feminist philosophy so as to provide 
a theoretical analysis of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent courts-martial focused 
on gender. 
17 Interestingly, R.W. Connell (1995) discusses this process of instantiating identity 
with his distinction between hegemonic and subordinated masculinities, where hegemonic 
masculinities feminize other masculinities in an attempt to maintain power and control 
through the act of dominance. Sjoberg (2007) points to this example later in her article 
to elucidate the relationship between the USA and Iraq; however, I suggest we not only 
think of prisoner relations in this sense (as feminized, through torture and also power), but 
also how women are gendered within the military, as gender-instantiated by men—literally 
feminized in terms of their relational power to masculinity. This was my experience of the 
U.S. military.
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experiences given the idea of intersected identities (race and ethnicity, class, 
gender, nationality, sexual orientation, etc.), and show how these intersected 
identities actually shape the ways in which women experience different kinds of 
subjugation. Feminists locate the origin of male dominance in patriarchal cultures 
within the social, economic, and political spheres of society, and are interested in 
the ideological processes that legitimize and perpetuate female subordination. As a 
of “woman,” namely as members of a subjugated social group, albeit within 
different contexts. Although some theorists argue that women do indeed see the 
world differently because they are women (nature), others simply claim that 
women experience the world differently in terms of power (culture), although 
even this is varied. It is this latter approach that I take.
Accordingly, feminist social theorists question the gendered hierarchy of 
cultures that privilege males, as this endeavor questions the social theory cannon’s 
universal voice that represents masculine biases. In Chapter 1, “It was not Lucifer 
Achieved: Zimbardo, Women, and Abu Ghraib,” I argue that one way American 
society is sexed and gendered is within science, where cultural biases are imported 
from dominant culture by scientists, and are impressed into theory and ways of 
knowing (Harding 1991). This can be seen in research design, as demonstrated 
as subject” in similar experiments. This section shows that by using a gender-
sensitive analysis, which accounts for sex, gender, and sexuality, one can come to 
a thicker understanding of social phenomena, including deeper understandings of 
both The Stanford Prison Study and the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. 
The Stanford Prison Study was aimed at researching if certain environments 
evoked certain behaviors—in this case, did a prison somehow generate violent 
behavior? Interestingly, Philip Zimbardo argues that the narratives from which to 
understand the abuse at Abu Ghraib can be found through an analysis of group 
conformity and obedience to authority, and in terms of his 1971 Stanford Prison 
Study. One might argue that still a further understanding of this abuse can be found 
in Stanley Milgram’s social-psychological study on obedience. However, neither 
of these experiments in obedience and authority uses a critical gender-sensitive 
analysis as a means for interpreting the abuse at Abu Ghraib. 
Using gender as a tool for analysis, it is possible to provide a richer understanding 
of the gendered masculine, and heterosexist nature of the American military. 
Although I fully support the separation within queer theory of heterosexuality 
from gender for understanding gender constructions, I found that because the 
military functions as a heterosexual entity, masculinity is forcibly aligned with 
heterosexuality for its understanding. Because of forced heterosexuality “by law” 
given “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, gender and sexuality are connected in the military as 
part of the normative code for gender identity.18 The “code of cultural masculinity,” 
18 Even though law is certain to change regarding Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT), 
discriminatory practices are still embedded within the military and larger culture towards 
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where both masculinity and heterosexuality function together as powerful cultural 
ideology, was demonstrated at both locations, the “Stanford Prison” and also at 
Abu Ghraib. At both locations, sexualized and homoerotic torture techniques and 
forced feminization existed as torture techniques, which exploited notions of both 
masculinity and fears concerning homosexuality.19 Zimbardo’s paradigm cannot 
sexuality are themselves used against prisoners and as torture techniques. 
This chapter shows that by using a gender-sensitive analysis, which accounts 
for power and heterosexuality, additional elucidations about both Zimbardo’s 
study and also Abu Ghraib are evidenced. I critique Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison 
Study using the realities of Abu Ghraib, and show how data from England’s 
and Harman’s trial evidence the importance for considering gender within the 
context of war crime studies—from the Stanford Prison Experiment to Abu 
Ghraib. 
Narrative and “Genderscaping”
As a feminist I argue for an account of gender that is radically constructed 
and constitutively performative (Butler [1990] 1999, Butler 1993b), one that 
allows for all interpretations of gender conceptions, gender-queer productions 
(Caldwell 2009), drag, trans, radical inclusion, postmodern spectacle, reward, 
value, space for consideration, among other plans for genderscaping. However, 
not all gender systems allow for radical possibility and inclusion.20 For example, 
one existing and limiting structure of gender relations occurs within the military, 
where the oppressive and suffocating gender code can be used to make further 
sense of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent courts-martial’s of Lynndie 
England and Sabrina Harman.
Gender categories provide descriptions of gender characteristics, where both 
masculine and feminine symbolic narratives and “codes” have been culturally 
employed to describe social phenomena. For example, in modern patriarchal 
societies some narratives describe gender in terms of binaries, associating 
LGBTQ individuals, and just as racism and sexism still exists even though laws prohibit 
discrimination, I believe that homophobia and associated discriminatory practices will still 
follow when DADT is repealed, and that heterosexuality will continue to inform gender 
understandings within heterosexist spaces.
19 Even within larger culture there is the idea that what it means to be male is to be 
“masculine,” and that this is also to be “heterosexual.” This is the stereotype that queer 
theory aims to get rid of in order to open up one’s ability to conceive of and thus perform 
one’s gender identity.
20 I am grateful for this notion of possibility in my theorizing to John J. McDermott 
and his tireless lectures regarding existentialism and also William James. His words still 
imprint my thought.
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masculinity with all that is essential, rational, reasonable, strong, orderly, active, 
controlled, and logical. Conversely, femininity is associated with all that is 
emotional, chaotic, weak, inconsistent, inessential, passive, uncontrolled, and 
irrational. Notice that this binary system is an arrangement of opposites, where 
masculine descriptions and traits are positively valued, and feminine qualities 
have less value. This value system has been socially constructed in terms of a 
gendered opposition and serves as a frame of reference when conceptualizing 
cultural understandings and meanings associated with gender. 
that the narratives associated with these codes is problematic both for gender 
constructions and also for social value and power distributions within a society. To 
dictate a standard for everyone, from which gender should be parsed, determines 
This is evidence of the limiting nature of binary gender categories in that only 
certain characteristics are available for gender construction, where masculinity 
and femininity are thought about in strict and contradictory ways. Additionally, 
the consequences of this kind of arrangement are that those who are gendered 
“masculine” are given more social value, prestige, status, privilege, power, and 
opportunity within patriarchal societies over those who are “feminine.” This 
is oppressive gender theorizing from the initial establishment of these gender 
categories themselves. 
Nonetheless, these binaries in fact inform the very ways that we do and have 
(uncritically, I might add) to think about subjects, individuals (their properties 
and qualities), and subjectivities. Narratives using gendered language have even 
been expanded for use to describe places and spaces, paradigms, sex categories, 
roles and bodies, among other things. That is the power of narrative—it functions 
as an ongoing and foundational storyline or backdrop from which we come to 
know and understand how the socially constructed reality of the world emerges. 
The consequence of these narratives is that they are the basis of stereotypes 
about gender within American culture. 
of the stereotypical association between sex and gender. Interestingly, one of 
the reasons that these gender binaries are based on stereotypes is that gender 
categories are usually associated with sex categories. When I refer to sex 
categories I mean those categories that describe and are thus usually coded to 
denote sexed males and females. This means that masculinity has a culturally 
informed narrative such that for its categorical conceptualization it is associated 
with guys, maleness, or the male subjectivity, while femininity is associated 
with girls, women, or the female subjectivity. What is more, the attributes 
that are associated by conceptually connecting the binary categories come to 
also represent sexed individuals through their gendered connection, and thus 
stereotypes about gender are applied to understandings of sex. In American 
culture, this association between sex and gender is so conceptually automatic 
that it may even sound strange to question its separation. 
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This is the socially constructed sex and gender connection that I am referring 
to that we, as socialized individuals, pass on to our children and reify ourselves 
through our interactions and unquestioned gendered assumptions. It is this 
narrative of gender that becomes the story that we come to believe as the truth of 
the social world. It is almost as if gender is on autopilot, such that no questioning 
of these associations takes place. We pass these connections along through our 
interactions as if they were truths about gender, that man should be masculine 
and that woman should be feminine, and that for some reason these are the only 
prescriptions and options we have in our culture for gender. This baseline of 
gender is the starting point from which conceptualizations about gender arise, and 
this baseline serves as literally the starting point or gender narrative creation myth 
for American society. I am not saying that these are correct starting points, but that 
these exist in conception only (remember, it is necessary to be critical).
What is interesting is that the U.S. military operates using a similar version of 
this creation myth of gender on a daily basis, which does little more than perpetuate 
outdated stereotypes of both gender and sex (and their forged association). Looking 
at the data surrounding Abu Ghraib, I show how the use of theoretical gendered 
binaries actually helps to make sense of some of the abuse at the prison and the 
associated courts-martial, which I argue was the result of gendered deviance. 
Power coupled with gender has been used to control bodies, and I show how 
torture, abuse, and other deviances in the name of gender were carried out upon 
the body at Abu Ghraib. Historically, women’s bodies have been controlled by 
patriarchal power in areas such as marriage, sexuality, and in legislation over 
abortion, among other places. However, power and control over the body can 
also affect sexed male bodies, where feminization of these male bodies serves to 
humiliate and mock cultural constructions of masculinity itself. In this way, power 
is used to torture both the body and mind.
In Chapter 2, “Abu Ghraib and the “Rationalization” of Rationality: Uses of the 
Masculine and Feminine Symbolic Narrative,” rationality and chaos as descriptors 
are explored to show that both have implications for understanding deviance in 
terms of gender. Many do not understand the full deviance that occurred at Abu 
Ghraib because this unique reading of the abuse is nonexistent in academic and lay 
publication. Through this analysis, I argue that a gendered mutation of rationality 
has rationalized the furtherance of torture at Abu Ghraib.
In this chapter, I apply a binary theoretical analysis of the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib and the following courts-martials. Although this is a limiting paradigm for 
understanding gender, the theoretical use of binaries and these binary stereotypes 
are a minimum starting point for gender analysis and critique. What is more, the 
U.S. military functions using these binary stereotypes in a non-critical manner. I 
associate modernity with masculinity, and divide modernity into two parts using 
my alternate reading of Chris Rojek’s “masculine” Modernity 1 and “feminine” 
Modernity 2. 
Within this chapter, I also describe Abu Ghraib’s built and created 
environment, and how this setting lacked modernist masculine rationality. Also, I 
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address Foucault’s theory of modern forms of punishment, and argue that at Abu 
Ghraib, power was used to punish both the body and soul. This is in contrast to 
Foucault’s theorizing about modern forms of discipline, and is associated with 
a critical discussion regarding gender, power and punishment for the following 
reasons: Iraqi women and children were held at Abu Ghraib; forced feminization 
of prisoners was used as torture; gender humiliation as a weapon was used against 
prisoners; nicknames were given to detainees in an attempt to control through 
masculinist power; soldiers, both male and female, suffer from PTSD given their 
experiences at Abu Ghraib; among other examples provided. These examples 
count as a form of gendered torture and deviance, and should be read through a 
critical gendered analysis.
Parsonian Gender Roles: A Thing of the Past?21
One aspect of society that is frequently analyzed using gender is the division of 
social power between men and women. These realized power differentials manifest 
themselves in the ways that society is organized, as they directly inform a schema 
of social order and value. In patriarchal societies, what I call gender ideology, or the 
set of cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes that favor the interests of the powerful 
masculine gender, come to function as dogma in that they foundationally constitute, 
justify, and legitimate positions of power.22 Additionally, in patriarchal societies, 
males are given social power, opportunities, value, and rewards unequal to women, 
Consider the doctrine of separate spheres as an example, where actual space 
is divided according to gender and also according to modernist binaries. Public 
space, or the space used for rational, political thinking is associated with males and 
right to own land, paid labor, and the right to education—all rights and opportunities 
that women did not initially have equal to their male counterparts in the United 
States. Private space or the domestic sphere, also known as the female or feminine 
sphere within this dichotomy, is associated with child rearing, the maintenance of 
the home, and all things having to do with the family and domesticity. In this way, 
certain types of labor, social value, and prescribed gender roles manifest from these 
social divisions of space. Quite literally, because of how social space is divided, a 
21 Previous research on Parsons and Abu Ghraib was printed in Sage’s journal 
Cultural Sociology in 2008 and was nominated for SAGE’s Prize for Innovation and 
Excellence 2008, “The Role of Gender in ‘Expressive’ Abuse at Abu Ghraib.” I want to 
thank Sage for allowing me to expand on this initial research with these new ideas and 
additional data.
22 This is a general understanding of power, as not all females or males come to 
understand gendered-power in similar ways given the intersection of other kinds of identity 
along with gender identity.
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prescribed genderscaping is forced upon individuals within society in such a way 
seemingly associated with each sex and the division of both space and the family. 
For some social theorists, this form of social control through the use of gender and 
Nonetheless, sometimes it is the case that theories need to be expanded upon in 
order to explain certain social and cultural phenomena. In Chapter 3, “The Abuse 
 I show 
how Talcott Parsons’ theory of instrumental and expressive gender roles illustrates 
what took place at Abu Ghraib in gendered terms. For Parsons, his notion of gender 
roles is fundamentally based on the idea that men are rationally instrumental and 
focused on means/goals, while women are emotionally expressive and focused on 
group cohesion. Overall, these complimentary roles “function” in terms of the total 
social system’s stability, whether you are imagining a family structure or a military 
prison. However, at Abu Ghraib, the gender role experiences deviated from Parsons’ 
theorizing, and with regard to the reporting of abuse, where both expressive and 
instrumental roles functioned in gendered ways that Parsons did not imagine given 
his theories. A new and creative reading of Parsons allows for original theoretical 
terms to be applied to Abu Ghraib in order to understand how soldiers, and even 
some of the “rotten apples” reported abuse. Terms are developed to demonstrate 
this additional gendered interpretation, such as the instrumental perceived reporting 
of abuse (where abuse is reported in the perceived belief the chain of command 
will respond, yet with a failed goal/means outcome), the expressive non-reporting of 
abuse (where abuse is not reported because of fear associated with the consequences 
of reporting and other expressive reasons), and the instrumental actual reporting of 
abuse (where abuse is reported with an actual means/goal or end outcome). In this 
way, we should not be so ready to accept stereotypical gendered accounts of society 
without question. 
My aim in this chapter is to show that responsibility for abuse is a collective 
thing—not only at the individual level, but also at the higher levels of command 
responsibility. It is this kind of critical analysis of abuse responsibility that was 
needed at Abu Ghraib and during the trials themselves. Also, I am not sure that 
anyone knows outside of the trials that abuse was reported—and even by the soldiers 
who would later face charges of courts-martial.
Postmodern Gender “Realness”
Like The Velveteen Rabbit (1976), I am concerned with how the notion of “real” 
is constructed, and how power relates to this conception of “realness.” As I 
Gender Hyperreality: The American Military and the Case of Abu Ghraib,” I am 
interested in how what is considered theoretically “real” instructs the formation 
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of conceptual and organizational paradigms, and especially categories for 
thinking about sex and gender. Considering the military as an example, some 
of these categories include: how sexed bodies are made sense of, how gendered 
bodies are made sense of, how militarized gender relations serve to enforce how 
soldiers understand their gender, how the military context limits the conceptions 
Abu Ghraib Prison and the associated trials, what then was theoretically real and 
what were postmodern simulacra about their gender performances as well as 
their roles? Using postmodern theory as a perspective for understanding notions 
of “realness,” it is possible to make clear how exactly gender identity and 
identity in general can be understood as something that is produced in relation 
to a socially constructed code of “realness.” 
Feminists and postmodernists alike have questioned this “design” (this 
reference to gender and race inequalities, assumptions of heterosexuality, and 
the primary positing of whiteness. At the center of this project is the elucidation 
of the ways in which our world is parsed, separated and categorized, such that 
an understanding of the organizational schema (the “real”), forced upon that 
which is being conceived of (thereby making its conception “real”), is itself 
dissected and critiqued (and for the postmodernist, deconstructed). It is for these 
reasons that I put into conversation Jean Baudrillard and Judith Butler, who both 
have theories of gender, and I consider both theories when describing gender 
understandings at Abu Ghraib as simulacrum in their construction, but real in 
their consequences. 
For Baudrillard, gender identity is about cultural signs, where identity 
simulacra. He does not view gender as something “real,” and instead sees gender 
as hyperreal—that which has no referential origin or reality apart from a self-
legitimating system (self-referentially valid). When individuals conform and 
contort their identities to the hyperreal categories of gender, or when identities are 
understood in terms of some gender “code,” these identities can be understood as 
succumbing to rule by simulacra of reality. Consequently, although Baudrillard 
claims that “realness” is dominated by a simulacrum of reality, he provides the 
means necessary for discussing the hyperreality of gender category simulations.
For Butler, gender is understood similarly to that of Baudrillard, however 
Butler allows for an analysis of power, where the policing of self-presentation 
is in terms of social norms. She argues that surveillance itself constrains our 
behavior and appearance formations, and that gender is a performative identity 
(which constitutes subjecthood) that can be conceptualized in terms of value with 
regards to its legitimating practices. Gender for Butler is thus an act of “doing” 
that is understood with regard to a socially constructed standard, which I argue 
is at base level a simulacra of reality. This means that, for Butler, “realness” 
regarding gender identity is something that comes from culture in terms of a 
normative system of value for identity realness (i.e., the heterosexual matrix for 
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value).23 Hence, gender is simulacra for Butler, as for Baudrillard, in that it is 
neither a representation of reality, nor a description of reality, as “reality” can 
only be found in the cultural representation itself and within the consequences 
of these representations. 
At Abu Ghraib, the postmodern deconstructed and imploded meanings 
of gender function in that they elucidate not only the consequences of gender 
for individuals, but also help explain the chaos of the prison using a gendered 
perspective. I develop the terms simulacra gender code, power simulacra, and 
rule by simulacra of reality to describe the gender processes and consequences 
of the following examples: the metrosexual soldier, the phenomena of drag at 
Abu Ghraib, the idea that “drag-techniques” were used to torture, and that gender 
simulacra and seduction played a role in the courtroom, among other examples.
Feminist Analyses of Abu Ghraib
Much of the analysis of the photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib has relied on a 
lack on data for the interpretations of the photographs themselves, and especially 
media interpretations. While it is true that I was indeed privileged in gaining 
access to a courtroom that many were restricted from, and therefore had an 
insider status with regard to the data of the trials, I am still somewhat confused 
about the lack of knowledge and the amount of assumptions that have been made 
of feminist analysis that would so blindly rely on media and other sources while 
not considering either their objectivity or possible biases, and also analyses of the 
variables for analysis, as we are trained to do. I think it is time for conversations 
about these women—these Fallgirls, as I have named them. Thus, in Chapter 5, 
“The Fallgirls of Abu Ghraib: Feminist Analyses and the Importance of Context” 
also given my interactions with soldiers at the various courts-martials I attended. 
Additionally, I repeatedly point out the importance of context for analysis of these 
events, and try to make sense of some of the events associated with Abu Ghraib in 
terms of context and gender so as to provider a richer analysis and understanding 
of these events.
I do want to mention that as a feminist, I was somewhat shocked when I read 
some of the interpretations that feminists made of the photographs that pictured 
women at Abu Ghraib. Sometimes these soldiers were unfairly described in ways 
of these gaps. However, other times there are clear mistakes in simple shallow 
feminist analysis that I would not expect from leading feminist scholars—some 
23 Although, to be sure, Butler is in no way advocating for this oppressive heterosexual 
matrix. Quite the opposite. See Undoing Gender (Butler 2004).
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who I have read and looked up to for years, as do other academics and activists, 
as did some of these women I write about in this book. This is about power, and 
the importance regarding frames of reference and how these are necessary for 
interpretation of the “facts” of women’s lives. Actions take place in contexts and 
some feminists have interpreted these actions and these women of Abu Ghraib 
outside of context, and without all of the correct contextual facts. This is not 
responsible theorizing. To make matters worse, some of these feminists still go 
around touting these incorrect facts at college graduation speeches and other 
lectures. Feminists, listen up … It is time to stop framing the Fallgirls of Abu 
Ghraib. 
My Little Protector Once Assaulter
As a means to understand the impact of what happened at Abu Ghraib (both at 
the prison and also the effect it had on one soldier), in Chapter 8, “Conversations 
with Sabrina Harman,” I provide sections of a series of conversations I had with 
Harman over summer, 2011. Within this conversation several themes become 
apparent: how homophobia exists within the military; the homoerotic and sexual 
nature of the military; how fear and PTSD exist for one soldier after the events 
at Abu Ghraib; sexism in the military; trauma in war; friendships with Iraqi 
prisoners and children; and the emotions associated with the events of Abu 
Ghraib, among other topics. 
Conclusion 
Fallgirls is a book about conspiracy, deceit and intrigue on the part of the American 
government. The government’s version is that there were “seven rotten apples” 
who were responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and that these rogue soldiers 
were the masterminds behind the invention of prisoner interrogation, torture and 
brutality. However, the government’s own report’s show that these soldiers were 
trained by their higher-ups in interrogation and torture techniques. If anything, the 
Levin-McCain report exposes the U.S. government and its successful attempt to 
“project” conspiracy charges onto the “rotten apples” in the form of guilty sentences 
at their many different courts-martials. In this way, it was the U.S. government that 
engaged in conspiracy, deceit and intrigue, whereas the women of Abu Ghraib have 
been framed as the Fallgirls, the “rotten apples” and scapegoats by the government, 
media, and certain feminists. 

Defense Counsel’s Opening Statements
Sabrina Harman Courts-Martial, Civilian Defense Attorney Frank Spinner, 
May 12, 2005, Fort Hood, Texas
CDC: This case is about a lot more than some still photos of what happened in Abu 
Ghraib. This case is about how the Army took a young woman, who decided to 
enlist in the reserves, in July of 2002, just after she completed basic training, how 
she started serving her country, her obligation faithfully. Only shortly thereafter, 
only six months later activated to report to Iraq. It’s about what she experienced 
when she was assigned over there. And it’s about the failure of leadership in the 
Army to give her the training and the resources to perform the task that she was 
assigned. 
 … 
What I would like to do is take a little bit of time to step back and look at the 
context in which these events occurred. 
 … 
You see, here’s the problem, how hard is it to look at some pictures and say wow 
that looks bad, that looks wrong? 
 … 
So who are some of the players that were called up to active duty and sent over to 
Iraq? Well there’s a Captain Reese, the Company Commander, he’ll be called to 
testify as a witness for the defense; some names that you may hear but they may 
not appear as witnesses I’m going to mention as well: Captain Brinson, Captain 
who were assigned to the prison but they were not part of the 372nd, but they 
played a role with Colonel Pappas who was the Head of Military Intelligence 
Operations and Lieutenant Colonel Jordan. I don’t anticipate that either of them 
would be here to testify, but their names may come up in the course of the evidence 
that you hear. Higher up the chain of command you’re going to hear the name 
Lieutenant Colonel Philabaum and the role he played, and then General Karpinski. 
Now, with respect to the actual nightshift you’ve gotten some of those names, I’m 
not sure if you got them all, but let’s just go over who worked on the nightshift. The 
people that were deployed earlier, a Staff Sergeant Frederick and Staff Sergeant 
Allen those were the senior NCOs working the shift. Then there’s Corporal 
Graner and as—between Frederick and Graner you are going to certainly see them 
depicted in some of these pictures that are—had been addressed. Sergeant Davis—
Javal Davis, also working the nightshift. Then there was Specialist Ambuhl along 
with Specialist Harman. By date of rank and I may be wrong on this but at least 
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as the evidence plays out I think it will show you that Specialist Harman was the 
lowest ranking guard that worked on the nightshift. 
In any event, this unit is activated and they undergo several months of training 
preparing them to go to Iraq. Finally, I think it’s around March of 2003 they were 
This unit—this combat unit was military police. What you’re going to learn is 
that they were stationed in Al Hillah and the idea was to train local Iraqis, police 
so there was a period of time before this unit ever went to Abu Ghraib where they 
arrive—this unit does not arrive at Abu Ghraib until October of 2003. They are 
given a task, in particular, Specialist Harman along with the others I named are 
given the task of guarding what is perhaps the most dangerous part of the prison. 
Now what are you going to learn about this Tier 1A and Tier 1B? You’re going to 
this is not like a normal prison when the maximum custody, minimum 
custody—or medium custody and minimum custody in some prison in the United 
States or even Fort Leavenworth the USDD. This was a prison. A former prison 
maintained and run by Saddam Hussein that basically was taken over by the Army. 
And in this prison it was overcrowded. That’s in part why they had camps and tents 
set up outside the hard site. You’re going to learn that there were more prisoners 
coming into this facility than they had guards and resources to secure them and 
maintain them. 
I anticipate that Captain Reese is going to tell you that the ratio of guards to 
detainees was well below a regular prison. Captain Reese is going to tell you that 
the focus down and narrow it on that part of the prison, Tier 1A and Tier 1B, 
you’re also going to be aware that this was a very unusual environment, because 
unlike the civilian facility where you might have maximum security, everybody 
that they had some very dangerous people locked down. People being held for 
military intelligence interrogations. People being held for interrogations by other 
their own prisoners who were being held there for various types of offenses. And 
and juveniles being held in the same part of the prison and that at some point 
moved along—next to the women and children and that one of the primary tasks 
that Specialist Harman was assigned, was guarding the women and the juveniles. 
The evidence will show you that in many respects, Specialist Harman, was on the 
peripheral of the primary duties—of the duties that were being assigned to this 
particular shift. 
I anticipate that between then Corporal Graner and then Staff Sergeant 
Frederick, they’re going to come in, they’re going to tell you that they were 
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the primary interface with military intelligence. And they’re going to talk about 
the duty to soften up detainees who were there being interrogated by military 
intelligence. But what does this tell you? It tells you that, again, this was not 
like some civilian, military prison—or civilian prison or military prison, where 
people who have been convicted of crimes and are just occupying space, serving 
their sentencing. This was an institution where there were ongoing intelligence 
activities for which Specialist Harman was not trained. 
You’re going to learn that when their unit arrived at Abu Ghraib and the hand 
off from the company that was there before them that there were a number of 
things going on. Now, the government has shown you some pictures and they’ve 
talked about how on 7 November they stripped these detainees and the initial 
emotional impact is that, wow, that’s terrible. Now, I’m not sure if he said it but 
the evidence is going to show that these weren’t just prisoners, they just—they 
weren’t just detainees. They had just been involved in a riot, I think it was at 
Camp Ganci and they were basically apprehended and brought back to this part of 
the prison because of allegedly participating in a riot. But, in any event, in terms 
of stripping and taking their clothes off is that what the 372nd learned when they 
arrived in October at Abu Ghraib just a few weeks earlier was that this was a 
common practice in Tier 1A, that it was part of the military intelligence operation 
to deprive detainees of their clothes. 
Furthermore, that they were tasked in working with military intelligence, 
something they had never been trained to do, they were tasked with using such 
techniques as sleep deprivation. And you may be saying to yourself, at this point, 
you know, why is this guy standing on the box? What’s the point of standing on the 
box? And this is the risk that we face in just looking at a picture and not looking 
behind the picture. He was part of—the evidence is going to show it was part of 
the sleep deprivation duties that Specialist Harman and others were assigned to 
perform. 
holding boxes, standing on boxes, as methods to get them to remain awake so that 
military—they would be off balance, I guess, from a sleep standpoint that would 
enable successful interrogations. In fact, that goes back to the context when you 
have to appreciate when you look at what was going on at Abu Ghraib at that time. 
The insurgency had started to attack. Abu Ghraib, the prison itself had 
experiences frequent mortar attacks. There was a—there was a sense of urgency 
in getting actionable intelligence and so the interrogators and working in concert 
with the guards were trying to obtain this kind of intelligence to save soldiers’ 
lives. And so it was in that context that these events arose and occurred … which 
is going to give you a sense of how could something like these photos come about. 
 … 
basically the conspiracy allegation. What this allegation means is that Specialist 
Harman entered an agreement with an intent to commit maltreatment along with 
the other people named there.
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 … 
she posed for a thumbs up photograph with Corporal Graner behind a pyramid 
of naked detainees, concede, the picture is there. This is not like a picture of the 
UFO when you don’t know if it’s a UFO or not. The picture is there and we’re 
going concede that she was behind the pyramid of detainees. This is what we do 
not concede, that she entered any agreement to maltreat detainees. That’s where 
And what the government will be relying on in great part for their case is called 
circumstantial evidence and you have direct evidence and circumstantial evidence 
I do not anticipate that any witness is going to come in and say, oh, we sat down 
with Specialist Harman and we said hey let’s—tonight let’s have some fun and 
maltreat detainees. That’s not how the evidence is going to come out. The way the 
evidence is going to come out is that while she was there, they were there, detainees 
were maltreated, so by inference there must have been some agreement to maltreat 
detainees. The defense is going to put on evidence that, in fact, Specialist Harman 
was upset as early as the 20th October 2003 about some of the things that she was 
seeing. Some of the things that she was never trained to contemplate or anticipate 
and it bothered her, and she started taking pictures to document that was going on. 
Not because she was part of a conspiracy, but because she was offended by what 
she saw and she hoped to be able at some point to prove it. 
 … 
 … 
that shows that Specialist Harman actually cared about inmates and tried to 
help inmates. And on occasion went to limits to see that they got proper care, 
safeguarded, and medical treatment. 
 … 
Now, was she there on November 4th when Gilligan, as you’ll hear the name that 
he was called is Gilligan, and he was made to stand on the box and the wires were 
put on his hand? Yes, she was there, we’re going to concede that. Now, we’re not 
going to concede something that you may wonder like, well, surely Mr. Spinner 
has lost his mind. We’re not going to concede that she put the wires on his hands. 
Despite the fact that—I’ll concede the government had as statement that she said 
concede that. And there’s going to be some evidence and some testimony that’s 
going to refute that. 
Additionally, you’re going to learn more about Gilligan than just this hooded 
Harman developed somewhat of a friendship with Gilligan. That, in fact, he 
achieved sort of a trustee type status in that part of the prison. That you can’t look 
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at this one snapshot in time, however terrible it may look, and understand it’s all 
about those relationships. How he got on that box? What happened on that box? 
And what happened after he got off the box?
The government is going to present the argument to you that that was an 
attempt to some form of maltreatment and/or torture. The defense is going to 
present evidence that, in fact, it was a joking type thing and that Gilligan was in on 
the joke and that this was simply a matter of sleep deprivation. 
With respect to the 24/25 October incident, under Charge II, under item 9, 
of these three detainees that were suspected of raping a 15-year-old male. Three 
male adults suspected of raping a 15-year-old male were brought back into that 
Tier 1A because of the allegations of raping this boy. Now let’s—what’s interesting 
incident is that we’re going to see pictures with multiple soldiers there, male 
soldiers standing around these individuals who are handcuffed, the Iraqis on the 
ground, naked and hand cuffed together. 
But what you’re not going to see is any picture of Specialist Harman involved 
in that incident. In fact, the defense is going to present evidence that contradicts 
the evidence presented by the government. 
We’re going to be calling, to testify, and I forget his rank, I can’t remember if 
he’s a specialist, sergeant, Staff Sergeant Ken Davis. In any event he’ll come before 
you and he’s going to contradict the witnesses presented by the government. He’s 
going to say he was there, I think, for around 45 minutes or so that the operation 
was being run pretty much some of the MI people along with Corporal Graner 
and that he didn’t see Specialist Harman there but she came there for a very brief 
I’ll be arguing that she didn’t do what they alleged she did. In fact, what you’re 
that nothing was done about it. Nothing was done about it. So there was someone 
there that night who observed these events, who reported it, and nothing was done 
Which leaves us with November 7th …
 … 
maltreat, maltreat, and maltreat … What does that mean, maltreat? How do you 
certain things happened. Now somebody might argue like, I’m going to show 
you in a minute, but whatever it was that happened, is that maltreatment? That’s 
because each of these allegations of maltreatment are not that Specialist Harman 
assaulted somebody, stepped on their toes, otherwise abused them, slugged them, 
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hit them, slapped them, or otherwise, the allegations of maltreatment with respect 
to Specialist Harman is that she took photographs and that’s what constitutes the 
maltreatment. 
going to present is pretty much that the detainees are hooded, they don’t know 
they’re being photographed, and so therefore they’re not maltreated …
alleged, whether or not Specialist Harman knew that Corporal Graner hit the 
detainee after the photo was taken. We’re further going to present evidence, as 
I said earlier, that Specialist Harman was taking these pictures, not as part of the 
conspiracy, but to document what she was going on—she saw going on. And then 
you’re going to learn that she left two days later on leave on November 9th, which 
was actually a time they could have shared—it started at 1600 on the night of 
the 7th and ran to 0400 the next day and then approximately 24 hours plus later 
she goes home on leave. By the way that just—that caused me to remember one 
thing. With respect to the maltreatment that occurred that night, some of it was 
witnessed by an individual, a government witness, Specialist Wisdom and it was 
witnessed by him, he reported it, and nothing was done about it. So as you realize 
to report these things, you’re going to have evidence that someone also observed 
what happened on November 7th, and reported it, and nothing was done about it. 
Now, with respect to—since we’re talking about the photographing, I’m going 
present evidence to establish that those were the last pictures taken on that night 
on the pre—I’m not even sure the government talked about this but let me sort 
of educate you. You’re going—there are three cameras that were in operation on 
the night of September—November 7th and so one of the government witnesses, 
Special Agent Pack is going to talk about these three cameras and he’s going to 
talk about the sequence in which pictures were taken and which pictures were 
taken from which cameras to sort of show a sequence of events over the course of 
that evening. We’re going to concede that Specialist Harman was there about the 
time—the same time that the seven rioters were brought back into that area of the 
prison and for the most part these pictures accurately depict what happened that 
night, but where it ends is that Specialist Ambuhl and Specialist Harman left before 
the last pictures were taken. They went over—they went to make some phone 
calls. Now, Specialist Harman’s female friend, companion, back in the states, who 
shared—they shared an apartment together, the 7th of November was her birthday 
and so Specialist Harman wanted to call her and tell her Happy Birthday. And so 
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she went over and procured a calling card so she could call Kelly Bryant, we’re 
going to call her as a defense witness in this proceeding, and so the evidence is 
going to corroborate that she bought a card that night and that, in fact, she made 
phone calls to Kelly Bryant and that she and Specialist Ambuhl had left together 
and used the internet on a government computer in one of the locations over to 
perform these transactions. So Specialist Ambuhl is going to testify that, in fact, 
she did go away with Specialist Harman and there’s going to be evidence to show 
that Specialist Harman wasn’t there at Tier 1A the entire duty shift. In fact, they 
shouldn’t have even been the runner that night so it wasn’t even as though she was 
supposed to be there during that entire shift. So in any event, understand that the 
pictures that are in dispute that show the masturbating, the government is alleging 
she wasn’t even there. In fact, I think Frederick who was the one who initiated the 
masturbating incident. In any event he’s going to say—I think he’s going to testify 
that she wasn’t there to his recollection for that event. So we’re contesting that 
 … 
whether or not it is maltreatment. The government is going to present it as this 
was some kind of maltreatment torture where they were using him and making 
him think that, no kidding, you really could be electrocuted. The defense is going 
to present evidence that Sabrina Harman, whether or not she put the wires on his 
joke and that this was just part of a bigger relationship that they had with Gilligan. 
They still had duties to do as soldiers and guards, yeah, they had to engage in 
sleep deprivation and this guy was still somebody who needed to be interrogated, 
but even in that strange context of what—the events that occurred at Abu Ghraib 
there were actually relationships that developed with these inmates. In fact, what 
enduring names, like Gilligan, Taxicab, some of them not so enduring, primary 
example “shit boy,” you may hear about that one, why he got that one, but some 
of these people weren’t just numbers and they all weren’t, you know, suspected 
terrorists, but there were relationships beyond what is shown in the pictures that 
the government has put before you. 
defense—and through cross-examination of some of the government witnesses we 
may show through that or through our own witnesses, that it was permissible to 
write on detainees, okay. Sometimes different pieces of information were written 
Harman misspelled the word rapist and wrote that on this detainee’s thigh. There’s 
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is whether or not he suffered any harm, whether or not he was degraded in anyway. 
I don’t think the government is going to be able to present any evidence that he 
could read English or he knew what was written on him. He may have known that 
something was written on him, but it comes down to was this maltreatment. 
 … 
Now, I have been derelict in my duty in one respect, and that is, I meant to 
introduce my co-counsel, Captain Patsy Takemura, she’s a Reservist, she was 
assigned to represent Sabrina Harman in Iraq and she has continued to represent 
her after coming to Fort Hood. She’s s a—in real life she’s a public defender in the 
in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and I served as a JAG in the Air Force so please 
forgive me for not at least introducing ourselves earlier. 
Once both sides have concluded and put on all their evidence, once you receive 
the instructions, you’re going to hear arguments. I hope that at least at this point, 
now that you’ve heard my opening statement, that it comes as no surprise that 
when I stand before you again, like this, based on the evidence, based on the law, 
I’m going to argue that the government has failed to carry their burden of proof 
Thank You.
Civilian Defense Attorney Frank Spinner
(12 May 2005, SHCM)
Chapter 1 
It was not Lucifer Achieved: Zimbardo, 
Women, and Abu Ghraib
unique problems that existed in that kind of environment. 
Civilian Defense Counsel Spinner, SHCM
Zimbardo is like the minimal starting point. I think what was at Abu Ghraib was 
much worse … there was much more going on with the social disorganization at 
Abu Ghraib. 
Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic, expert witness Harman Courts-Martial (May 2005, SHCM)
Within the social sciences, one of the important questions centers on the construction 
of knowledge: How does the social scientist view the world and make sense of it? 
to shape the very world it attempts to explain? Feminists argue that any knowledge 
creation that does not take into consideration an analysis of gender is lacking 
in that it does not adequately interrogate power differentials and assumptions 
about sex, gender and sexuality within culture. In addition, it is sometimes the 
objectivity and truth—and fundamentally “othering” women in the process. The 
of how patriarchal cultural attitudes shape science, where ideas about the world 
questions asked, as well as other aspects. These very practices come to also 
shape culture in that theoretical gender constructions arise, where the masculine 
gender as a central concern for critical analysis was a common shortcoming in 
many of the knowledge constructions and interpretations surrounding Abu Ghraib. 
The iconic photographs of abuse in 2003 at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are 
explained by social scientist Philip Zimbardo (2007a, 2007b) through a narrative 
and analysis of group conformity, and in terms of his 1971 Stanford Prison Study. 
Along these same lines it would seem that an additional explanation might be 
experiments such as Zimbardo’s and Milgram’s for explaining the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib, because to some extent they do provide an interpretation. However, these 
social psychological experiments do not address entirely the fact that there was 
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indeed a Durkheimian anomic absence of authority (see Caldwell and Mestrovic 
2010, Mestrovic and Caldwell 2010, Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008a, Caldwell and 
Mestrovic 2008b) and the lack of David Riesman’s ([1961]2000) inner-directed 
“moral compass”—both of which were non-existent at Abu Ghraib as shown 
by the numerous testimonies at the courts-martial of both Lynndie England and 
Sabrina Harman, as well as the U.S. Government’s own reports (see Mestrovic 
2007, Danner 2004, Strasser 2004) regarding the lack of leadership with regard to 
prisoner treatment, and the lack of responsibility of those higher-up with regard 
to the abuse itself. These issues need to be addressed in order to fully account for 
the chaos of Abu Ghraib. And so, I argue that because of testimony supplied at the 
England and Harman courts-martial, analysis of the government’s reports, as well 
as other evidence, that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was not simply the result of a few 
I further argue, however, that abuse took place because of the gendered 
masculine and heterosexist nature of the American military (for the Army, 
like the scientist, is part and parcel of larger culture) and Zimbardo does not 
address any of these alternate explanations in his assessment of Abu Ghraib. 
For example, in The Lucifer Effect, Zimbardo (2007a) does not even mention 
the existence of female prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Instead, he writes as an 
extension of his famous experiment with reference to “good boys” gone bad at 
lawyers, commanders, girlfriends, and other female roles. I do not believe that 
Zimbardo’s account, given its gender biases and omissions, can be considered a 
full explanation, and especially since it excludes 50 percent of the human race. 
in” the perspective of women by adding women’s experiences and women as 
subjects associated with Abu Ghraib as a counter to Zimbardo’s exclusively 
male-centered analyses, from the Stanford Prison Experiment to Abu Ghraib.1 
By using a gender-sensitive analysis, which accounts for both gender and 
sexuality, one can come to a thicker understanding of the infamous events of this 
now iconic occurrence at Abu Ghraib. Thus, I argue that Zimbardo’s Stanford 
Prison Study neither fully illuminates nor makes a substantial contribution in 
understanding the events and the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, which was a real 
place with actual suffering that involved males and females as well as gender 
and power permutations. Instead, Zimbardo’s explanation seems to lack critical 
1 I do not mean to suggest that there exists a single or only several women’s 
perspective(s), but that for a thorough analysis, all individuals that are a part of a system 
should be represented. 
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analysis and does not really consider complex gender relations and power as a 
central point of departure.2
Zimbardo’s Prison Study 
Consider Zimbardo’s experiment, which provides an explanation of group 
conformity to social roles, which within a social context, Zimbardo argues can 
1972, 2007a, 2007b, Musen and Zimbardo 1991). Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison 
Study (1971) simulated a mock jail situation where exclusively male students 
were randomly assigned the role of guard or prisoner. This experiment was aimed 
at understanding the behavior and psychological consequences of occupying 
and maintaining the role of a prison guard or prisoner within an institutional 
environment. A realistic looking prison block was constructed in the basement 
of Stanford University (mimicking the highly-controlled environment of the 
National Guards at Attica Prison), and 70 young men were screened physically 
and psychologically for the experiment. The 24 healthiest men—or as Zimbardo 
calls them, “boys”—were selected to participate in the study, and they were given 
their roles as either guard or prisoner. (It is important to note that these students 
were psychologically screened so as to rule out any deviant personalities, so as to 
“prove” the environment itself was pathological enough to distort the behavior of 
psychologically healthy individuals.) The Palo Alto city police actually participated 
in the experiment and arrested publicly those previously designated to be prisoners 
then transported to the Stanford University basement’s mock jail. 
The guards and prisoners spent the next two weeks in the prison with each 
other. Zimbardo, the superintendent of the prison, had instructed the guards not to 
physically harm the prisoners, but to create situations of boredom, frustration, fear, 
and arbitrariness so that the prisoners understood that the guards now controlled 
their lives. In this way, Zimbardo played the “role” of warden in his own experiment. 
It was the guards’ responsibility to maintain constant surveillance of the prisoners, 
who in turn had no degree of privacy whatsoever, and understood through these 
actions their absolute helplessness. Additionally, the guards were instructed to 
create an atmosphere of powerlessness for the prisoners, where their identities 
Once the prisoners arrived at the mock jail, they were stripped naked, given rubber 
shower shoes, and chained around one leg as a constant reminder of their role 
2 I want to make clear that Zimbardo was aware that gender was a component of 
his study—he did put “prisoners” in “dresses” and intended them to feel as subjugated 
women. However, there was no real critical analysis either in his study, his analysis or of 
Abu Ghraib, or of the military in terms of deep level gender theorizing or a gender-sensitive 
analysis.
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status. Symbols were used at the prison to show status, with the guards receiving 
a whistle, billy club, uniform, and mirror sunglasses (to allow the guards to mask 
their “own” identity for that of “guard”)—all symbolic of their powerful role over 
the prisoners and their elite status. The prisoners received identical plain potato-
to the guards, and identical inferior status as prisoners.3 Hence, identities were all 
socially constructed and in terms of power. 
Incidentally, here is an instance of the “logic of emasculation,” which Zimbardo 
does not weave directly into his theory of obedience to authority—that of femininity 
used as a means of subordination. By dressing men in women’s clothing, this 
questions the association between maleness and masculinity. Although feminists 
and queer theorists question the association of sex and gender as neither natural 
nor normal, which I agree with, the cultural norm that functioned in Zimbardo’s 
1971 context (and still now to some extent within “normative” gender categories of 
dominant culture) saw these categories as intertwined. Hence, the actual treatment 
of sexed men as “women,” or the feminization of male bodies as punishment or 
subordination, functioned to psychologically break down the “prisoners.” What is 
more, these male “prisoners” are punished by being treated as women, or labeled 
as such, where prisoner is akin to female, an already subjugated group within 
patriarchal society itself. The punishment here is thus forced feminization. Although 
alternative identities are socially constructed with regard to power for both prisoners 
and guards, other reasons for these identities are to minimize actual individualities as 
well as to force the adherence to the arbitrary, coercive rules of the prison institution; 
nonetheless, the analysis of gender as a descriptor is key in drawing out some 
important ways to think about this oppression. In this way, the mask of the mirror 
other markers—all understood and mediated through the context of gendered power 
relations—provides alternate identities for both prisoners and guards, and makes the 
prison environment a complex and diffuse social network of power. 
Both guards and prisoners, soon after arriving at the “Stanford Prison,” became 
resentful and hostile towards one another. When tactics of force were shown not to 
work effectively, as sometimes prisoners laughed at guards’ commands, thereby not 
taking the situation seriously, the guards began to additionally use psychological 
tactics to control the prisoners. Things that ultimately led to the guard’s increased 
power over the prisoners are as follows: guards humiliated prisoners sadistically by 
assigning them duties such as cleaning out toilets with their bare hands, forcing them 
3 On Zimbardo’s website www.prisonexp.org, he states that prisoners were treated 
“more like a woman than a man,” which is the only statement that examines the activities 
at the Stanford Prison in terms of gender and power. However, I believe he intended to use 
the terms of gender “feminine and masculine.” This is further proof of the unquestioned 
two.
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to do pushups and repeat commands, and sing songs such as repeating “prisoner 
819 did a bad thing” so as to redirect prisoner hostility away from the guards. 
Additionally, guards interrupted sleep to do roll calls (argued to provide regular 
interaction with prisoners as a means to show control), called the prisoners names 
thereby berating them, took away their blankets, clothing (nakedness), and beds, used 
sexual humiliation, and forced them at night to urinate and defecate in buckets in their 
cells. In some cases, the guards attempted to give some prisoners privileges such as 
beds, clothing, and better meals as a means to gain prisoner compliance through 
reward. Additionally, the guards used a storage closet as a place to put prisoners in 
maintaining the guard’s control. As a means for preserving the environment of the 
prison, compliance of prisoners, and the authority of the guards, Zimbardo instructed 
guards to put paper bags over the prisoner’s heads when they went to the restrooms 
2006). Not surprisingly, the prisoners resisted and insulted the guards in return. 
Within a day there were signs of stress and anxiety, as prisoners were beginning 
to feel extreme panic, frustration and loss of control. (The prisoners who did not 
show anxiety became blindly obedient to the guards.) On the second day, Prisoner 
8612 started to complain of stomach pains and headaches, and when he went to meet 
with Zimbardo (as a prisoner, and not a student), Zimbardo (in the prison supervisor 
“warden” role) told him that he could not leave the experiment and instead offered 
prisoner 8612 a deal for easy treatment if he would become a “snitch” (Musen and 
Zimbardo 1991). Prisoner 8612 returned to the population and told everyone that 
he had met with Zimbardo and that there was no way that anybody could get out of 
the experiment (Musen and Zimbardo 1991). Because of the reported outcome of 
this meeting with Zimbardo, the prison superintendent, the prisoners really began 
to feel like prisoners. Additionally, the guards began to think of the prisoners as 
dangerous. There were minimal signs of physical rebellion in the mock jail, and 
instead there were evidences of psychological stress. After only four days, Zimbardo 
depression, crying, rage, and acute anxiety” (Zimbardo 1972). For example, Prisoner 
8612 began to show signs of confusion and helplessness, and began to exhibit signs 
of a “crazy person,” which turned into uncontrollable rage (Musen and Zimbardo 
Zimbardo cancelled the experiment totally. Zimbardo (1972) says that guards began 
to treat prisoners as “despicable animals” and those guards were taking sadistic 
pleasure in cruelty. Zimbardo also characterized some of the prisoners as becoming 
so servile, yielding, and submissive that they were said to have only been concerned 
with their escape, their own individual survival, and their escalating hatred of the 
guards (Zimbardo 1972). 
It is important to note that Zimbardo “decided” to end the experiment as the 
result of his girlfriend, and then wife-to-be, Christina Maslach’s strong protestations. 
Zimbardo has acknowledged her whistle blowing role throughout his writings, 
and in fact, he dedicates his most recent book, The Lucifer Effect, to her with the 
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words: “dedicated to the serene heroine of my life: Christina Maslach Zimbardo.” 
female voice, the only “different voice,” in the more than 30-year-old patriarchal 
and exclusively male-centered narrative of the Stanford Prison Experiment and its 
perhaps the reason that the experiment itself ended. 
the situation and environment within which the students existed, coupled with their 
terms of situational forces and adherence to roles within these situations. Zimbardo 
thus concluded that prison violence is a behavior that is rooted in the social character 
of jails and prisons themselves, and not in the personalities of those either working 
point, admitting in The Lucifer Effect that he was the superintendent at the mock 
argues that the prestige of both Stanford University and also the prestige of science 
in general all played roles in convincing students to adhere to their roles within the 
experiment. 
Zimbardo applied this narrative to the abuse at Abu Ghraib as a way of 
understanding the events; however, Zimbardo’s account leaves out some important 
factors that are imperative to consider when providing a narrative for the detainee 
how other, competing authorities (in Zimbardo’s experiment, the police department, 
Stanford University, and the American Psychological Association) created chaos in 
abuse; that American troops were located in a war zone and faced daily catastrophes 
of war; that cultural differences were exploited and used against prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib as torture techniques; the anomic absence of authority at Abu Ghraib; the 
lack of any moral guidelines for action; and above all, how Harman and England, 
the women of Tier 1A actually coped and acted differently (as shown in their trials) 
at Abu Ghraib vis-à-vis the abuse and reactions to it. Zimbardo does not consider the 
from outside that context (such as culture itself), inward to the prison and effect the 
social climate, shape the individuals who are part of that environment, and replicate 
cultural power differentials (including authority, but not limited to that) within those 
are enacted and gendered.
Milgram and the Absence of Authority Figures
Another approach for understanding the abuse at Abu Ghraib is in terms of 
Stanley Milgram’s 1962 social psychology experiments at Yale University, where 
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Milgram aimed to understand the effects of group behavior and blind obedience to 
abuse, for which the application of Zimbardo’s experiment failed to account.
Milgram conducted conformity experiments in a controversial study that was 
aimed at understanding how inhumane actions can be understood with no concern 
for consequences, such as with Nazis in World War II. His research question was 
the following—Under what conditions would a person obey authority when it goes 
against one’s conscience? In this experiment, Milgram explained to male recruits 
that they would be taking part in a study of how punishment affects learning. One 
by one he assigned them to the role of either ‘teacher” or “learner,” and placed the 
learner (who was also the accomplice in the study) in a connecting room. Note 
again that the idea of testing how women would behave under similar research 
conditions did not seem to occur to Milgram or any of the noted researchers in the 
obedience to (male) authority paradigm.4
The teacher watched the learner sit down in a contraption representing an 
electric chair, where the researcher applied electrode paste and electrodes to the 
learner’s wrist, explaining that the paste would prevent blisters and burns. As the 
teacher looked on, the researcher then fastened a leather strap to prevent movement 
when given electrical shock. Although the shocks were to be painful, Milgram 
assured the teacher that there would be no permanent damage. The researcher 
then led the teacher into an adjoining room and showed him that the electric 
chair was hooked up to a generator that gives shocks; however, the “teacher” role 
did not know that these would be phony shocks. There was a dial that could be 
turned to adjust the intensity of the shocks, and once seated in front of the shock 
generator, the teacher is supposed to read a pair of words aloud and then repeat 
got it incorrect, he would be shocked, with increasing intensity. The listener was 
supposed to moan when “shocked,” and as the shocks became more intense, the 
learner was instructed to begin to yell and pound on the wall. After a certain level, 
there was silence from the learner following shocks given from the teacher. Now, 
even with this silence, Milgram was trying to research how many teachers would 
go all of the way to the highest shock level under the command of Milgram, the 
asked Milgram how far on the shock meter they had to go, Milgram would reply 
“As far as necessary” (Gibney 2006). 
At Milgram’s urging, the “teachers” kept participating with the experiment, 
even though they believed that they were causing harm. The responsibility for this 
4 I am not arguing that women would all have the same perspective, that women in 
general would respond in similar ways, or that male power is always analogous; however, 
I am arguing that women should have been included in Milgram’s research so as to fully 
represent all human behavior for comparison.
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be understood as taking the blame for the “teacher’s” actions with his prodding 
for these actions. In this way, responsibility was removed from the “teachers” with 
regard to the harm they perceived that they were causing, as Milgram “the authority 
Milgram. Almost two thirds of the subjects (“teachers”) went all of the way to 450 
volts, even with all of the negative responses from the learners, and even after 
the roles that we accept and that behavior itself is dominated by social roles we 
are to play. Milgram’s research into obedience suggests that people are likely to 
harm on others.
Applied to Abu Ghraib, Milgram’s study about compliance with authority 
ups in the military had regarding prisoner abuse. For example, there was some 
confusion about the status of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib—were they prisoners 
of war or enemy combatants? The President of the United States was not clear in 
the characterization of the status of these detainees in Iraq and there was much 
discussion about their relative standing. This unclear characterization of prisoner 
status by the Commander in Chief of the United States (and various attorneys for 
the White House), and within the military itself, led to uncertainty with regard to 
prisoner rights. Thus, it was not initially clear if the Geneva Conventions applied 
to prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and hence there was some confusion about proper 
between prisoner rights in Afghanistan, where the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply, versus prisoner rights in Iraq, where they were applicable. 
Moreover, the new situation at Abu Ghraib that is different from Milgram’s male-
centered studies is that Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was a female commander 
of all the prisons in Abu Ghraib. But as she explains in her book,  
(2005), her male superiors dealt with this unwelcome fact by simply bypassing her 
completely when it came to all decisions regarding Abu Ghraib. As she points out, 
she was kept “out of the loop,” and she makes it clear that she believes that this 
is because she is a woman (Karpinski 2005). On the other hand, she was the only 
commander, male or female, who was demoted as punishment for what occurred at 
Abu Ghraib. This complex reality of Abu Ghraib in terms of command structure, 
any other work in the obedience to authority paradigm.
Additionally, as was shown in the courts-martial of England and Harman, 
abuse of prisoners was again and again reported to those higher up in the chain 
of command (see Chapter 3). However, initially nothing was done about these 
reports of abuse, and only after the photographs of the abuse were leaked to the 
press did this maltreatment become an outright issue. Once abuse was reported 
and nothing was done about it, logically it follows that those who took the reports 
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command, including Donald Rumsfeld, the former Defense Secretary (who the 
responsibility for the torture and abuse of detainees in U.S. Military custody in 
Iraq), have been charged with maltreatment of detainees. Rumsfeld has been quoted 
in the media as stating that he “felt bad about what happened to the detainees [at 
Abu Ghraib],” but he has personally approved interrogation techniques such as 
stress positions, nudity, and the use of dogs, which violate long standing military 
rules (Gibney 2006). In fact, with regard to using questionable tactics for detainee 
interrogation, Vice President Dick Cheney was also quoted as saying that it might 
be time to “take the gloves off and go to the dark side” (Gibney 2006).
Additionally, training in interrogation techniques migrated from Guantanamo 
Bay, Afghanistan, and to Iraq, where Major General Geoffrey Miller provided 
questionable treatment of prisoners. Case and point, interrogation tactics were 
Moreover, at the England and Harman courts-martial, testimony was provided 
regarding orders given to the prison guards at Abu Ghraib specifying tactics for 
The MPs were told to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, which was outside 
of the duties of the MPs, who were to function as guards. Former Sergeant Ken 
Davis stated at the England courts-martial, regarding the events of October 25, 
where prisoners were handcuffed together nude and after suspicion of rape, that 
he reported this questionable treatment of MPs abusing detainees to his platoon 
leader, and that he was told that the MIs were in charge and to let them do their 
job. Said Davis to his platoon leader after seeing naked prisoners handcuffed in 
sexual positions, “The MI’s are doing weird things with naked detainees.” Davis 
me and he says have we crossed the line? And I had no idea what was going on 
and I said I don’t know, you’re MI, aren’t you? And he said, well you’re the MP. 
And I said well I would have to say yes. He said well we’re military intelligence, 
we know what we’re doing, and he kind of turned around and walked away” (May 
16, 2005, SHCM). 
Additionally, in a 2006 Documentary shown on Sundance about Abu Ghraib 
(Gibney 2006), Ken Davis describes a conversation that he and Charles Graner 
had one evening after Graner’s shift, where Davis asked Graner if he was getting 
sick since he was losing his voice. Graner said “no, he wasn’t getting sick,” but 
explained that MIs were pushing MPs to “soften up” detainees, and that he, as 
an MP, had been yelling all night. As bombs were going off outside of the prison, 
MIs were yelling at MPs and telling them, says Davis, “there goes another 
American losing their life and unless you help [soften up detainees] then their 
blood is on your hands too” (Gibney 2006). MIs were using the psychological 
tactics of guilt coupled with obligation as a means to get the MPs to “soften up” 
the prisoners, where the prisoners were now getting the full brunt of the MP’s 
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force, as they were being emotionally equated with the “terrorists” bombing 
the prison outside of the walls of Abu Ghraib. What is important to remember 
here is that most of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were common criminals, if 
criminal at all, and that these prisoners were suffering violence at the hands of 
American troops because of the psychological techniques that MI was using on 
MPs paranoid and delusional, where events outside of the prison were being 
equated in terms of responsibility (transferring blame) onto the incarcerated 
detainee’s. In this way, MI was applying psychological techniques on the 
because of MI urgings. These urgings, coupled with the high priority placed on 
“actionable intelligence,” argues Danner in his book Torture and Truth (2004), 
led to the valuing of intelligence as more important than the lawful respecting 
of the Geneva Conventions or the various prohibitions on torture signed onto 
by Congress. Explicitly, in some cases, military personnel were told “do what 
you have to do to get confessions” (Gibney 2006). In fact, Private Frederick 
hooded detainee on the MRE box, after stating that he wanted him as stressed 
out as possible that night, as he would be interrogated the following day—“I 
don’t give a fuck what you do, just don’t kill him, I need him to talk tomorrow” 
study in that Abu Ghraib was not a controlled-for environment, there was not 
with regard to responsibility for the actions being urged forward.
Again, missing even in these discussion of the role of MI at Abu Ghraib 
are the glaring facts that the general in charge of all military intelligence in 
Iraq was female, Major General Barbara Fast. Interestingly, the point person for 
implementing General Miller’s Guantanamo techniques in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq was female, Captain Carolyn Wood. Fast and Wood are, for all practical 
purposes, invisible in discussions of this sort. Next to nothing is known about 
the following: their roles, whether they protested against the techniques, how 
they got along with their male counter-parts in the chain of command, and in 
general—their “voice” or “subjecthoods.”
Nonetheless, Milgram’s study does apply to the situation between England and 
Graner to some extent. One of the expert witnesses for the defense stated under oath 
that Graner could have been running a “class on obedience,” where Graner was the 
scientist authority and England was the individual showing blind obedience to this 
authority, or “teacher” using Milgram’s study as a parallel. In Xavier Amador’s and 
Thomas Denne’s expert opinion at England’s courts-martial, England was compliant 
with Graner’s wishes and orders, and showed loyalty and duty to Graner since 
they were in a relationship as lovers at Abu Ghraib prison. Additionally, Amador 
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characterized Graner as acting as England’s “father” when describing the level of 
England’s compliance, evidencing a clear power/role differential.5 
Consider for a moment Graner’s testimony about the now infamous picture 
of England holding a leashed detainee. Graner stated under oath that he pulled 
sling tether. Earlier that day, “Gus” had been violent towards the guards and so 
Graner thought he was using precautionary measures by not entering the cell and 
using an extraction technique. Sergeant Hydrue Joyner’s testimony later that day 
as his personality made a lasting impression on him because he refused to wear 
clothing. Graner stated that both England and Meghan Ambuhl were present 
during this extraction in case the prisoner became violent, as cell extractions 
were repeatedly described in the courts-martial as dangerous situations where 
soldiers enter the prisoner’s environment. Graner intended to yank the prisoner 
out of the cell by his shoulders, but the leash slipped and went up around his 
neck instead. Graner stated that the prisoner then got up on all fours and crawled 
out of the cell, at which time Graner handed the tether to England. Graner took 
three photographs of this detainee with England holding the tether, and stated 
that England was compliant with all of his orders—Stated Graner, “England 
trusts me, yes. She did not think I was going to maltreat the detainee.” Implied in 
this statement is the idea that England held Graner in high esteem such that she 
(England) believed that his behavior could not be aimed at anything unethical 
or wrong—she trusted him as her lover. Actually, I doubt that England even 
because of consideration of Xavier Amador’s expert witness analysis of her 
where she is smiling and pointing to an Iraqi’s genitals, Graner stated under oath 
that he had ordered England to get into the photograph. No doubt, England was 
compliant with this order, again demonstrating the kind of blind faith that she 
put in Grainer. Applying Milgram, in this example his notion of obedience to 
through testimony as being compliant towards Graner’s requests. 
However, considering the previous examples—the questionable status of the 
prisoners, the fact that abuse was reported and ignored, and also that tactics for 
instructing some of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and as separate from Zimbardo’s 
claims of environmental conditions as the reason for action—there is indeed 
another narrative that should be considered as a reason for the abuse itself. 
5 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Mestrovic did not agree with 
the tactic taken by the two expert witnesses in psychology, because, as a sociologist, he 
said that such an exclusively psychological explanation unfairly shifted all the blame onto 
Graner, and not the social climate that transformed Graner’s behavior. 
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by only focusing on the power of situations and roles, and thus Zimbardo’s 
situations. What is also interesting is that in his own study, the Stanford Prison 
as he both controlled the experiment and was also an active participant in the 
experiment as prison supervisor. Again, not only did Zimbardo serve as the 
social scientist and creator of this experiment, he was also a participant in this 
experiment with his role of prison supervisor. 
Nevertheless, I do not argue that in these examples, total responsibility can be 
Ghraib, there was no written or agreed upon method or tactic for detainee care 
or interrogation that was consistently taught or put forth as procedure. Instead, 
prisoner care and detainee interrogation was described in testimony as “ad hoc” 
in nature. SGT Robert Jones even stated in his testimony that Graner, who was 
described by Jones as having a “strong personality,” had a following of sorts, 
actions of others with his “ad hoc” approach to detainee care and handling. Says 
the Commander of the 372nd Military Police at Abu Ghraib, Captain Donald J. 
Reese, in his testimony about Internment Resettlement (IR) or how the 372nd 
had not even been trained for what they had been assigned to do at Abu Ghraib 
(they were a combat support and security combat escort company) and his 
perception of prisoner care and detainee interrogations: “In October 2003 there 
was no guidance put in writing for the prison standards. We were not trained 
in IR. This was a totally new mission for all of us. At that time no one stopped 
to review the Geneva Convention” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). At Abu Ghraib 
action for continued “duty,” and there was no controlled for environment such 
as Milgram’s laboratory. Nonetheless, Milgram’s study thus gives some insight 
experiment does not. 
Yet the role of Lynndie England highlights again the fact that gender played 
Graner, and even feared that he would shoot and kill them (see Chapter 3); but, 
“authority” out of “love.” Moreover, as the defense attorneys tried to argue, 
she was involved in this “abusive love relationship” because she was stressed, 
scared, and disoriented, so that Graner became her “moral compass.” Graner 
made it very clear in his testimony that he did not love or even care for England 
or their baby, and especially as he walked off of the stand, past England and their 
child, without so much as eye contact. A straightforward application of Milgram 
and Zimbardo is not complete without taking into account these aspects of cross-
gender relationships in authority and obedience.
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Beyond Authority Figures: Back to Zimbardo and Abu Ghraib
While it is true that there are some similarities evidenced between Zimbardo’s 
study and the events at Abu Ghraib, there was much dissimilarity given the 
realities of Abu Ghraib.
First, Abu Ghraib was located in a war zone where American troops were 
killed regularly, and mortar and rocket-propelled grenade attacks on the prison 
itself were made nightly. Additionally, at Abu Ghraib there was a lack of food, 
water, medical provisions, and even electricity, such that there were sometimes 
no electricity from the generators, and at night outside lighting from vehicles 
that Abu Ghraib prison stunk, was nasty, and was possibly “the nastiest place on 
earth.” Both DiNenna and Joyner asked out loud during their testimonies why the 
U.S. Army picked a prison that was in the middle of an active war zone (itself 
a violation of the Geneva Conventions) for handling supposedly high-security 
threats. Conversely, Zimbardo’s study was located in the basement of Stanford 
University, and neither the prisoners nor the guards faced the daily atrocities of 
war that American troops experienced. In this way, although not emotionally 
safe, the prisoners in Zimbardo’s study were physically safe from bodily harm, 
had supplies such as food, water, and electricity, had security, and had constant 
support from both the school and creators of the study. Additionally, Zimbardo’s 
participants were released upon showing signs of emotional distress, while at Abu 
Ghraib emotional distress and chaos was evidenced in many ways as a normal part 
of life. Additionally, American soldiers were not given any way out of the chaos 
of Abu Ghraib as this was not a study with a set duration. Under oath and in his 
testimony, Graner called the prison “bizarro-world” in an attempt to characterize 
the chaotic environment at Abu Ghraib, where screaming from prisoners in painful 
stress positions was heard every night, he claimed, at Tier 1-A. 
Another difference between Zimbardo’s experiment and the events at Abu 
Ghraib is that cultural differences did not exist in Zimbardo’s experiment. Unlike at 
Abu Ghraib, where prisoners were Iraqi, and where interrogation techniques were 
used that exploited Iraqi cultural fears. In Zimbardo’s study, all of the participants 
were American males who were students at Stanford. This means that at Stanford, 
there was not the ability for guards to use different cultural values as a means and 
method of torture, as all of the Stanford participants basically had similar cultural 
and contextual experiences. (Only shared cultural gender codes could be used for 
torture at Zimbardo’s mock prison.)
I argue that yet another dissimilarity between Zimbardo’s Prison Study and 
the events at Abu Ghraib is that women were present at Abu Ghraib, and only 
men participated in Zimbardo’s study. This is foundationally important when 
analyzing misogyny and sexism at Abu Ghraib. In the courts-martial of England 
and Harman, it came out in testimony that American soldiers imprisoned women 
and children at Abu Ghraib. Through interviews with soldiers who were witnesses 
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at the trial, I learned that the women and children were “swept up” along with 
the men in disorganized arrest raids, and in some cases were kept as “hostages” 
to make the men talk during interrogations. What is of great interest is that the 
U.S. Government conceded in open trial that it kept women and children at Abu 
Ghraib, without charging them with any crime, but never stated the reason for 
their detention. (The government reports also fail to investigate the reasons for 
detaining women and children.) Captain Donald J. Reese, the 372nd Military 
stating, “We knew it was in violation of the Geneva Convention … We did the best 
we could to segregate the males, females and children. It was physically impossible 
to keep all the detainees separated” (June 24, 2002, SHA32). Nonetheless, if the 
“backstage” reason stated by the soldiers is that, indeed, the women and children 
were held as hostages, then it seems that the U.S. Army engaged in a practice it 
condemns in its enemies, namely hostage-taking. But the soldiers stated they were 
not asked the reasons for this curious fact while they were testifying on the stand, 
and thus one of the hidden realities of Abu Ghraib was exposed.
Cultural Code of Masculinity
Against all of these critiques, there are indeed some similarities evidenced between 
Zimbardo’s study and the events at Abu Ghraib. For example, both situations 
evidenced emblematic use of symbols for power such as uniforms, naked 
prisoners, and billy clubs. Similarly, both Zimbardo’s prison and Abu Ghraib show 
similar behavior in prisoner care with the use of stress positions/situations where 
prisoners were hooded and chained/zip-tied, stripped naked, and the frequent 
restraint of bodies in an attempt to display power. Additionally, looking at abuse 
in Zimbardo’s study and also at Abu Ghraib, the nature of abuse at both locations 
turned sexual. Both situations evidenced similar sexualized and homoerotic torture 
techniques—a mock (homosexual) wedding at Stanford, and forced masturbation 
and naked pyramids at Abu Ghraib. I argue that this can be understood in terms 
of the connections between sex and gender, power, and sexuality, and that what 
is missing in Zimbardo’s account of the abuse during his prison study, and his 
Consider how gender is socially constructed with regard to power, where in 
larger cultural narratives about gender, masculinity is equated with heterosexuality, 
and value is given to this association. In this way, the connections between sex, 
gender, and sexuality function as a culturally practiced ideology. One of the 
characterizations of the American military is that it has been socially constructed 
as a masculinist and heterosexist environment. Cynthia Enloe (2000) even goes 
so far as to describe the military, and the process of militarization, as part and 
parcel of patriarchy or privileged masculinity. This means that value is given to 
the characterization of things that are “masculine,” where cultural stereotypes of 
maleness and masculinity are equated and rewarded commensurately. Consider 
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the advertisements for the Marine Corps, where what is needed are a “Few Good 
Men,” or the Army’s advertisement where what is sought is “An Army of One’s 
Own,” and always a male soldier’s face is shown in the advertisement. Perhaps 
grant from the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, since Zimbardo’s 1971 study, the U.S. 
military has gone co-educational, and it seems that Zimbardo has not developed 
his analysis associated with his study with these gendered changes. 
Additionally, I argue that heterosexuality is the organizing sexuality or “logic” in 
the American military, where gays and lesbians are not legally allowed to “openly,” 
and thus with open and valued knowledge of their gayness, serve their country. 
This is obviously because of the laws regarding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”; however, 
these cultural attitudes do exist in larger culture where gays and lesbians have 
parts of larger society. These characterizations of the military, that of masculinity 
and heterosexuality, culminates in what I term a “code of cultural masculinity,” 
where what it means to be male and masculine is understood as heterosexual in 
nature. This issue became salient when Sabrina Harman was “outed” as a lesbian, 
along with her wife/partner Kelly, during her court-martial. Soldiers told us that 
the Army was “killing two birds with one stone” by prosecuting Harman—using 
her as a scapegoat to support its “few rotten apples” theory, and expelling her from 
the military because of her sexual orientation.
American cultural values underwrite this fear of homosexuality, where 
homosexual men and women, or those who identify as queer, have frequently 
been targeted with violence in American culture and have thus faced massive 
amounts of discrimination physically and legally. New legislation forbids the 
use of sexual orientation as a means for violence or the threat of violence with 
hate-crime legislation, where hate crimes are punished more severely than 
exactly similar crimes that are not driven by stated discriminatory practices. I 
argue that homoerotic torture can be described in kind as a hate-crime of sorts, 
between maleness, masculinity, and straightness. Additionally, these qualities 
have historically been powerful perspectives (ideological canopies even) 
in American society, and thus function as an organizing principle of our 
society’s heterosexist patriarchal structure based on power. Interestingly, these 
theoretical conceptualization. 
The “code of cultural masculinity,” where both masculinity and heterosexuality 
function together as the power symbolic of the military, was evidenced in many 
ways at the Stanford Prison and also at Abu Ghraib prison. At Abu Ghraib and 
during the Stanford experiment, both situations evidenced homosexual torture 
techniques to exploit culturally constructed attitudes about masculinity and fears 
of homosexuality. Zimbardo’s paradigm for analysis does not show the importance 
of sex, gender, and sexuality as themselves torture techniques, which were used 
against both Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Zimbardo’s student-prisoners. At 
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both Abu Ghraib and also at Stanford, prisoners were made to endure humiliation 
and torture that can be understood as primarily homoerotic in nature. For example, 
naked Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib were chained into painful stress positions and 
forced to wear women’s panties on their heads.
Regarding Zimbardo’s experiment, male prisoners were dressed in very plain 
women’s dresses that went down to their knees, and were given no undergarments. 
actually gendered in design and revealing as a form of humiliation. The “phallus” is 
actually feminized given the vulnerability of the genitals themselves, where phallic 
“sexy” or “erotic” in the typical fashion of the adult entertainer, they did function 
in a pornographic way, as genitals were exposed and nakedness was evident in 
6 In this way, 
masculinity was taken away through the characterization of prisoners as women, 
and since they were actually wearing what Zimbardo himself called a “dress” 
(Musen and Zimbardo 1991). This is an attempt to make the male prisoners feel 
exposed and powerless, as this image of the prisoner goes against the masculine 
power symbolic, and literally “strips” protective clothing away from men, thereby 
making them vulnerable and thus characterized as culturally feminine.
Additional humiliation of prisoners can be understood in Zimbardo’s 
experiment, and as similar to Abu Ghraib, through the sexually humiliating 
2006). This is an example of guards toying with prisoners to establish control 
through the use of raw sex. Additionally, at the Stanford prison, there was a mock 
wedding between the bride of Frankenstein (played by one male prisoner) and 
Frankenstein (played by another), where these prisoners were forced to say, “I 
love you, Frankenstein” to his male-pseudo wife. One prisoner is depicted in 
this arrangement with his arms around the other prisoner’s neck, and both bodies 
are forcibly pressed together by the guard instructing the action. This example 
uses drag roles and forced femininity as a means of humiliation, and questions 
heterosexuality and masculinity with the stated “I love you, [Prisoner] 2093” and 
the wedding theme itself (Gibney 2006). In this way, sex and sexuality are both 
exploited as torture techniques.
What is telling about how Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study came to an end is 
that it had to do with Zimbardo’s then girlfriend, and now wife, Christina Maslach 
Zimbardo. Zimbardo took Maslach to the basement of the Stanford psychology 
building to show her the experiment and her reaction was that of disgust and 
disbelief. Her response to Zimbardo was that the study had changed him somehow 
and she stated that “I’m not sure I want anything to do with you if you continue this 
study” (Gibney 2006). It was that day that Zimbardo ended the study. What is so 
telling about this ending is that it was affected by Zimbardo’s girlfriend, a woman, 
who clearly demonstrated a position of power in that her reaction gave Zimbardo 
6 I do not mean to suggest that Zimbardo’s images were somehow sexually appealing.
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the impetus to see the study for its unethical nature. Had Zimbardo analyzed his 
study in terms of gender, surely this dynamic would have been exposed, as would 
have other connections of gender, sex, and sexuality.
In a way, Maslach functioned as the highest member of the Stanford Prison 
Study’s “chain of command” in that her input ended the experiment, when 
even Zimbardo, after hearing complaints from his student-prisoners, did not 
immediately end it. Mestrovic (2007) points out this fact when analyzing why 
the students continued to play the roles of sadists and victims, even though they 
were psychologically healthy. Mestrovic (2007) argues that Zimbardo’s role 
as scientist/prison superintendent, the prestige of Stanford University, and the 
prestige of science in general, coupled with the students’ belief that Stanford 
would not permit real abuse to occur, that the institution of science would not put 
a student in harms way, and that Zimbardo himself would not allow the abuse 
to become excessive, “precluded serious questioning of the abuse that occurred 
during the Stanford Prison Experiment” (Mestrovic 2007: 43). Mestrovic asks a 
question concerning the culpability and responsibility of the low level soldiers, 
the “rotten apples” at Abu Ghraib—Could they have quit? Could they have 
walked out? According to Mestrovic, and applied to Zimbardo’s experiment, the 
student guards were “restrained” from reporting or stopping the abuse, or even 
quitting their roles in the experiment “by layers of competing social and cultural 
rationalizations that offset the reality of abuse” (Mestrovic 2007: 43). Applied 
to Abu Ghraib, Harman did not “walk out the door” when she witnessed abuse 
because the unhealthy norms that operated in the poisoned environment of the 
prison, which kept her a part of the “abusive relationship” that existed at Abu 
Ghraib. Says Mestrovic (2007),
The soldier who witnessed or even participated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib 
looked up to and idealized the prestige of the U.S. Army and of the international 
community whose support was assumed in the war against Saddam Hussein’s 
pariah regime. One assumes that the soldiers at Abu Ghraib felt that their 
mission was honorable. The soldier would probably have assumed that the U.S. 
Army would not put him or her in a position in which he or she would be harmed 
unnecessarily, cause unlawful harm to others, or engage in actions that would 
bring forth disgrace to the military unit or the U.S Army
Thankfully, Zimbardo’s girlfriend watched the abuse during his experiment and 
this incident resulted in ethical correction; however, at Abu Ghraib, this kind of 
female voyeurism was used as a torture technique itself, as soldiers told me that 
female U.S. soldiers were ordered to be present during abuse, as well as by male 
naked showering prisoners precisely in order to add to their humiliation. Further, 
“The most unhealthy norms in the poisoned environment at Abu Ghraib dictated 
that Harman ‘went along’ with the abuse” (Mestrovic 2007: 42). That said, 
neither Zimbardo’s students nor the soldiers at Abu Ghraib could have escaped 
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the environment within which they existed because both locations had poisoned 
social climates. 
Conclusion
Through a consideration of the testimony that was given at England’s and 
Harman’s courts-martials, what is missing in Zimbardo’s paradigm for explaining 
the abuse at Abu Ghraib is an analysis of the connections with regard to power, 
gender and sexuality. This kind of analysis explains the homoerotic nature of the 
abuse and the evidenced sexualized and feminized torture techniques. 
As I have argued, it seems initially that experiments such as Zimbardo’s 
and Milgram’s can explain the abuse at Abu Ghraib; however, I maintain that 
these paradigms either do not apply, or only show partly why the abuse took 
place. Through the use of additional perspectives such as an analysis of the 
gendered masculine and heterosexist nature of American culture and military, 
additional narratives about prisoner abuse are formed. Because the issues above 
are not considered by Zimbardo’s paradigm, and because his analysis is built 
exclusively on a male-centered obedience to authority paradigm, I conclude 
that Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study does neither fully elucidate nor make 
Testimony of Captain Donald J. Reese, U.S. 
Army, Sabrina Harman Courts-Martial
Captain Donald J. Reese, U.S. Army Company Commander for the 372nd, was 
Direct Examination by Trial Counsel
Q: Let’s go to approximately 2002, is that when you became the Company 
Commander for the 372nd?
A: Yes, I took the command in December of 2002. 
mission was, where was the unit located, that type of thing?
A: They were—they’re typically a combat support company, they were located 
in Crescent Town, Maryland. 
Q: How large was it?
A: If we’re at 100 percent strength we’re at typically 180 soldiers. 
 … 
A: Basically there’s two different types of MP units. You have a combat support 
and you have an IR, Internment Resettlement Unit. This particular unit, the 
372nd, is a combat support unit and that’s how their MEDL is set up and that’s 
how they—we trained at Fort Lee, you know, in accordance to our MEDL. So 
we did very little IR training, you know, to be honest. 
Q: Well in terms of combat support what kind of duties would that----
A: ----we were security combat escorts, MSR security. 
Q: MSR, meaning?
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A: Supply Routes—convoy security, that type of thing is where we focused. 
 … 
Q: Now, with respect to Al Hillah, did you have an opportunity to observe 
Specialist Harman during that period of time that you were assigned there?
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: And how would you characterize her performance during that time period?
A: She did a good job for me there; I had no problems with her. I would classify—
if I had to give her a category I would say she probably is an average soldier. She 
didn’t stand out superior, but she also gave me no other problems, disciplinary 
problems, or any other reason to think otherwise. The kids there is the one thing 
that sticks about me with her and they loved her. I mean, if I would come up to 
the sub-station in my vehicle, you know, maybe she was off that day, they would 
come running to my vehicle thinking that, you know, that might have been her, 
hoping it might have been her probably, and, you know, they—I judge a lot 
of things off how the kids react to people and they loved her and they looked 
forward to seeing her. And I believe her relationship that she built with the kids 
over there, you know, will do the military and, you know, the United States a lot 
of justice in the future because she pulled a great relationship with the kids there. 
 … 
Q: You mentioned the term earlier “Internment Resettlement,” so are their 
units—military police that are primarily—have that as a mission? ...In terms 
of Internment Resettlement, is that more related to serving guard duty over 
detainees?
A: That’s correct, it’s—they focus on correction—well, there’s a 85 Charlie, 
which is strictly corrections, they focus more on the detainees in the POW 
Camps, that type of thing. 
assigned at Abu Ghraib Prison?
A: That probably would have been the end of September, early October. 
Q: What training did you receive in this process of transition?
A: We conducted, I believe, there was some mandatory training that we 
completed prior to taking the mission. It was basically cell extraction; we went 
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through some training there. Some riot control training. I think non-lethal; we 
went over that again, as far as the rounds. And there might have been one or two 
other things that I can’t recall at this point. 
Q: Did you receive any training on the Geneva Convention and handling 
different categories of detainees such as you subsequently experienced in Tier 
1A in Abu Ghraib?
A: No, sir, we had the brief at Fort Lee during our mobilization period but it 
was a more generalized brief, it just covered, you know, kind of brushed over 
everything. The Geneva Convention is a very detailed document, it would take 
a rather extensive class to cover that in detail?
Q: In any event, at Fort Lee, at that time you had no idea that you would—your 
unit was going to be in a position of ultimately serving as prison guards?
A: That’s right, sir, we didn’t know at that time. 
Q: And if I understand what you just said, once you knew you were going to Abu 
A: That’s correct. 
time that you arrived? What kind of condition was it in?
A: Well, less than favorable living conditions. We actually occupied an old 
medical area. They had—when we arrived there was debris, you know, rocks, 
dirt, everywhere. There was no showers, no facilities like that. A lot of medical 
paraphernalia, needles and things like that laying around. We had to clean all 
that up before we were to move in. We had to paint the walls. So, it was in pretty 
bad shape over all, when we moved in. 
Q: What kind of quarters were your troops provided?
A: We actually lived in jail cells …
 … 
Q: Right. What occurred in that October timeframe? Did you see a change in 
activity?
A: Sure, I mean, us—when we went to Abu Ghraib, that’s in the middle of the 
Sunni Triangle so that’s—it’s a little more hostile there as opposed to where we 
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more, you know, IEDs on the road, that kind of things, explosions, and so there 
Q: With respect to the prison itself, what did you experience in terms of the 
numbers of detainees that you found there and how did that change over time?
point. The big thing was that they kept increasing the number of people that they 
brought to us and we didn’t have the space to put them in. That was a big push 
there and they—they kept pushing me to work with the contractors to open up 
more space and that was the big thing. The numbers were probably, you know, 
150 to 1, detainees versus 1 guard and then of course you got to throw in the 
corrupt so we had a very high number of detainees verses MP and we also had to 
Q: Did you feel that you had adequate manning for the mission you were 
assigned?
A: Actually no, I mean, I had four missions going on at one time. At least we had 
one platoon down there and, you know, we were understaffed. 
 … 
Q: And before we get into talking any more detail about what you actually 
did at Abu Ghraib, let’s clarify who some of the people were. Who is General 
Karpinski?
A: She was the 89th MP Brigade Commander. 
Q: And what was your relationship to her?
A: I fell underneath her—I fell under the 320th MP Battalion and the 320th fell 
under the 800th, so she was directly in charge of all the prisons in Iraq. 
Q: And who headed up the 320th at that time, do you recall?
A: Yeah, Lieutenant Colonel Phillabaum was my battalion commander. 
Ghraib?
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A: Major DiNenna was the S-3 at the battalion, and within my company the head 
of the—I had a couple of captains as platoon leaders, I had Captain Brinson he 
was the 4th Platoon Leader and he was the OIC, I put him in charge of the actual 
hard site, the prison so--. I had a Lieutenant Raeder who was in charge of the 
escort missions. I had a Captain Steva who was in charge of PSD mission. And 
then I had an E-8 serving as the fourth platoon leader. 
Q: What was Captain Brinson’s duty assignment? What was the scope of his 
control?
A: Yeah, when I got there I basically put him in charge of the hard site. I said 
to him, you know, I can’t focus on this, I have too many other things going on, 
just—your job is to focus on the hard site, you know, give me daily reports as 
to what is going on, what needs to be done, and, you know, my guidance to him 
was, just, you know, just make sure we’re doing the right stuff down there. Make 
sure there’s no, you know, we’re doing the right things. 
A: Colonel Pappas was the Brigade Commander. Colonel Jordan—I’m not 
really sure what his title was or really what his role was, but he was involved 
with the MI folks. Sometimes he acted like the commander, but I’m not really 
sure what he did there. Those were the main players that I mostly dealt with. 
Q: With respect to Colonel Jordan and Colonel Pappas, who spent more time in 
the Tier 1A/1B area? Do you have any sense of that?
Q: At any rate though, Colonel Pappas was seen in that area as well?
A: Yes.
Q: How about on the NCO side of the house, who were the senior NCO leaders 
in your company?
A: I have First Sergeant Lipinski, was—is here. There was my platoon sergeant; 
Sergeant First Class Snider was a Platoon Sergeant for 4th Platoon. He—his 
platoon was mostly working in the hard site. The majority of his platoon was 
down there so he kind of covered the hard site also. I had some other platoon 
sergeants that were—I don’t know if you want me to name them all?
Q: No, Sergeant Snider was the one who pretty much was placed in senior NCO 
leadership control over that----
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A: ----that’s correct----
Q: ----Tier 1A and B?
A: Right, and like I said it was mostly because it was his—a majority of the 
people down there were from his platoon. 
 … ……..
Q: What did you see in terms of how detainees were being handled and treated 
you know, I walked in and, you know, I seen a lot of—not a lot, but a few 
people that were new within the cells, you know, not outside walking around, 
And, you know, and they gave me the response of, you know, this is MI tact or 
tactic or technique that they use or, you know, it was either that or there may 
have a supply issue, or it may have been, you know, they were psychological, 
maybe suicidal, so they may have removed their clothing. But there’s—they 
treated them a little differently down there for sure. 
Q: What kind of people were being kept in that part of the prison? What was 
your understanding at that time?
A: I was told it was people with intelligence value, but it really was a hodge- 
podge of a bunch of people down in there. We had women, we had children, we 
had psychological patients, we had patients with, you know, diseases that were 
contagious, there was everything. We also had the people with the perceived 
intelligence value too, all mixed together. 
Q: Did you have people also like on CID hold?
A: Yes, CID, MPI, you name it.
Q: OGA?
A: OGA: ..Other Government Agencies all mixed in one. 
Q: Was there—did you—was there any particular written guidance posted in 
that area at that time that outlined the way the different groups or the categories 
of prisoners were supposed to be treated?
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we didn’t—we had not idea for the most part. 
Q: In terms of the—in terms of how you were able to set it up, did you set it up—
did you talk to your counterpart about that, about the axis of written guidelines 
and about the fact that there was a Hodge Podge of individuals in there?
A: Yeah, we—you know, we obviously talked about it. At that time, you know, 
it wasn’t as crowded, but, you know, as we went along as a few months passed, 
you know, as more and more people came in we had no choice but to put them 
there. We had no other room for them. So we tried to segregate them the best we 
could as far as the females, and males, you know, the best we could do. We tried 
to keep the people with TB off by themselves, you know, that kind of thing, but 
at some point, you know, there just wasn’t enough room. 
Q: Now, did the Coalition Provisional Authority have any people that they kept 
back in that area or were they in other parts of the prison, do you—if you recall?
A: I don’t recall that, no I don’t know. 
Q: In any event what was your understanding again in this sort of transition with 
respect to chain of command and who had primary responsibility for Tier1A and 
Tier1B?
A: It was my understanding that that was under MI control and we—although I 
had MPs in there, but it was under control of the Military Intelligence command 
and we had the rest of the wings. 
Q: So had you ever been trained to work with MI in that kind of environment?
A: No, sir. There’s really no doctrine out there that I could even reference 
because it—I don’t know of any other mission that has been combined like that.
 … 
Q: Did you go to anyone in your chain of command about the fact that you were 
undermanned?
A: Yes, that was a daily battle. Major DiNenna, the Battalion S-3, and he and I 
had almost a daily conversation, mostly one-sided, from his end. But, you know, 
he constantly was tasking me with things and I didn’t—did not have the people 
to do it so, I mean, it was a constant battle. 
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Q: So, in terms of the hours—duty hours and the number of days a week what 
was the, especially in that October, early November timeframe, what kind of 
shifts did your soldiers have to work?
A: We all worked at least 12 hour shifts with no days off, we just didn’t have 
the people. 
Q: Based on your assessment of the number of detainees you had, the missions 
you were being assigned, how many soldiers would you have liked to have?
A: We needed at least another company at a minimal. It probably would have 
been, ideally probably two or three more companies. 
Q: Did you personally ever sit down and talk to your soldiers that worked in 
Tier1A and 1B and make clear lines for them in terms of how detainees could 
be treated?
A: I probably never actually had that conversation in a group setting. We hit the 
ground running and we just took the mission over. There was no time to—you 
know, we didn’t have the time to do the training aspect portion of it. There 
wasn’t training days. It would have been great if we could have done that but no. 
 …  
Q: But in terms of the EPW training, and trial counsel asked about care, custody, 
and control. Was there anything about that training that prepared your soldiers 
for what they faced in Tier 1A? I’m not talking about, you know, the other camps 
and the other places, but for the unique conditions and circumstances as you 
previously described?
A: No, sir, as I stated earlier there’s not any doctrine out there that I could 
reference to get any kind of guidance for that type of mission. 
 …  
(May 16, 2005, SHCM)
Chapter 2 
Abu Ghraib and the “Rationalization”  
of Rationality: Uses of the Masculine  
and Feminine Symbolic Narrative
There was this common place tolerance of the nudity, of yelling, of arbitraries, 
of capriciousness, of intimidation, of uncertainty, and it applied to everybody, the 
detainees and soldiers alike. There was chaos, there was confusion. 
Stjepan Mestrovic, expert witness Harman Courts-Martial (May 17 2005, SHCM)
The use of a narrative to tell a story becomes the basic foundation of that story—
the thing we remember about that tale, the main point and basic structure of 
the account itself. There have been several narratives surrounding Abu Ghraib, 
and in this chapter I analyze rationality and chaos as descriptors to demonstrate 
that both have become narratives that work to obscure and repress additional 
gendered explanations of what occurred in Saddam Hussein’s former torture 
chambers—later owned and operated by the American military. Although it is true 
that modernist binary categories are problematic when discussing gender, I use 
a theoretical approach informed by binaries so as to begin a discourse about the 
gendered deviance and sexualized abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison. 
The Enlightenment Project and Rationality
Modernist theory paradigmatically rests upon a foundation of reason and 
rationality as the privileged locus for both objectivity and claims of universal truth. 
Within this theoretical canopy, ideas of justice, fairness, and liberty have been 
conceptualized as products of the Western Enlightenment Project. As part of this 
modernist paradigm, reason and rationality come to represent the basis for intellect 
and logic. This paradigm of modern thought, which directly informs foundational 
Furthermore, these modernist presuppositions instruct social conceptual schemes 
from which society is understood and organized. It is in this way that modernist 
notions of reason and rationality become the symbolic measure for theorizing and 
conceptualization. These constructions themselves come to represent and function 
as the standard for thought, order, and the very basis of what some consider 
“respectable science.” 
However, many have argued that modernist grand-narrative schema serve to 
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only certain conceptions of reason and rationality, namely those conceptions of the 
socially powerful. Feminist theorists, for example, argue in different ways that the 
voices or perspectives of those with little social power are silenced within modernist 
conceptual schemes ordered around patriarchal societies. This line of argument 
rests upon the idea that those with social power are able to dictate the standard of 
reason itself, thereby delineating its benchmark. This grand-narrative of reason 
serves as the basis for theory construction and informs feminist examinations of 
how science is done or understood (Fox-Keller [1985]1995, Keller and Longino 
1996, Longino 1990, Longino 1986), how knowledge is created (Abbott and 
Wallace 1996, Fraser and Nicholson 1990, Harding 1998, Harding 1993, Harding 
1991, Harding 1987, Harding 1986a) how gender is conceptualized (Butler 1999, 
Butler 1993a, Butler 1993b, Beauvoir ([1949]1952), Fausto-Sterling 1992), how 
sex categories are understood (Oudshoorn 1991), how sexuality comes to be 
understood (Fausto-Sterling 2000, Rich 1980, Rubin 1984, Rubin [1975]2002, 
Sedgwick 1990, Terry 1999), among many other modes of feminist conjecture.
In a like manner, building on Adorno and Horkheimer (1979), some 
postmodernists argue that the modernist paradigm is at odds with the aims of 
enlightenment and liberation, thereby resulting in an invalid and contradictory 
the conceptual boundaries of “reason” and “rationality,” this coupling instead 
subtly masks modes of domination, forms of oppression, and sites of control 
(Ahmed 1992, Baudrillard ([1995]2002), Baudrillard ([1981]1994), Baudrillard 
([1979]1990), Baudrillard ([1991]1995), Bauman 1992, Butler 1999, Butler 1993a, 
Butler 1993b, Derrida 1978, Foucault 1988, Foucault [1975]1977, Foucault 1972, 
Haraway 1991, Haraway 1997a, Haraway 1997b, Irigaray 1985a, Jameson 1991, 
Lyotard ([1979]1984), Lutz 1995, Mestrovic 1994, Mestrovic 1993, Mestrovic 
1992, Mestrovic 1991, Rorty 1989, Rosenau 1992). In this way, modernist 
conceptions of reason and rationality become paradoxical and irreconcilable with 
the stated goals of the Enlightenment project itself, such that both actual suffering 
and theoretical casualties result— the seeming impotence of modern theory 
construction. Thus, although reason and rationality ostensibly promise order and 
structure, these concepts can be shown to actually produce malice and oppression 
instead. Indeed, it is sometimes even the case that accounts of rationality are 
theoretical canopy.
Gender and Modernity
One starting point for studying gender theory within modernity is this: the binary 
of masculine and feminine. It is the narrative from which American culture is 
based, and this stereotype is still used to explain the realities of the social world, 
identity, bodies, roles and more. This narrative functions as a cultural code, 
where masculinity and femininity oppose each other, even in terms of value. In 
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modern patriarchal societies “masculinity” is associated with all that is reasonable, 
rational, essential, orderly, logical, controlled, predictable, calculable, active and 
strong. Conversely, “femininity” is associated with all that is emotional, chaotic, 
weak, inessential, uncontrolled, inconsistent, passive and irrational. It is this 
modernist theory of gender binaries that comes to function as a rational grand 
narrative schema. Because this system is socially constructed in terms of reward 
and value, and operates as a benchmark for cultural understandings for gender, 
it serves as ideology in that it prescribes meaning and reward, and allows for 
only certain cultural conceptualizations and productions of gender themselves. 
However, this binary code for understanding gender is problematic in that it 
proposes an uncritical conception of gender that is imbued with power, where 
dyadic conceptions of stereotypical (and sometimes essentialized) conceptions of 
masculinity and femininity are prescribed, where problematic heterosexualized 
parings of both sexual desire and identity exist. In addition, this system does not 
adequately make sense or room for all gender conceptions and “genderscapings,” 
although binary systems are rationalized to do so nonetheless. What is so curious 
culture of masculinity or “masculinized militarism” (Kaufman-Osborn 2005). 
Theorizing binaries, although socially oppressive when conceiving of gender, 
aids in understanding the gendered deviance and sexualized abuse at Abu Ghraib, 
and so I use binaries to begin a conversation about gender, the abuse at the prison 
and the resulting courts-martials. It is this very important theoretical starting point 
that is used to show how complex gender and power permutations operated at 
Abu Ghraib, and which also helps to explain deviance within the context of the 
masculinist military itself. 
In this chapter, I provide a discussion of the chaos associated with Abu Ghraib 
order, where order and rationality can be equated with the masculine symbolic 
code. In this way, I describe the illusory order and actual chaos at Abu Ghraib 
and his Weberian-inspired McDonaldization project, describing modernity and 
calculability, and control (Ritzer [1993]2004). This basic notion of “modernity,” 
I argue, is a “masculine” modernity given its links to the theoretical binary 
characterizations associated with “masculinity.” 
However, Ritzer’s notion of modernity is further divided by Chris Rojek’s 
(1995) demonstration that modernity has two contrasting faces, namely Modernity 
1 and Modernity 2.1 Rojek’s modernity of order and rationality (Modernity 1) is 
the one that I call “masculine” modernity because of the similarities of associations 
1 I am not arguing for an essentialist position regarding men and women; instead, I 
am trying to unite notions of gender with theoretical understandings of modernity.
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between Rojek’s descriptions and the stereotypes of masculinity.2 By showing 
that the prison was not run in a rational manner (maintaining social order), 
with principles applied to everyday life (a clear system of law), with precision, 
planning and order, it can be deduced that a deviance associated with the notion 
of rationality, order, and ideas surrounding traditional notions of modernity 
ensued. The deviance at Abu Ghraib was thus evidence of Rojek’s Modernity 2, 
experience, deviance and restlessness existed at Abu Ghraib (Rojek 1995: 82).3 
This is an alternate reading of modernity, which claims the rationality and order 
of Modernity 1 is nothing more than an illusion—a “rationality,” if you will. The 
consequences of the theoretical gendered “feminine” deviance of Modernity 2 
were harms for the body and soul of both prisoners and soldiers alike. 
I also describe the built and created environment at Abu Ghraib that was 
portrayed in the courts-martial as further evidence of the lacking of masculine 
rationality, order, and control that are all part and parcel of modernity. To be clear, 
applying Rojek’s notion of the chaos of modernity 2, it is possible to understand this 
deviance, in that a lack of modernity 1 “masculine” order led to the abuse. In other 
words, I agree in part with Kaufman-Osborn (2005), that “a logic of emasculation” 
informed the abuse at Abu Ghraib, where disciplinary techniques strip prisoners of 
masculinity and torture is through forced feminization—“emasculate in order to 
subjugate”. However, I argue that this “logic” was itself irrational (even if the idea 
that I make is that the deviance itself was gendered, as was the chaos. 
Additionally, I discuss Foucault’s ([1977]1995) narrative of modernist power 
structures, and here I am especially interested in how power was used to punish 
both the body and soul at Abu Ghraib—which is antithesis to Foucault’s position 
regarding punishment in modern times. Both Foucault and many feminists share 
to exert control over women’s bodies and minds. This becomes an important 
discussion of power coupled with gender in that women’s bodies and souls (both 
American and Iraqi) were punished at Abu Ghraib, where Iraqi women and children 
were held as bargaining chips at the prison. Social control is established through the 
what is controlled are both the prisoners’ bodies and souls/minds at Abu Ghraib, 
and especially in the following situations: when dogs were used to intimidate Iraqi 
prisoners, nakedness as a means for control, male prisoners “friendships” with 
female guards, male prisoners being treated as “females,” female guards being 
forced into photographs of abuse, the torture of Iraqi males in front of American 
female guards, panties being put on male prisoner’s heads thereby “feminizing” 
them (and especially given the gendered and associated sexualized nature of this 
2 This gendered reading of Rojek is my own.
3 Although Rojek is discussing leisure and modernity, I argue that his theory regarding 
modernity still applies here. 
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torture, and the associated violation of Iraqi cultural constructions of masculinity), 
among many other examples. I maintain that the dehumanization and abuse of 
prisoners has set the stage for the physical and sexual abuse that followed, where 
punishment occurred in the form of gender manipulation and humiliation. 
Finally in this chapter, I discuss the nicknames given to detainees as a means to 
display raw “masculine” power on the part of the American male guards, as well 
as the use of photography itself to evidence this exposed power over prisoners. 
Punishment coupled with power and gender can be applied to American soldiers’ 
experiences of Abu Ghraib, where both male and female soldiers reluctantly 
disclosed that they were suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
from the abuse they suffered and witnessed.
The Prison: Abu Ghraib
Consider the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. First, it was built by Saddam Hussein 
as a modern prison to control, in Foucault’s scheme, the minds and souls of the 
prisoners as opposed to torturing their bodies. Paradoxically, it came to serve as a 
site of torture of the body under Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as the American 
liberation and occupation. Second, the prison itself is about the size of an average 
airport in the United States, thus exhibiting its domination over the built and 
created environment. Third, the “phallic” panopticon at Abu Ghraib stands out 
visibly in all photos of the prison. For Foucault, the towering panopticon serves 
the function of controlling prisoners through surveillance such that the prisoners 
are never certain when they are under the gaze. Finally, despite these modernist 
features, Abu Ghraib during American occupation was vulnerable to attacks, 
defenseless, porous to Iraqis, and incapable of surveillance in Foucault’s sense. 
It was chosen by the U.S. Army to serve as a prison, this time in the middle of an 
active war zone, which also contradicts Foucault.
Under the modernist paradigm, one would have expected this American run 
rationality, prediction, and control (Ritzer 2004). Interestingly, these are also 
gendered characterizations of masculinity within modernist patriarchal paradigms, 
and also characteristic of Rojek’s Modernity 1. Applying McDonaldized 
characteristics to Abu Ghraib would mean, for example, that the prison would 
have been well supplied with food, water, medical supplies, clothing, and other 
things, up to and including the rules of engagement and the rules of detention and 
interrogation. Instead, the U.S. government’s own reports, as well as testimony 
at the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse trials disclosed chaos with regard to all of 
these phenomenon: food and water were scarce (even for the American soldiers); 
supposedly there was no clothing for the detainees to wear and that is why many 
were housed naked; the Rules of the Geneva Convention were never posted; 
soldiers did not know what the rules of engagement were as they were changing 
every day; and Military Intelligence (MI) and Military Police (MP) roles were 
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blurred and confusing. Interestingly, the association of duties between the MI’s 
and MP’s was a failsafe system of checks and balances that was itself disregarded. 
All of these examples point to the irrational, barbaric, and harshness associated 
with the experiences of Abu Ghraib, which I argue led to cultural and emotional 
harms for the prisoners there, and harms also for the American soldiers.
Examining testimony, everyone who was asked about the state of the prison at 
constant attacks made on the prison itself. Many stated that it was not a “normal 
prison,” as its detainee population included a combination of women, children, 
“terrorists,” and common criminals as prisoners. On May 16, 2005, Captain Reese, 
courts-martial of Sabrina Harman stated in open court that Abu Ghraib had “less 
than favorable living conditions” and that soldiers sometimes “lived in jail cells” 
which were dirty. Says Reese, “We actually occupied an old medical area … When 
we arrived there was debris, you know, rocks, dirt, everywhere. There were no 
showers, no facilities like that. A lot of medical paraphernalia, needles and things 
like that laying around” (May 16 2005, SHCM). 
Also at the Harman trial, although during the sentencing phase on May 17, 
operations at Abu Ghraib, also described the conditions of Abu Ghraib as appalling, 
called the prison a “trash hole,” and noted not only that wild dogs and rodents 
Captain Reese added, “when we arrived to Abu Ghraib it was like a warzone with 
rubble everywhere. There was nothing there for soldiers. It was a below average 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison were sickly, where cases of vomiting and diarrhea 
Major DiNenna stated under oath that there were not enough medical personnel 
and that there were 2-3 medical evacuations per day. “They—we had a lot of 
diabetes, TB. Based on their diet change their health went down very quickly. 
Towards the end we were doing two to three MEDVACs a day for heart conditions, 
diabetics, I think, stuff as well. A lot of amputees, and wounded prisoners came in. 
So they had a great deal of problems.” DiNenna continues, “The conditions were, 
for lack of a better term, deplorable” (May 17, 2005, SHCM).
Additionally, Captain Reese commented on the extreme insurgency in the 
area around the prison. Further explaining the environment at Abu Ghraib, 
DiNenna continued, “We had a very high threat external as well as internal, we’d 
have between 7 and 9,000 prisoners and they have a hundred soldiers per shift 
to watch them all. We had to deal with that as well as the constant mortar attacks 
SHCM). Commenting on the environment within the prison, Sergeant Cathcart, 
an MP assigned to the night shift at Tier 1A stated under oath “It is fair to say 
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that this was a dangerous environment that we worked in. We were mortared 
constantly and on alert a lot. We also had to worry about Iraqi Correctional 
stressful environment. Every time we did a cell search we found weapons” (June 
24, 2002, SHA32).
Major DiNenna described the lack of lighting at Abu Ghraib, where nightly 
attacks took place in conditions with no internal lighting. The lighting used each 
night at Abu Ghraib consisted of military vehicles surrounding the prison and 
turning on their headlights for visibility inside of the prison. The lighting inside 
of the prison literally came from vehicle headlights located outside of the prison. 
Explaining the lighting situation, Major DiNenna stated in testimony, “Well 
obviously when you guard prisoners you need lights at night. Lightning was 
an issue the entire time. We—you know, generators were—or lights would go 
replaced. There was an Army contract to install permanent lighting in the outside 
were times when we had to bring in vehicles around the compounds just to add 
enough lighting to keep it on the prisoners at night” (May 17, 2005, SHCM). 
This situation was “incredibly dangerous, with low morale and high stress” 
stated Major DiNenna. In a word, these courtroom depictions of Abu Ghraib are 
Figure 2.1 The outside of Abu Ghraib at night with lights
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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themselves barbaric, where masculinist reason has mutated into representations 
of the female symbolic of inadequacy, or narratives of a gendered Modernity 2. 
Regarding prisoner uprisings at the hard site of Abu Ghraib, Major DiNenna gave 
several reasons for these confrontations, including the mixing of Sunni and Shiites. 
He even claimed that some prisoners had not even been told why they were being 
held for six or more months after initially being detained at Abu Ghraib. Stated 
DiNenna, “Most of the uprisings were a result of the food, overcrowded, being 
detained for a lengthy periods of time where they either were not interrogated by 
MI or they didn’t receive timely court dates. So even though they’re locked down 
in a cell so to speak, there’s six to eight prisoners per cell. We also let the Iraqi 
result was … you could hear it throughout the entire hard site prison so if one tier 
erupted then another tier would be erupt and at the time we only had 8 to 10 MPs 
in the entire hard site to work the facility because that was all the soldiers we had 
left” (May 17, 2005, SHCM). These uprisings were acts of reprisal for neglect and 
abandonment, and the absence of any rational system for prisoner processing that 
one might have expected at a U.S. military run prison. 
On the topic of food and water at Abu Ghraib, the contracted food was 
basically inedible because it was contaminated. Furthermore, and against the 
used to feed detainees, which resulted in a long and tedious situation for guards, as 
they had to strip MREs of pork products for cultural reasons, and had to remove 
Tabasco sauce bottles because they could be used as a weapon. Stated DiNenna in 
the courtroom, “Initially we started with MREs for the prisoners. When a contract 
was set up … The food was usually undercooked, it was dirty, it had debris, the 
food had rodent, feces, and glass. At times for their evening meal they would 
receive a boiled egg and two pieces of cheese which obviously the prisoners didn’t 
appreciate. It got to the point where they were either throwing stones or rocks 
at the vendors themselves or throw the food back at the MPs. We had medics, 
every time it came in. So a lot of the times we would just throw the vendors out the 
gate, so to speak, and give the prisoners the MREs which made them very happy 
(May 17, 2005, SHCM). DiNenna described the water conditions at Abu Ghraib as 
scarce, as sometimes delivered in fuel trucks, and stated that soldiers and detainees 
had access to only two, two-liter bottles of water per day for all activities such as 
drinking and washing. 
Still further evidence of irrationality and the lack of prediction and control at 
Ghraib were corrupt. Private Ivan Frederick an MP for the 372nd at Abu Ghraib 
the facility as very poorly built. There was access to weapons unimaginable. The 
Iraqi police were very, very corrupt. They would bring in weapons, bring in pills, 
drugs, they would bring in maps of the facility, take maps of the facility out, give 
them to family members. It was just—it was a nightmare for corrections” (May 13, 
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2005, SHCM). Major DiNenna echoed Frederick’s concerns, stating “Bribery was 
and shaking hands with the families of the prisoners is a big deal … They would 
know a prisoner who may be in a particular village, or tribe, or that correctional 
and then would assist the prisoner to escape. They smuggled in weapons to the 
prisoners... They also would send—would smuggle in razor blades from the Iraqi 
Medical Facility which was later set up. And they would take them on work details 
and just let them go. Give them a change of clothes. We spent a lot of time watching 
Major DiNenna further claimed that there was a high level of internal threat 
to the American soldiers since there were not adequate personnel to deal with 
the prisoners. DiNenna even stated that there was such a low ratio of prisoners 
to guards that he postulated about 150 prisoners or more to each guard at Abu 
Ghraib, with guard’s stress levels elevated by working what he thought were 12-
16 hours per day. Said DiNenna, “Yes, actually overcrowding existed everywhere. 
You know basically our mission—entire mission we should have seven MPs on 
the gate so to speak for 500 prisoners and as well as the tower guards. So it would 
be approximately 10 or 11 MPs per 500 prisoners. You do the same ratio—in 
a hard site facility it’s different, that’s basically a corrections operation, which 
is entirely different than the internment resettlement operation, so the issue we 
ran in to at the hard site when they put a lot of the Iraqi Civilian Criminals in 
there is they just kept opening tiers and kept putting them in, but we didn’t get an 
increase in soldiers.” (May 17, 2005, SHCM). Additionally, Captain Reese stated 
that American military personnel worked 12-hour shifts with no days off, and that 
really 2-3 more companies were needed to ideally run the prison effectively. Says 
Reese, “My soldiers were subject to threats by the Iraqi prisoners. It was well 
known among the guards that they were at risk. Based on the ratio of guards to 
inmates there was a threat to my soldiers. My soldiers were not trained to handle 
prisoners … I discussed the ratio of detainees to guard with my chain of command 
… Towards the end we were probably 1 [guard] in every 100 inmate. The desired 
ratio is probably 10 guards per 100 detainees” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). In his 
testimony, Major DiNenna stated that “prisoners had nothing to do all day but 
come up with ways to make weapons,” resulting in further threats to guards (May 
17, 2005, SHCM). 
There was some confusion, according to Major DiNenna, for the American 
shortage of supplies, as there were no uniforms available that would signify roles 
prisoners a lot of times you couldn’t tell who was who because they didn’t have the 
the orange jump suits for the prisoners, but though they were prisoners, to us very 
quickly they weren’t keeping up with the supplies we had which again created a 
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but they didn’t have—a lot of them didn’t have uniforms in the beginning so 
Thus, American guards were responsible for monitoring Iraqi detainees, Iraqi 
of supplies, and corruption of Iraqi personnel. This corruption, confusion, and 
lack of organization are all mutations of masculinist modernist rationality, where 
individuals at Abu Ghraib experienced instead chaotic conditions of Rojek’s 
“feminine” theoretical Modernity 2.
When asked about detainee care, Captain Reese stated under oath that 
prisoners were kept naked in cells as part of a MI tactic. Interestingly, Captain 
Reese postulated that this could also be a supply issue, or maybe that the inmates 
had removed their own clothing because they were “psycho.” Stated Reese at 
female underwear over the heads of the detainees. The practice was taking place 
before we got there. One of the inmates used an MRE carton as underwear and to 
cover himself. I thought it was odd to have women’s underwear on their heads so 
I talked to the person that I was taking over for. He told me it was a humiliation 
tactic. We had a supply issue. We had supply issues. We did not have enough 
underwear. I know some of the females had to wear male boxers” (June 24, 2004, 
SHA32). Although clothes were at one point available it was common practice 
to control the body through nudity at Abu Ghraib, and it was repeated in court 
over and again that it was a detention technique to strip detainees naked. What is 
more, one only has to consider that these detainees were arrested or detained while 
wearing clothing, and did not all arrive at Abu Ghraib prison naked. Captain Reese 
… I visited the hard site 100 times from mid-October to mid-December … Iraqis 
were hooded during those occasions. Iraqis were nude. I did raise the question 
of nudity to the previous company commander of the 372nd ... He told me that 
it was a common practice to have the detainees nude. I raised the issue with … 
Major DiNenna. He told me it was a tactic used by MI. I assumed that since Major 
DiNenna told me that the tactic was acceptable, I never looked for anything in 
writing” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). 
Social control was thus a product of power as applied to the body in gendered 
ways that offended cultural constructions of masculinity itself, where the very 
act of being naked, housed in overcrowded conditions with other naked male 
prisoners, and further humiliated through the use of panties on one’s head implies 
both a kind of feminine vulnerability and a homoerotic approach to torture. It can 
be argued that nakedness is equated with feminine vulnerability, where prisoner 
control is maintained through compliance and subordination of the exposed body. 
Control of the detainee’s “feminized” body is achieved in several ways: through the 
use of uncomfortable homoerotic living conditions, where naked men share small 
overcrowded living quarters; through the use of “drag” given the female panties 
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worn by the male prisoners themselves, albeit on their heads in certain situations; 
and through the use of forced feminization, or the stripping of masculinity (power, 
humiliated through the use of forcible nakedness in front of female guards.4 
Captain Reese also stated under oath that there was no outline at the prison 
about how to treat different kinds of prisoners, and hence an absence of detainee 
treatment guidelines. The American soldiers at Abu Ghraib were supposed to guard 
all types of prisoners, some considered as having especially valuable intelligence, 
yet the guards had no additional training to handle these special prisoners, and had 
no guidance of distinction for inmate control. Captain Reese stated the prisoners in 
Tier 1A and 1B were “people with intelligence value,” although he admitted that 
prisoners were mixed together in a “hodge-podge” because there was little room 
at the prison for detainees, thereby providing a contradictory account of detainee 
value in Tier 1A and 1B. This becomes problematic because some of the prisoners 
were just common criminals, some were Iraqi prisoners that were “CID holds” 
(Criminal Investigative Division) (This is a fact omitted in the U.S. Government 
reports, namely, that not only were some prisoners “MI holds” to be interrogated, 
but the Criminal Investigative Division had its own separate prisoners and the 
reason for this has not been explored.), others were detainees that were being 
investigated by other government agencies (OGA) (such as the CIA, and the dozen 
or so other secret agencies such as the Navy, National Security Agency, etc.), and 
some prisoners were even “ghost detainees,” or prisoners who were not accounted 
for by record or number as located at Abu Ghraib. These “ghost detainees” were 
of high value to the military and, according to Captain Reese, were brought in 
through “the backdoor,” with no prisoner numbers assigned to them and with 
strict instructions to “not let anyone talk to them, MI would be back to check on 
them.” Says Reese, “I was confused about the chain of command at Abu Ghraib 
because we had so many different agencies there. Other agencies that were there 
were Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), MI, OGA and FBI” (June 24, 2004, 
SHA32). This is a chaotic system of prisoner order at Abu Ghraib, even for Reese, 
the prison’s company commander himself! 
Additionally, women and children were kept at Abu Ghraib prison in Tier 1B, 
which Major DiNenna described as the only place available for segregation of 
women and children. He stated under oath that women and children (the youngest 
of which were 11- or 12-years-old, said DiNenna) were brought into Abu Ghraib 
4 I argue that relationally, this symbolic construction of power in the humiliation 
scenario can be read as giving phallic power to the female guards within this context, that 
of the masculinist military, in addition to actual power over male-bodied prisoners, simply 
by virtue of the female guards being present in these scenarios. Interestingly, this is not 
about female hatred or misogyny, or the use of this as torture, but the powerlessness of 
masculinity when faced with the symbolic confrontation of “phallic femininity.” Kaufman-
Osborn (2005) describes these practices as “emasculat[ion] in order to subjugate.” Hence, 
this is the breaking down of masculinity as opposed to the devaluing of femininity.
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if a male in their family was arrested, and under the guise of possibly offering a 
kind of protection. However, it came out in court later that women and children 
were used as a means for bargaining, where males could turn themselves in so 
that their female family members would be released from Abu Ghraib. This was 
on their capture tags, which were functionally useful with regard to specifying 
rationalization for keeping female prisoners thus crumbles in terms of motivation 
when learned that women were kept for bribery purposes. Additionally, this 
system of bribery uses women as objects for trade for their male family members, 
representing further instances of female subordination at Abu Ghraib. Consider 
Frederick’s testimony on the stand at the Harman courts-martial:
A [Frederick]: It was pretty much the most stress I’ve ever been under in my life. 
It was constant mortars, rockets, grenade attacks, insurgents, everything. 
Q: What kind of training were you given for the unique environment that you 
found at Abu Ghraib in October of 2003?
A: None, none, sir.
Q: Were you ever trained in the Laws of Warfare of Geneva Conventions, in 
terms of how to treat detainees in a prison type of environment?
A: Not in a prison type of environment.
Q: Under what theory of incarceration do you put women and juveniles and 
A: Sometimes they thought that family members of high priority detainees, they 
were trying to get information about their father, or family member that’s a part 
of Fedyeen, or a part of Sadaam’s Regime, something like that, and they try to 
get information to where their location is.
Q: So had these women and juveniles done anything wrong that you’re aware of?
A: Not that I’m aware of. (13 May 2005, SHCM) 
Thus, prisoners were all mixed together, even sickly and contagious prisoners 
with outbreaks of tuberculosis, according to Captain Reese. 
soldier’s testimony (Joyner, Wisdom, Jones, Darby, and Rivera), echoed that of 
Captain Reese’s description of the conditions at Abu Ghraib. Thus the descriptions 
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prediction and control at Abu Ghraib are instances of mutations of masculinist 
1; instead, at Abu Ghraib, gendered deviance in the form of Modernity 2 chaos 
existed. In fact, Major DiNenna stated under oath, when asked the question:
Q: Sir, at the time that you were at Abu Ghraib going through all of these issues, 
what were you feeling?
A. Abandoned. 
Q. Why?
A. Actually I guess the theater IG, I can’t remember the colonel’s name, arrived 
towards the end of September, beginning of October timeframe I believe and 
basically stated that we were forgotten, we were a forgotten mission. We were 
set up just to keep these prisoners and keep them out of the way. You know, 
when you’re at a facility whether it’s a hard site prison or tents on the outside, 
it’s—you’re setting up a city and you need the resources to do that, we weren’t 
supplied. (17 May 2005, SHCM)
From the point of view of a rationally-run bureaucracy, one would have expected 
that Abu Ghraib would have both a reliable chain of command in place, and that 
they would have also followed U.S. Army protocol for responsibility. In the myth 
of American dominance and the Western Enlightenment Project, the U.S. Army 
should have been
evidence instead shows the lack of this kind of bureaucratic order. For example, 
culpability and all responsibility for the abuse at Abu Ghraib, and all responsibility 
was shifted onto the lowest ranking soldiers. To this day, the Army has not 
Thomas M. Pappas? Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum? Brigadier General 
Janice Karpinski (now Colonel Karpinski)? 
Additionally, the government’s own reports substantiated the testimonial 
claims of the courts-martial with the indication that almost none of the paperwork 
learn as you go along and on-the-job-training basis (Taguba Report). 
As well, the U.S. Army protocol requires the ratio of one military guard to 
prisoners. The U.S. government reports (Jones and Fay) state that the Army knew 
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that overcrowding was a serious issue, but failed to remedy the situation, and 
still failed to do so up until its closing (Strasser and Whitney 2004). Moreover, 
the government reports state that approximately 80 percent of the prisoners at 
Abu Ghraib were not insurgents, and were not “terrorists,” but were ordinary 
Iraqis such as taxi drivers, persons mistakenly arrested during sweeps, or even 
hostages (Strasser et al. 2004). In addition, women and children were imprisoned 
at Abu Ghraib as bargaining chips for obtaining information. The absurdity of this 
situation is that most of the prisoners did not have the information that the Army 
wanted (Strasser et al. 2004). Hence, the “feminine” irrational symbolic comes 
to replace the organized and coherent system, which was seemingly based upon 
reason as its template—where irrationality comes to replace the rational itself. 
To illustrate this paradox of stated Enlightenment goals versus the actual chaos 
at Abu Ghraib, consider the prosecuting attorney’s explanation of why prisoners 
wore Iraqi panties on their heads. Captain Christopher Graveline (the prosecutor 
for both Specialist Sabrina Harman and Private Lynndie England) stated that the 
reason for the panties on the heads of the detainees was that there was a shortage of 
supplies of clothing, so that American soldiers were sent into Baghdad to purchase 
Iraqi women’s panties as “clothing.” Captain Graveline made this statement in 
concurred with this statement on the stand, saying “yes sir” to the prosecuting 
counselor. Interestingly, this “clothing” was used as a technique for humiliating 
detainees, as it was placed on their heads, and was not used as a cover or barrier 
against the environment or as part of a prisoner uniform. 
In these outlined ways, the descriptions of Abu Ghraib evidenced the lacking 
of “masculine” order, control and rationality associated with the modernist 
Enlightenment paradigm. Hence, chaos as an explanation for the disorder and 
abuse at Abu Ghraib can actually be understood in a gendered manner, where 
chaos comes to represent conceptions of the female symbolic narrative of 
vulnerability, disorganization, and emotionality—all theoretical binary opposite 
characterizations of reason and rationality, and alternative ways that “feminine” 
modernity is conceptualized.
Foucault and Power
On the face of it, it might seem that prisoner abuse was a means for establishing what 
Foucault labels as the power of the sovereign (Foucault 1988, Foucault [1975]1977). 
In a modernist patriarchal society, this “sovereign” is associated with masculinity 
such that power is aligned with the masculine symbolic or phallic power, as this is 
the ultimate measure for self-determination. At Abu Ghraib, punitive abuse was used 
as a means for the goal of creating a power relationship in a chaotic setting—the 
guards in control versus prisoners. For example, Major General Miller is quoted 
in Frontline: The Torture Question, PBS documentary (2005) as stating words to 
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the effect “unless the detainees feel like dogs everyday, you’re not doing your job 
properly.” 
Through the use of dogs as a means of disciplinary power to scare prisoners, a 
power relation was created that depicted the “masculine” power of the guards and 
the “feminine” vulnerability of prisoners—again, sovereign versus that which is 
controlled. It was further documented in the Fay Report that civilians employed 
by the military used dogs to scare prisoners, hit them, and encouraged soldiers 
to abuse them (Mann 2004, Strasser 2004). Likewise, a feminist application 
of Foucault’s contention that the body is the principal site of power in modern 
society is also useful in explaining the social control of Iraqi prisoners in terms 
of how the body is used for some of the kinds of torture that were found at Abu 
Ghraib, namely the gendered and homoerotic torture. These are examples of raw 
masculine power over the body through the use of force and in an attempt to create 
a means for control.
Ironically, and in contra distinction to Foucault, the use of power by the American 
military became a disruptive force, or understood in terms of the irrational and 
chaotic feminine symbolic. Intended to bring apparent order in an environment 
of chaos, American power-tactics actually produced more chaos, which can be 
understood as the by-product of mutated masculinist and modernist schema of 
reason and rationality. Again, against Foucault, the reality of the situation at Abu 
Ghraib was that the sovereign was exerting power over both the body and soul. 
Moreover, the American soldiers did not present themselves as exerting the power 
of the sovereign in a raw and naked sense. Instead, the wolf-like power-tactics 
came in the sheep’s clothing of democracy and rule of law, hidden in commands 
they indeed ordered and provided training for these interrogation tactics. 
For example, as shown in the courts-martials, detainees arriving at Abu Ghraib 
“Welcome, you are now at an American-run prison, you will be treated decently 
and humanely, and not like you were treated under Saddam Hussein’s regime.” 
The irony is that the detainees were treated as if they were detainees under Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. Foucault’s theory does not account for this subversion of the 
ideals of social order, democracy, and the enlightenment project.
Perhaps it is for this reason that Baudrillard wrote a book entitled Forget 
Foucault ([1977]1987). Foucault’s theory can be construed as a modernist attempt 
to depict a mere shift in the ordering principle of the Enlightenment from the body 
to the soul. To be sure, prior to the leak of the abuse photographs, Americans 
were received as using “psychological yet humane” methods of interrogation as 
FM 34-52 was rendered obsolete by various memoranda from the White House 
and Lieutenant General Sanchez, such that the concepts of torture, interrogation, 
and abuse became unintelligible (see Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008a). This is an 
example of how a “standard” for prisoner treatment imploded in meaning such 
that it resulted in confusion and chaos with regard to interpretation. Nevertheless, 
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power as depicted at Abu Ghraib was a spectacle aimed at maintaining prisoner 
compliance. However, the real postmodern spectacle is that Foucault’s power over 
the soul degenerated into gendered and homoerotic abuse of the body and soul, 
and was documented for the entire world to see. It is therefore technology itself 
that allowed us a new, compelling, and undeniable way of seeing the hidden reality 
of Abu Ghraib. 
is the American discourse of conquering another nation for the sake of liberation 
and democracy. The second seems to be the discourse of being above the law; the 
rest of the world must follow the Geneva conventions, but the U.S. chooses when 
and if the Geneva conventions apply at Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and in 
Iraq (Mestrovic 2005). The third discourse seems similar to Baudrillard’s notion 
of seduction (which represents mastery over the symbolic universe) (Baudrillard 
pretense of bringing liberation and democracy while secretly contradicting these 
very principles through abuse. For Baudrillard, seduction is associated with the 
“feminine” and the ability of the “feminine” to rule by mastery over the symbolic 
universe (and “the code”) versus by “masculine” power. 
Baudrillard’s notion of seduction, Baudrillard himself links his notion of seduction 
to his overall discussion of “the code” that organizes the economy of signs and 
symbols in society. In the case of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, the “code” 
becomes a false reality that is not merely a simulacrum that has been severed 
from reality, but a seduction of reality itself—or at least reality’s appearance. Abu 
Ghraib was not a hyperreality of appearances as Baudrillard’s seduction might 
suggest (Baudrillard [1979]1990). Instead, real actual documented empirically 
regarding democracy and liberation. Neither Foucault’s nor Baudrillard’s theories 
capture the complexity of the situation at Abu Ghraib and its relationship to the 
larger American culture.
 Through this spectacle, no voice has been given to the prisoners themselves, 
even if some of the people in Abu Ghraib have been given faces, they are not given 
their real names. One of the most fascinating aspects of this situation at Abu Ghraib 
that came out in the trials is that the prisoners were given American nicknames 
such as “Gus,” “Gilligan,” “Shitboy,” “Bigbird,” “The Claw,” and so on. These 
nicknames can be understood in terms of American pop-culture television shows 
2005) of the prisoners is in itself a form of dehumanization and abuse, and can 
process of lacking autonomous identity within patriarchal culture, and a form of 
“othering,” or in this case, the literal erasing of identity in favor of re-naming 
altogether. The U.S. government reports stated that the dehumanization at Abu 
Ghraib set the stage for the physical and sexual abuse that followed, and was based 
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that blend into the violence and gratuitous sexuality of American culture, cinema, 
and pornography.
of dehumanization, and at Abu Ghraib the result of these acts was the vanishing 
of prisoner identity and the reconceptualization of identity in a sub-human and 
bestial manner. (As a matter of fact, examples of treating prisoners as on par with 
animals have been provided above.)
If Foucault is correct about his notion of punishment of the soul, then the irony 
of the situation at Abu Ghraib is that punishment of the soul occurred through the 
taking of the pictures, which is in itself a violation of the Geneva Conventions. 
These pictures highlighted the homoerotic nature of the punishment, as well as 
the compulsory and common nudity. The homoerotic punishment evidenced in 
the photographs of abuse is a cultural violation of Iraqi masculinity, and places 
Figure 2.2 Detainee nicknamed “The Claw”
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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the detainees in a subordinate category of both vulnerable “female” and forced 
“homosexual.” In a word, the punishment of the soul has taken the form of 
humiliation. It is important to understand that contrary to Foucault and Baudrillard, 
humiliation is not just a means of control, although it can be depicted in this way. 
Rather, humiliation is in itself not only a violation of the Geneva Conventions but 
shame is itself savage and is not rational detainee treatment. It is on par with the 
medieval physical forms of torture that Foucault writes about in Discipline and 
 ([1975]1977).
The photographs of abuse also function as Foucault’s panopticon, since they 
show the abuse to the whole public consciousness. This allows the public to visit 
Abu Ghraib; however, too much focus on the photos negates the fact that the 
abuse is far-reaching and widespread in Iraq. Additionally, sometimes the photos 
themselves were destroyed, a fact that came out at the Fort Hood trial of Sabrina 
Harman in Megan Ambuhl’s testimony, when she stated that she was personally 
ordered to remove all traces of the photos from the computer hard drive located in 
Tier 1A at Abu Ghraib prison. In a word, the photos themselves become a focus 
of masculinist power and control in that they construct and tell the “truth” of 
Abu Ghraib to the world. This becomes a scapegoat for reasons of insurgency 
and anti-American targeting, and also a rationalization for keeping the photos 
secret from the public eye. In the closing arguments of the Lynndie England 
case, the prosecution made the argument that seven soldiers (the “rotten apples”), 
and England especially, were to blame for the insurgencies and anti-American 
targeting. In the Enlightenment society, the photos would be seen as a whistle 
blowing tactic (see Harman’s letter to Kelly, and also Mestrovic 2005), yet this 
meaning becomes subverted as the blame for targeting is shifted onto the lowest 
ranking of military soldiers. Nonetheless, in her trial, England was cited as the 
cause for blame for future deaths to American soldiers.
There are other forms of torturing the soul, as well as the body, yet Foucault 
seems to operate under an untenable principle that the body and soul are 
radically divided. However, psychological research has demonstrated that 
mental pain and cruelty has an immediate and long lasting effect on the body 
through stress, which in itself leads to physical symptoms. Reconceptualized in 
this way, other forms of abuse at Abu Ghraib can be seen: torture of the body 
and soul simultaneously; the desecration of the Koran; using dogs as a means 
of torture and control; contaminating Islamic religious prayer sessions with 
the presence of dogs; rape, which inherently involves torture to the psyche and 
body simultaneously; and religion used to torture the soul through anti-religious 
sentiment and actions. An additional abuse includes the hooding of detainees as 
the detainees hear noise and experience physical blows, yet are fully unaware 
of what is going on except through sound, and therefore cannot anticipate or 
predict action. This is torture because it is mental abuse and capriciousness for 
the victim.
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Additional torture of the mind is evident in the before mentioned holding of 
women and children prisoners, without charge and without hopes of being freed 
the principal target of power to analyze contemporary forms of social control over 
both women’s bodies and minds, where femininity is policed in terms of certain 
juridical laws of culturally constructed gender (Bartky 1988, Bordo 1988, Sawicki 
1994). In this case of women and children prisoners, the emphasis on practices 
through which power relations are reproduced converges with the feminist 
project of analyzing the politics of personal relations and altering gendered power 
bodies in that they are imprisoned, such as the argument goes with regard to some 
women’s historical experiences in the institutions of marriage, motherhood and 
compulsory heterosexuality. Hence, at Abu Ghraib, women prisoners did not have 
any power over their bodies or minds as prisoners, and thus women’s relationships 
to their bodies and minds are constrained by their status at Abu Ghraib as pawns 
and as supposedly “protected” prisoners. 
However, all the while, Foucault’s medieval spirit of punishment has just 
mutated into a new form of the same.
Moving beyond Foucault’s Continuum of Punishment and Cruelty
Foucault argues that physical cruelty as a form of punishment has been replaced 
with notions of more humane punishment of the mind and soul in modern 
nations that operate under the principles of the Enlightenment project (Foucault 
[1975]1977). Regarding Abu Ghraib, this does not seem to be the case. Instead, the 
Enlightenment project, as well as postmodern notions of simulacra, are subverted 
by cruelty that involves both the body and the soul.
Subversion is used through the holding of “ghost detainees,” which are people 
who are held without being formally charged. This can be seen as an example of 
what Foucault calls the sovereign’s right to make charges against a person that 
they do not know about (Foucault [1975]1977). Even the notion of “rights” is 
itself an enlightenment ideal that is based on a masculinist narrative (see Rojek’s 
notion of Modernity 1), which is itself a simulacra in this example. 
Consider the story in Time magazine that reports on the murder of a ghost 
detainee by CIA agents at Abu Ghraib after being captured by Navy Seals 
November 4, 2003. Printed plainly in Time magazine was the following: “The 
death of secret detainee Manadel al-Jamadi was ruled a homicide in a Defense 
Department autopsy” (Zagorin 2005). It was stated in The New Yorker that a 
Swanner, continues to work for the CIA. Likewise, in The New Yorker, reports 
of up to four more detainee deaths at the hands of the CIA were acknowledged, 
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yet “US government’s policies on interrogating terrorist suspects may preclude 
the prosecution of CIA agents who commit abuses or even kill detainees” (Mayer 
2005). Where are the rights of these detainees? Are they being considered? 
It is not surprising then to know that at the Sabrina Harman trial, one 
photograph in particular was never shown—the one with her smiling and giving 
the thumbs-up over a body packed in ice, the body of Manadel al-Jamadi. If this 
photograph were shown in court and at the trials, it can be imagined that more 
questions might be asked about who the dead body was that Sabrina was smiling 
over in the photograph, and more importantly, how did that detainee die? What is 
known about the photograph, however, is that Harman was ordered to smile and 
to pose in the picture by Graner, a male guard at Abu Ghraib. In this way, power 
over the body was gendered for Harman in that she was forced by a male superior 
to participate in the photo where she is shown smiling over al-Jamadi’s corpse. 
Moreover, power over al-Jamadi’s body and soul was evidenced in his death at the 
hands of the CIA.
Subversion is also used in this war when one considers current reports of “black 
sites,” or secret prisons run by the CIA, reportedly in locations of the former Soviet 
Bloc Countries. This is yet another example of how the CIA operates outside of 
the law, thereby making the American notion of the rule of law a simulacra itself 
(Baudrillard [1981]1994). In many ways when Baudrillard claims that “the Gulf 
War did not take place” and that there has been a “perfect crime,” it could now 
be heralded that that “American law does not exist” in the postmodern sense, and 
that we have now entered into the “spirit of terrorism” (Baudrillard [2002]2003, 
Baudrillard [1995]1996, Baudrillard [1991]1995).
For Foucault, confession (a form of subversion) is integral for punishment 
(Foucault [1975]1977), and perhaps this is why it was so important for the MI’s 
to get the confession out of detainees. After all, we are seemingly looking for the 
truth through the punishment and control of detainees. However, the American 
MIs used what Foucault would term medieval methods of torture such as physical 
blows and physical suffering to extract these confessions, while simultaneously 
professing adherence to enlightenment narratives. 
However, after attending two separate trials dealing with detainee abuse at Abu 
Ghraib, it became clear to me that these trials were really games of subversive 
Foucault is right, and punishment is now aimed at just punishing the soul, then the 
“bad-apples” would not be shackled in body chains that connected at the ankles, 
wrists, and waist, and also surrounded by giant guards and journalists taking photos 
as they left the courtroom after the verdict. This kind of punishment is aimed at 
both the control of the body and the soul. Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman 
were not just handcuffed on a guarded military base, but their hands were shackled 
to their legs on a guarded military base— the largest Army base in the nation, and 
in front of the entire world view of the media who waited, leisurely camped, and 
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strategically placed to get the best photos of this humiliating spectacle. I argue 
that this spectacle was really about how female soldiers, England and Harman, 
offended the masculinist code of the military by virtue of being female in the 
masculinist military itself, among other reasons.
Punishment is thus an interesting concept coupled with gender and power, and 
can even help explain why relationships existed between the detainees and the 
guards of Abu Ghraib prison. From the point of view of the detainees, there was 
the Stockholm Syndrome of the prisoners— laughing, joking, or complying with 
their abusers. This was documented in court during the Harman trial when Sabrina 
herself stated that “Gilligan,” the man in the hood with the electrodes attached 
Interestingly, this was a strategy in sleep deprivation, and for a detainee that 
soldiers had a “friendship relationship” with. Says Sergeant William Cathcart in 
his testimony regarding the sleep deprivation program, “we wanted an SOP for the 
sleep deprivation program. There should have been a break in the sleep deprivation 
program after 72 hours, but there was nothing in writing” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). 
In Gilligan’s situation, the guards created a game for their “trustee” prisoner in 
order to keep him awake and in response to what they saw as unfair and long 
MI sleep deprivation scenarios being enforced. (In this example, a simulacra of 
torture took place at Abu Ghraib when mock torture sessions were constructed, 
capturing the notion that this is torture of the soul through the mock torture of 
the body. This is a simulation of torture because no shock was delivered and only 
the situation was reconstructed to give the effect of the abuse. See chapter four 
for further explanation.) However, the Stockholm syndrome also applies to some 
of the abusers themselves, as a large number of soldiers (both male and female) 
with whom I spoke with reluctantly disclosed that they were suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from the abuse they suffered and witnessed 
in Iraq and at Abu Ghraib. Thus, in a sense both the American soldiers and the 
detainees became victims of the very punishment that they exacted. 
The “Rationalization” of Rationality
I have demonstrated that rationality associated with modernity has several different 
gendered understandings, and conceptual links to masculine and patriarchal 
systems, where gender can be used to understand “rationality” and “chaos” at 
Abu Ghraib. 
Throughout this analysis, rationality itself has not been used to correct the 
social order; rationality has not been used to restore the legitimacy of the Geneva 
Conventions; instead, a gendered mutation of “masculinist” rationality has been 
used to rationalize torture instead of stopping it. This can be understood as a mutation 
of the masculinist symbolic “code” in that it is neither rational nor logical. At the 
Abu Ghraib prison, rationality applied should have resulted in order, control, and a 
safe prison. Instead, what both the detainees and military personnel of Tier 1A and 
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Tier 1-B at Abu Ghraib prison encountered and experienced was a prison within 
a prison. “Rationalization” of supposed rationality itself occurred throughout the 
Abu Ghraib prison, within government reports, inside of the courtroom itself, and 
throughout the sworn testimony of the courts-martials.
At the Abu Ghraib trials, there was the rationalization that abuse of detainees 
abuse was happening all over the compound of Abu Ghraib (for example, when 
detainees were being taken out of transport trucks, when detainees were moved 
or searched, etc.), and abuse is still happening all over Iraq according to Captain 
Ian Fishback’s account in the , and the more recent 
Levin-McCain Report (2008). This is especially important to point out because 
abuse was occurring before the “rotten apples” arrived in August 2003 at Tier 
1A of Abu Ghraib. More importantly the abuse is still continuing after the abuse 
was reported in January 2004, and well into the year 2005. The abuse has been 
documented to extend well beyond the boundaries of the Abu Ghraib prison, and 
has been documented at FOB Mercury, FOB Tiger, and other bases in Iraq, not to 
mention at U.S. military bases in both Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay. But, 
what remains important is that much of this abuse was gendered in that it aimed 
at garnering power through gender humiliation and homoerotic torture over both 
the body and soul.
Within U.S. government reports, the reports themselves do admit that the chain 
of command set the stage for the abuse and chaos at Abu Ghraib, but rationalized 
that culpability fell entirely on the lower ranking soldiers, two of which were the 
only women at the hard site of Abu Ghraib, and who were shown not to have 
participated in abuse. 
Within the courtroom, the rationalization was that these were just a “few rotten 
apples” doing the abuse, when even expert witnesses such as Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic 
terminology as within the government reports themselves, and as evidenced by 
the expansiveness of the abuse. Additionally, the judge had complete control of 
what would be admitted for evidence into the trials, thereby performing the iconic 
role of masculine control. Hence, the wider reasonable connection between abuse 
at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan was never allowed to be heard 
within the courtroom. Says Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic, right before the judge forcibly 
cleared the courtroom, sending Mestrovic out and the panel immediately back 
into deliberation, “connect the dots of the migration of abuse, Guantanamo Bay, 
Afghanistan, Abu Ghraib, Iraq.” Even Captain Fishback’s report on the Human 
Rights Watch Report web page was denied entry into the trial as evidence because 
of its supposed yet seemingly incorrect “non-relevance” to the abuse cases being 
tried at Fort Hood. Instead, the rationalizing in the courtroom was that this abuse 
was caused by a few “rotten apples,” and seemingly continues in Iraq in part, it 
was argued at the courts-martial, because of their doing.
Considering the testimony heard at the trial of Lynndie England, not one 
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held liable or culpable for the abuse itself. The government reports demonstrated 
knew or should 
have known under U.S. Army protocol that the abuse was occurring. Hence, the 
thereby a rationalization for their “acquittal” occurred.
It is through the rationalizations in each of these aspects—the prison, the 
government reports, the courtroom, and the testimony—that reason itself was 
presented as a simulacrum. “Reason” itself was not killed, as Baudrillard would 
have us believe ([1995]1996), but an economy of rationalization has sprung up to 
replace it, where at one time gendered masculine rationality and enlightenment 

Testimony of Major David DiNenna, U.S. 
Army, Sabrina Harman Courts-Martial
Major David DiNenna, U.S. Army, was called as a witness on May 16, 2005 for 
Q: For the record state your rank, name, and unit of assignment?
A: Major David DiNenna, Senior, currently assigned to the 220th MP Brigade. 
Q: Sir, can you tell us about the conditions that you found at Abu Ghraib when 
you got there?
arrived—when the 72nd MP Company was present in Abu Ghraib operating 
Camp Vigilant and a couple hundred prisoners, within the four walls of Abu 
Ghraib itself was trash, debris, glass, metal, rubble, packs of wild dogs, rodents. 
It had been looted by the civilian populous after the Regime released all the 
prisoners so it was in a—it was total disarray and trash. 
Q: And, sir, can you tell us about the hygienic conditions or lack of hygienic 
conditions there?
A: Whenever a soldier or a unit arrived at Abu Ghraib, most of the soldiers came 
existed. They would be like that for a couple of days and then get over it. Some 
would get it again, and some wouldn’t. The lucky ones wouldn’t get it at all, 
Q: Did you have enough medical personal, sir, to take care of these soldiers who 
were getting sick?
A: We were extremely limited on medical personal throughout the entire time. 
other medics from all the other units created an aide station, so to speak. But 
between—we had to serve the soldiers as well as the prisoners. So we—bottom 
line we didn’t have the enough medical personal. 
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A: Extremely. They—we had a lot of diabetes, TB. Based on their diet change 
their health went down very quickly. Towards the end we were doing two to 
three MEDVACs a day for heart conditions, diabetics, I think, stuff as well. A 
lot of amputees, and wounded prisoners came in. So they had a great deal of 
problems. 
Q: And what was the danger level at Abu Ghraib in the middle of all of this, sir?
A: It was extremely high. We had a very high threat external as well as internal, 
we’d have between 7 and 9,000 prisoners and they have a hundred soldiers per 
shift to watch them all. WE had to deal with that as well as the constant mortar 
Q: And did you have enough soldiers to deal with all of these attacks, sir?
A: No. The misconception is that when you guard soldiers you simply stand there 
and watch—or when you guard prisoners you stand there and just watch them. 
That is not the case. WE averaged probably between a 100 and 150 prisoners 
per soldier. We didn’t have near enough military police so lots of personal were 
required for extra security for the MPs to run three different facilities as well as 
escorts, and QRF, and the list is just endless. WE were probably about a battalion 
and a company short of personal. 
Q: And how was the stress level there then, sir, for you and other soldiers?
A:  Well it was extremely high. Soldiers were probably worked between a 12 
and 16 hour day. We would try to give them at least a half of day or a day off so 
they could do laundry. But besides that—between that and the attacks—when 
you guard prisoners and you’re attacked you just don’t seek safety for yourself, 
you also have to keep guarding the prisoners because they’ll attempt to escape 
which they tried many times when we were attacked. So it’s kind of two full 
missions when you’re a soldier guarding prisoners, which made the stress level 
extremely high. 
Q: Did you have many occasions of escape, sir?
A: We had—in the outside facilities we had 11 prisoners escape. In the outside 
facility we had a couple escape but they were usually aided by the Iraqi 
Q: Sir, you just mentioned lack of lighting, could you tell us about that?
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A: Well obviously when you guard prisoners you need lights at night. Lighting 
was an issue the entire time. We—you know, generators were—or lights would 
them replaced. There was an Army contract to install permanent lighting in the 
So there were times when we had to bring in vehicles around the compounds just 
to add enough lighting to keep it on the prisoners at night. 
Q: How often would say that occurred?
A: At the beginning it was quite a few times at Camp Vigilant. Ganci was a very 
large facility that even the truck lighting wouldn’t help that much. And then 
the hard site prison itself, the generators just wouldn’t continue to run so that 
the capability of taking apart the bunks and developing—making weapons out 
of the metal. So the lighting for the entire times was an issue, discredited—we 
never resolved it. 
Q: Sir, can you explain to us how the—how did—people taking apart these 
bunks and making weapons?
A: Prisoners had nothing to do all day but come up with ideas of how to make 
weapons. They—when they built the hard site prison, they didn’t use proper—
they didn’t—well the bunks, they didn’t use proper cement when they put in the 
bars on the windows. It was basically just a—they wanted to get it done quick. 
CPA wasn’t really there to supervise them, they actually didn’t get there until 
could just chip away at the cement on the bars, they would take them out and 
they could basically just bend the bunks until the metal broke which they did in 
quite a few of the tiers when they had uprises. 
Q: And, sir, can you tell us about these uprisings in the tiers?
A: In the hard site prison?
Q: Yes, sir.
A: Most of the uprisings were a result of the food, overcrowded, being detained 
for a lengthy periods of time where they either were not interrogated by MI or 
they didn’t receive timely court dates. So even though they’re locked down in 
a cell so to speak, there’s six to eight prisoners per cell. We also let the Iraqi 
the result was—we would then take over the operation from them, bring in the 
internal reaction force for cell detractions. The problem was that if—you could 
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hear it throughout the entire hard site prison so if one tier erupted then another 
tier would be erupt and at the time we only had 8 to 10 MPs in the entire hard site 
to work the facility because that was all the soldiers we had left. 
Q: And how many prisoners would you have in the entire hard site with these 8 
to 10 soldiers?
A: Towards the end they would bring us around 1,500 to 2,000 throughout the 
whole hard site. 
Q: And, sir, you talked about the fact that food was a factor in the uprising. 
Could you tell us a little bit more about the food issues at Abu Ghraib?
A: Initially we started with MREs for the prisoners. When a contract was set up 
through a local Iraqi Company, it was actually subcontracted, was set up through 
a local Iraqi Company it was actually subcontracted to a hotel in Baghdad, and 
then subcontracted to another company that would deliver the food. The food 
was usually undercooked, it was dirty, it had debris, the food had rodent, feces, 
and glass. At times for their evening meal they would receive a boiled egg and 
two pieces of cheese which obviously the prisoners didn’t appreciate. IT got 
to the point where they were either throwing stones or rocks at the vendors 
themselves or throw the food back at the MPs. 
include looking on it every time it came in. So a lot of the times we would just 
throw the vendors out the gate, so to speak, and give the prisoners the MREs 
which made them very happy. 
Q: And, sir, what kind of issues did you have with giving the prisoners the 
MREs, did that cause issues for the soldiers?
A: Well, midway through some—around the November timeframe we were 
directed not to purchase any more MREs. 
Q: Directly from who, sir?
A: Major General Orfakawski at the CGTS center. They wanted to use 
humanitarian meals which we couldn’t—they couldn’t give us enough because 
we were well over capacity. However, we did have some MREs on hand that are 
kept for the prisoners because we knew that the Iraqi Food Contract was going 
to continue, so it would be an issue. The other thing was we’d have to take out 
the warming products, good serving work products. We also had to take out the 
Tabasco sauce and a lot of things that they could use to make weapons which 
they would use the Tabasco sauce for. So to feed 6,000 prisoners on the outside, 
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on the outside compounds as well as the ones on the inside of the hard site, 
MREs was a lengthy process because you had to sit there and trip their MREs. 
It took quite a bit of time which made the prisoners pretty upset which then puts 
more stress on the soldiers because they had to deal with that issue.
Q: And you said that there was some issue about overcrowding in the hard site. 
Can you tell us about that, sir?
A: Yes, actually overcrowding existed everywhere. You know basically our 
mission—entire mission we should have seven MPs on the gate so to speak for 
500 prisoners and as well as the tower guards. So it would be approximately 
10 or 11 MPs per 500 prisoners. You do the same ratio—in a hard site facility 
it’s different, that’s basically a corrections operation, which is entirely different 
than the internment resettlement operation, so the issue we ran in to at the hard 
site when they put a lot of the Iraqi Civilian Criminals in there is they just kept 
opening tiers and kept putting them in, but we didn’t get an increase in soldiers 
and they did the same on the outside at Ganci and at Camp Vigilant as well. 
Q: And could you tell us about the issues you had with detainees being kept in 
custody longer than those who were—not having court dates?
A: Well it existed both for the—well they labeled security detainees, which was 
attacks on coalition forces and it was the same case for the civilian detainee—
the criminal detainees which was Iraqi on Iraqi violations. Every time a new 
sweep—or operation would come in and those who were to be interrogated 
would be pushed on the back burner and these new ones coming would then be 
interrogated. Well if you multiply this by six months you have a prisoner that 
was there for six months and never spoken to either by MI or the same would 
happen with the civilian courts, they were just standing them up. So civilian 
criminals that were there for—in the beginning would be there towards the end 
as well ----
…. 
Questions by the Defense Counsel Continued
Q: Sir, were there women and children kept at Tier 1 Alpha and Tier 1 Bravo at 
the hard site?
A: To answer the question, yes, they were in 1 Bravo. 
Q: 1 Bravo. Sir, can you tell us about that? Why were women and children kept 
in 1 Bravo?
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A: The issue was when either the Iraqi Police or the capturing unit U.S.—for the 
coalition units would bring a prisoner to Abu Ghraib, it didn’t matter whether it 
was a male or female or juvenile. We could obviously not—we could not keep 
them in Camp Vigilant or Camp Ganci where you had 7,000 male prisoners, so 
we—since Tier 1 Bravo was complete we used Tier 1 Bravo for females and 
juveniles. And the unit there did put up—did ensure that the female prisoners 
had sheets, they would hang sheets so that no one could see inside their cells. 1 
Alpha was not used, we had male prisoners in 1 AlphA: Then they would take 
the—as they started opening prisoners in Baghdad, juvenile facilities they would 
try to transfer some of the juveniles to those facilities. 
CPA and MI came to me and said we had to empty out 1 Bravo because of a 
particular sweep they were doing and they needed it. Well, I did that, but it sat 
vacant for weeks and I was still receiving juveniles and females so I had to put 
them back in there which was another issue. But that’s the only segregation 
place that we had. 
Q: So you did the best that you could with what little you had, sir?
A: Correct. Sometime in January we were able to open up a tier strictly for 
juveniles. 
Q: Sir, how young would you say was the youngest juvenile you had?
A: I think it was 12----
 … 
Q: And, sir, were there ever times where women and children were brought in 
and they did not commit a crime or they were just brought in to Abu Ghraib 
because they had been with somebody who was arrested?
A: Yes.
 …
Q: Sir, can you tell us about the water conditions at Abu Ghraib? Did you have 
enough water for the soldiers and the prisoners?
was rationed for the soldiers, which was two liter bottles per day. When we were 
just to supply the prisoners with water as well as the soldiers. What that entails 
is two water trucks and then three or four HMMWVs which was a lot of personal 
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because they delivered the water in fuel trucks, because we inspected the water 
that was trying to pump water from the outside, purify it, and then run it through 
to the facilities. Yet some of those hoses and water buckets were damaged by 
more water runs to BIOP. So it was an issue throughout. 
Q: Sir, um, you called that convoy with the water trucks and HMMWV, the 
security HMMWVs had to take IED Alley. Can you tell us why it was called 
IED Alley, sir?
A: Abu Ghraib was basically set up in the middle of the Sunni Triangle between 
Fallujah and Baghdad. So, to get to the BIOP, Baghdad International Airport, 
we had to travel down the road which was right in front of Abu Ghraib Prison 
which ran right down to BIOP. When IEDs, I guess for the lack of a better term, 
became popular as a tool to use there was so much ruble and debris on the side 
of the road just as well as dead animals which were used to place the bombs in 
so to speak and they knew it was heavily traveled. It was basically the only route 
to be—was actually the safest route which was going through the towns on the 
north side of the prison which had a lot of markets that would be congested. So 
they really targeted that route. 
Q: So IED Alley was the safest route your soldiers could take, sir?
A: Correct, from the prison to BIAP yes. 
Q: Sir, can you explain to us what the Sunni Triangle means?
A: Um, it’s a—I guess we interpreted it as being the stronghold or the most 
support for Saddam Hussein and his Regime, and then it was three locations and 
it was basically just in the middle of a combat zone is where they put the facility. 
 … 
Q: Sir, can you tell us about when the porta johns came in to Abu Ghraib?
and then the soldiers. Then the issue became throughout September until we 
got them in February, the contractor who was supposed to pump out the porta 
johns sometimes wouldn’t show up or there was so much they had to empty 
it and come back and sometimes they wouldn’t come back. So therefore the 
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soldiers and the prisoners which obviously created chaos. 
Q: Sir, can you tell us about the supply issues at Abu Ghraib between the 
September/January timeframe? Or October and January timeframe … for the 
prisoners and the soldiers?
…
A: For the prisoners, once the prisoners were obviously captured during the 
summer months so when they came in they had shorts and they had no shoes, 
short sleeve shirts. We requested in June that we needed contracts set up for 
winter clothing for the prisoners. Up until sometime in December we still had 
not received adequate clothing and blankets. We were able to get enough Korans 
which were passed out to one tent—at the compound we had 20 tents so each 
tent received one Koran which was for the prisoners to pass around which they 
did. So for the prisoners themselves the clothing was probably the biggest issue. 
To them obviously when it gets down to 70 degrees it’s very cold as it was for us 
as we were going through the summer. For the soldiers it ranged from everything 
from meals to some type of air conditioning or basic supplies, radios, we didn’t 
have any—or enough handheld radios whatsoever to communicate at all, which 
was an issue the entire time. Soldiers were actually purchasing—calling home 
and having them sent over. Because we put in a contract for a Motorola Base 
Station, but it was denied and then it was approved when we left. Pretty much 
everything was approved when we left. 
Q: Sir, can you tell us about the issues with clothing supplies to prisoners in the 
beginning in terms of lack of jump suits and things like that, sir?
A: That was mostly the issue in the hard site. CPA was again responsible for 
that facility. Tier 1 Alpha and 1 Bravo was basically given to the MI community 
for their, I guess, higher intelligence value prisoners. But for the rest of the 
facility it was CPAs responsibility. Again they actually didn’t show any 
representation. They visited once in a while, but they weren’t really there as 
often as they were supposed to be. The problem we ran in to was when the Iraqi 
you couldn’t tell who was who because they didn’t have the uniforms for the 
suits for the prisoners, but though they were prisoners, to us very quickly they 
weren’t keeping up with the supplies we had which again created a problem. As 
didn’t have—a lot of them didn’t have uniforms in the beginning so it was—you 
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Q: And, sir, can you just, um, verify for the record what the CPA means?
A: Coalition Provisional Authority. 
Q: Thank you, sir. Sir, you—it sounds like in the beginning at least with this 
place we hear you had to depend a lot on the Iraqi Police or IP, did you have any 
issues with the Iraqi Police or--?
A: Well there’s the difference between the Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Correctional 
hands with the families of the prisoners is a big deal. 
Q: What do you mean about that, sir?
A: They would know a prisoner who may be in a particular village, or tribe, or 
receive money and then would assist the prisoner to escape. They smuggled in 
weapons to the prisoners. When the Iraqi----
Q: ----what kind of weapons, sir?
A: Well what’s known is the handgun that was smuggled in around the November 
24th timeframe. They also would send—would smuggle in razor blades from the 
Iraqi Medical Facility which was later set up. And they would take them on work 
details and just let them go. Give them a change of clothes. We spent a lot of time 
… 
Q: Sir, at the time that you were at Abu Ghraib going through all of these issues, 
what were you feeling?
A: Abandoned. 
Q: Why?
A: Actually I guess the theater IG, I can’t remember the colonel’s name, arrived 
towards the end of September, beginning of October timeframe I believe and 
basically stated that we were forgotten, we were a forgotten mission. We were 
set up just to keep these prisoners and keep them out of the way. 
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You know, when you’re at a facility whether it’s a hard site prison or tents on 
the outside, it’s—you’re setting up a city and you need the resources to do that, 
we weren’t supplied. 
Q: Sir, did you ever have the opportunity to bring these issues up to your chain 
of command?
A: Daily. Every day from July to February we sent up a Situation Report that 
there was approximately 240 times just on paper that they were addressed we 
had visits from now Sergeant Major of the Army Preston who was a Command 
Sergeant Major for Lieutenant General Sanchez, September/October timeframe, 
anywhere it was brought to her attention. Obviously it went through the computer 
and based on my decisions. 
Q: And, sir, what would be the response to the daily e-mails for help?
much ever materialized. So I guess the response would be okay we got it, but it 
was the same when we had VIPs visit or anything. They’d ask who do we need, 
we’d tell them, and they would leave and I guess so would the request. 
 … 
Q: Sir, have you talked about bringing—you brought these issues to them, what 
was his response?
A: That he was taking it back to the CJTF7 and work the issues. 
Q: And how many times did you see Command Sergeant Major Preston. 
A: I did personally a couple of times as well as the other Sergeant Major that 
escorted him around.
Q: And his response was the same?
A: Yes we’d like to receive a DFAC in December which was a pretty inadequate 
event. It was—the food wasn’t properly prepared and so a lot of the soldiers 
timeframe BIAP was right down the street and soldiers knew that—what the 
conditions they had at BIOP were much better than ours and couldn’t understand 
why we couldn’t receive certain things which affected the morale and stress 
obviously. 
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Q: Sir, can you tell us if you spoke with General Sanchez when he came down 
to Abu Ghraib?
were brought up. 
Q: And what was his response, sir?
A: Basically talking to our staff and ensuring that they receive that so to speak. 
And I guess they took it back. 
Q: Was anything ever done, sir?
A: Actually up until the story—they declared Abu Ghraib an enduring base 
which meant the funnel was opened up—or everything opened and we came 
into a very small funnel. We didn’t have the resources that they were trying 
through the November timeframe, and then it was the MI Brigade commander 
was appointed as the FOB commander. 
Q: When was that, sir.
A: In November of ’03. 
(16 May 2005, SHCM)

Chapter 3 
The Abuse was Reported: Parsonian Gender 
The social system at Abu Ghraib was not self-correcting; rather, it was self-
perpetuating. 
Captain Jonathan Crisp, Defense Attorney, Lynndie England Courts-Martial
I wanted to kind of pursue a career in the military but now, after this—these 
incidents, you know, I’m not really going that route anymore, sir. 
Specialist Matthew Wisdom, MP [May 17, 2005, SHCM]
I would put the men and women of my company up against any active duty 
company. That one wing was a very small part of what we did. I saw a number 
of acts of courage, dignity and professionalism from my soldiers. These acts were 
Captain Donald J. Reese [June 24, 2004, SHA32]
I think they were in a very abusive situation. I think that yes, not only the detainees, 
but they themselves [the soldiers]… there was a climate of fear and intimidation in 
which to various degrees they were internalized … the U.S. Government’s Reports 
say, which with sociology say, there’s a mixture of institutional responsibility and 
individual responsibility. 
Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic, Expert Witness, Sabrina Harman Courts-Martial
Feminist social theory is aimed at the analysis of the subordination and 
marginalization of women from social and cultural arenas, and is focused on 
the analysis of male power as dominant over women.1 This kind of analysis of 
power associated with gender shows how our society and culture is organized in 
terms of attitudes and beliefs concerning gender categories. Further, these gender 
categories inscribe gender roles in terms of power. 
Power coupled with gender informs the organization of society and thus are 
1 As stated earlier, it is important to note that gender experiences differ between 
regard to race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and cultural value, among many other hierarchical 
and intersected ways.
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analysis of gender constructions shows how gender roles have been conceived of as 
a means for establishing and sustaining social control. From these understandings 
of power coupled with gender, social roles emerge and social theorists have come 
up with many different ways to discuss these gendered roles. 
In this chapter, I discuss one social theorist, Talcott Parsons, and his notion of 
instrumental and expressive gender roles, and argue that his gender roles served 
a multitude of functions simultaneously and especially given the masculinist 
code of the military; however, I move beyond Parsons, and argue that given 
the complex social situations at Abu Ghraib, Parsons’ notions of “instrumental” 
and “expressive” are limited with regard to their explanatory power. I therefore 
construct new theoretical terms to illustrate the dysfunctions at Abu Ghraib and 
through the creative refashioning of Parsonian theory.
Parsons Instrumental and Expressive
Talcott Parsons developed his systems theory of the sexual division of labor 
based on biological sex roles within the family (Parsons 1937, Parsons 1951, 
Parsons 1954, Parsons and Bales 1955). According to Parsons, both gender roles 
and behaviors are informed by biological, psychological, social and cultural 
gender socializations, and we come to understand these associations of gender as 
associated with sex categories initially within the family itself. Additionally, these 
gender roles function in tandem toward equilibrium and assimilation with all of 
society’s other subsystems in a structural functional manner.
In Parsonian terms, the “expressive” feminine role is associated with care 
giving and domestic mothering obligations, is concerned with the welfare of 
others, aimed at providing emotional assistance, as well as a sense of belonging or 
integration to the family/group. Parsons associates the “instrumental” masculine 
role with the man’s ability to earn a wage in the public sphere, and other rational 
goal centered tasks. In this way, Parsons views the male as a social “agent” who 
thinks in terms of “rationally-linked goals and means,” and is valued for such 
within society (Parsons and Bales 1955). The social world thus becomes organized 
in this gendered way, where sex categories are associated with these Parsonian 
gender roles, both as a means of providing social order and social solidarity for the 
family and larger culture as well.
I use Parsons to analyze Abu Ghraib because his theory of gender is relevant 
when discussing the U.S. military, as this context still works culturally on such 
basic gender stereotypes and prejudices.2 In previous publications (see Caldwell 
2 Although gender theory has developed considerably since Parsons’ writings, his 
at both the trials and the events at the prison itself. Feminists, gender theorists, and queer 
theorists have deconstructed gender roles ; however, the U.S. military does not 
seem to have participated in this critical thinking project as of yet.
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and Mestrovic 2008), applying Parsons’ dichotomies to gender stereotypes of 
U.S. military culture was helpful when explaining the rigid typecasts of gender 
roles within the military. However, I expand Parsons’ theorizing and show that 
his distinctions between instrumental and expressive are functional, even in 
dysfunctional social situations, and especially given the masculinist code of the 
military. 
For example, in previous publications my colleague and I (see Caldwell 
and Mestrovic 2008) explain in detail the variations of instrumental-expressive 
distinctions that emerged at Abu Ghraib with the following thematic descriptions: 
expressive abuse, or when abuse is strategically expressive in nature because it 
will bring about an instrumental end (such as the instrumental taking of women 
and children as hostages or bargaining chips at Abu Ghraib, and the playing 
upon emotions for their release; or the instrumental use of women’s panties on 
prisoner’s heads as a means for expressive humiliation); expressive torture or 
when during torture there is an emotional bond formed, much like a Stockholm 
Syndrome type scenario, between the abuser and abused, and where the torture 
itself has no rational goals/means instrumental plan for interrogation (such as 
with “Gilligan” the hooded detainee on the box); and the instrumental misuse of 
expressive functions or when Military Intelligence manipulates emotions as part 
of an instrumental, goal-oriented strategy (such as the calculated use of dogs and 
also nudity to break down prisoners through the use of cultural values and social 
norms as torture tactics themselves).
In this additional expanded and revisited chapter on Parsons’ notion of 
instrumental and expressive, I show how the use of these gender markers helps to 
explain the several circumstances where the “rotten apples” and those associated 
with Tier 1A and 1B actually did report the abuse that they saw and witnessed 
at Abu Ghraib, however without response from their chain of command. I use 
Parsons’ theory of instrumental and expressive gender roles to discuss these 
reports of abuse, and show how a sociologically imagined, creative and expanded 
reading of Parsons helps explain further what took place at Abu Ghraib in 
gendered terms. New theoretical concepts such as the instrumental perceived 
reporting of abuse (where abuse is reported in the perceived belief the chain of 
command will respond, yet with a failed goal/means outcome), the expressive non-
reporting of abuse (where abuse is not reported because of fear associated with 
the consequences of reporting and other expressive reasons), and the instrumental 
actual reporting of abuse (where abuse is reported with an actual means/goal or 
end outcome) are developed to illustrate this additional gendered interpretation. 
It is my aim to point out that responsibility for abuse is not only at the individual 
level, but also collectively at higher levels for command responsibility within the 
military, and that this kind of joint responsibility for abuse was non-existent at Abu 
Ghraib and the courts-martials. 
 As a functionalist, Parsons is concerned with maintaining system homeostasis, 
and even when that system is a prison. Abu Ghraib was characterized in court, in 
government reports, and in interviews as chaotic and thus “socially disorganized” 
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confusion of standard operating procedures as well as role expectations; confusion 
about the leadership of the prison itself; serious supply shortages including soldiers 
to guard prisoners, food, water, and clothing; overcrowding; lack of due process 
for prisoners; lack of training and military discipline, and other things (Mestrovic 
and Caldwell 2010, Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008b, Karpinski 2005, Mestrovic 
2007, Strasser 2004). In fact, says Seargent Hydrue Joyner (an MP in charge of the 
day shift at Abu Ghraib) in his testimony at the England trial regarding his orders 
at Abu Ghraib: “Here are the prisoners, this is how we treat them, good luck!” This 
statement is further evidence of the dysfunctional social system at the prison, with 
no established set of rules, including standard operating procedures. Nonetheless, 
even with these chaotic characterizations of the overall conditions at Abu Ghraib, I 
still argue that Parsons’ instrumental and expressive dimensions, and their creative 
reinterpretations and applications, “functioned” with regard to understanding the 
reporting of abuse. To be clear, abuse was reported. Nothing was done with those 
reports up the chain of command within the dysfunctional social climate of Abu 
Ghraib. 
The Punishing of Rapists, October 24-25, 2003
On October 24 and 25, there was a torture incident at Abu Ghraib that was 
captured in photographs in response to three Iraqi detainees who were thought 
to have raped a 15-year-old boy. (Interestingly, the prosecutor disclosed at the 
trials that none of these Iraqis were actually rapists.) What is known is that these 
were tied together in homoerotic poses, and were verbally abused. Looking at 
the photos of abuse, the prisoners had abrasions and were bleeding from damage 
of that evening: Rivera, Cruz, Krohl, Graner, Harman, Frederick, Adele the Iraqi 
and Unknown 2). 
When Specialist Israel Rivera, a 19-year-old Military Intelligence soldier, took 
the stand at the Harman trial, he stated in his testimony, “SPC Cruz came to the 
living quarters around 1900 and told me about a rape of a 15-year-old boy. I was 
told that two or three detainees held him down and raped him. I asked what they 
(June 24, 2004, SHA32). (Rivera also said in his sworn statement that the purpose 
for him being present at this incident was to witness the show of force against the 
detainees.) Rivera established the heterosexist environment of the prison when 
he stated, “the soldier with the green BDUs [Graner] had a speaker box with a 
microphone attached to it. He was shouting homosexual slurs into the cell that 
the detainees were in” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). Further explaining the events of 
the night, Rivera continued, “The detainees were taken out of the cell and were 
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shaking. They were told to get down on their stomachs and crawl, and to drag their 
SPC Cruz if we even knew if they did what they were accused of. He said that one 
of them came forward and recanted … The detainees were frightened; they were 
shaking, begging and crying. It is terrible for an Arab to be naked with another 
man. They begged for us to stop” (June 24 2004, SHA32). 
Then came more homoerotic abuse. Said Rivera, “After the log rolling they 
were gathered by the MPs into a mass of bodies. They were just—not stacked, 
they were placed to where they were almost hugging each other, so it seemed that 
they were having homosexual relations and they were chained up so that the—so 
they wouldn’t be able to resist, and they were able to maintain style—hold on 
each other … they were handcuffed in such a way that they were embraced” (May 
13, 2005, SHCM). This is an example of the instrumental misuse of expressive 
functions (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008b), although in this case, both MI and 
MP are using expressive torture tactics to executing the abuse. Further, Rivera 
without being contaminated—and Specialist Cruz was using his feet to push down 
on the buttocks of these detainees to make them seem as though they were having 
sex” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). The trial counsel asked Rivera how Corporal Graner 
would move the detainees, and Rivera responded, “He would grab arms of legs 
to manipulate movement … he was manipulating their limbs in order to get that 
embrace” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). In Parsonian terms, Graner was instrumentally 
moving the detainees in a planned way, towards an end torture tactic, and using 
expressive means of gender and sexuality humiliation as punishment itself. 
Moreover, in his sworn statement, Rivera was asked if the top leadership knew 
about the abuse of prisoners, if they were “in the loop,” “looking the other way,” 
or “oblivious” … and Rivera answered that they were “oblivious.”
Rivera added that he was shocked at what he saw in terms of the abuse that 
night, claiming, “When you are there and you see this going on it has an effect 
on you” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). He maintained that he just stood there shocked, 
watching, not knowing that photographs were even being taken. Although Rivera 
was offered immunity for testifying against Harman, he was initially charged with 
dereliction of duty, or the failure to protect Iraqi detainees from abuse, cruelty, 
and maltreatment, as it was their duty to do so, and as if the soldiers could have 
stopped the abuse. So why did Rivera not attempt to stop the abuse?
Rivera stated in open court that he was afraid—afraid to stop the abuse that 
evening because he had fear of his fellow-soldiers—fear that they would retaliate 
against him physically. Disclosed Rivera, “I feel an obligation to step in if someone 
is in violation of the law. I did not step in and stop this situation because I was in 
expressive non-
reporting of abuse, where abuse is not reported because of expressive reasons, in 
this case, emotions of fear and also possibly the maintaining of group cohesion 
and unity. (Had Rivera reported abuse, he perceived the group would have turned 
on him.) In this example, for Rivera to display the emotion of fear within the 
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context of the hyper-masculine U.S. military, he came across as expressive in the 
Parsonian sense. In the everyday language that I heard soldiers use during my 
research and within the trials, Rivera would have been labeled as a “pussy” had he 
protested the abuse. 
Nonetheless, Rivera did end up telling someone—he told his female friend 
of the same rank, Specialist Ann Schlagel, who reported it to a superior. Stated 
Rivera, “As I was leaving the tier Specialist Cruz asked me if I was going to say 
anything and I told him that I wouldn’t ... The morning after I told Specialist Ann 
Schlagel … I told her of the entire incident in full … it was someone that I could 
trust … she came up to me, she said, you know, that thing you told me about, 
that thing with the detainees and Cruz, it has been taken care of. She said she had 
talked to [MP, NCOIC] Sergeant Joyner” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). Indeed, the 
female defense counsel Captain Takemura hammered Rivera with questions about 
why it was that he didn’t report this incident further up the chain of command, and 
why he did not follow up on his report.
Q (defense counsel Takemaura): You basically lied to him [Cruz] and told him 
I’m not [going to tell anyone]? … Because you’re afraid of Cruz?
A: I was at the time, yes.
Q: And despite the fact that this was such an emotional turmoil for you, the only 
person you went to was somebody that you were really close to, is that correct?
A: Correct … Schlagel.
Q: And she told you that, in fact, that you both needed to talk to somebody about 
this? ... And yet you never did? … because you trusted her when she told you 
that, in fact, she had taken care of it, is that correct? … You never talked with 
Sergeant Joyner though, did you?
A: No, ma’am, I didn’t. 
Q: Ok, and as an American soldier that was at Tier 1 that night, it was your duty 
to make sure that these detainees were safe … and you never stopped what was 
going on …
A: No, I never made any effort to make it stop.
Q: And you said that Staff Sergeant Frederick was there? ... and Corporal Graner 
was there?... and you never asked [them] what was going on or tr[ied] to stop 
[them]?
A: No, ma’am
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Q: Because you were afraid?
A: Well I mean they were the ones—authority with the rank and they were the 
ones that were doing this, it seemed rather foolish of me to say, hey, what are you 
guys doing? It seemed like I would be compromising my own safety … because 
they were willing to do this to a detainee why would they not do it to me?
(May 13, 2005, SHCM)
It is clear from Rivera’s testimony that he did not trust his fellow soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib, and the one that he did was a female. Interestingly, the phrase “don’t 
be a pussy” was used by soldiers at the prison when fellow soldiers resisted 
abusing prisoners, and this very comment is a gendered statement focused on the 
belittling of masculinity within the hyper-masculinist context of the U.S. military 
itself—perhaps even the belittling of Rivera. It could be argued that Rivera’s fear 
itself went against the unwritten “code” (Baudrillard 1983a, Lyotard [1979]1984) 
of constructed military masculinity, and thus his crimes can be construed as 
embarrassing the U.S. with his feminine-expressive and passive reactions of fear, 
and even though he did not participate in physical abuse.
Additionally, according to Rivera’s testimony, the phrase “You didn’t see shit!” 
was commonplace at Abu Ghraib when referring to the abuse as well. Indeed, 
Jeremy Sivits, a mechanic at Abu Ghraib who only witnessed a small portion of 
the abuse, stated that he didn’t report abuse for the following reasons, “Because 
I was asked not to, sir … [by] Staff Sergeant Frederick … As I was leaving the 
tier that night he said, ‘Hey Sivits, you didn’t see shit!’”(May 13, 2005, SHCM). 
This was a Parsonian instrumental command using the expressive emotion of fear 
(from someone who outranked him, nonetheless) as a “guarantee” for the non-
reporting of abuse, and in some ways, it worked. Both of the above statements 
have functions in terms of the expressive non-reporting of abuse in that they 
instrumentally either create a co-conspirator through the use of expressive fear 
(“Don’t be a pussy!”), or through the use of fear keeps the fact that abuse took 
place concealed (“You didn’t see shit!”). Again, Parsons’ notion of instrumental 
and expressive does not fully make sense of how expressiveness can achieve an 
instrumental goal, and so a re-interpretation of Parsons is required. 
25 and stated that another MI agent named Roman Krohl woke him up and 
said, “Hey we’re punishing rapists!” Cruz stated at the trials that the “rules of 
engagement were loose so we could do what we want” and also that he “helped 
the photographs of abuse look sexual, and I argue expressive-gendered and 
homoerotic, Cruz insisted on the stand and to the prosecutor that the naked and 
tied up embrace of the prisoners was instrumental in nature aimed at their control, 
and “to keep them from kicking and biting.” Although Cruz did not report the 
abuse up the MI chain of command (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008b), he did 
report the abuse to a higher-up. Attorney Frank Spinner asked Cruz in court if 
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he reported the incident to anyone, and Cruz answered, “The next day, to the day 
shift, MP NCOIC of the hard site, Sergeant Joyner … the only [other] thing that 
I did was a little while later, I would say a week or two … I went and asked him 
and he said he took care of it” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). The fact that Cruz did 
go back and check to see if the report had been acted upon was instrumental and 
focused on an end outcome—one we can never know—perhaps that of ending 
for torture? Nonetheless, the very fact that Cruz revisited his reporting attempt, 
 
instrumental actual report in nature, focused on a means/end goal outcome. Says 
the civilian defense attorney, “to your knowledge you’re not aware of any action 
taken as a result of that report at that time?” Replied Cruz, “No, sir.” (May 13, 
2005, SHCM).
Perhaps the best example of an instrumental actual report from the October 
event, where the soldier made sure that his report was heard, was seen in Ken 
Davis’ testimony. Davis was an MP in the 372nd at Abu Ghraib, and stated 
that he had sought several different outlets to report the abuse from the night 
of October 24-25, 2003. Davis stated that he was sure that it was MI who was 
Krol. Trial counsel asked Davis, “And you’ve been pretty insistent upon that and 
you’ve sought a number of outlets to do that in, correct? ... the ? 
CNN Live with Paula Zahn? ABC News? Hardball with Chris Matthews?” He 
responded, “That’s correct, sir” (May 16, 2005, SHCM). The civilian defense 
counsel Frank Spinner had the following exchange with Davis in court about his 
role in reporting abuse:
Q (Frank Spinner): With respect to talking to various news programs about this 
case, why did you talk to those news programs?
tried to report it and no one was listening so I went to my congressman and I 
told him either you all would listen or I would tell the media.
Q: And, in fact, you appeared before Congress too didn’t you?
A: Members of the Armed Services Committee, yes, sir.
Q: So, again, were you just doing this because you wanted to be the center of 
attention?
A: No, sir, it’s because I want the truth, sir.
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Q: … Cruz or Krul, were they also talking on this program? ... and was the[ir] 





A: The next day to Lieutenant Raeder, sir … I told him that MI was doing some 
pretty weird things with naked detainees. (May 16, 2005, SHCM)
felt that he was not heard. He occupied the role of an active and threatening 
autonomous agent, both at Fort Lee and with his congresswoman, and in a 
creative whistleblowing attempt approached the media. Not only did this 
tactic serve the goal of explaining what was happening at Abu Ghraib, but it 
also “corrected” the story of those who attempted to explain the abuse to the 
media initially, yet were perpetrators of the abuse itself according to Davis and 
others. This was instrumental in nature given the end result aimed for, and also 
somewhat achieved—the abuse was now known publically. 
However, the expressive consequences for Davis’s instrumental role as a 
injury. The prosecutor initially sought to charge him with conspiracy, and 
eventually dropped the charges. The prosecutor treated Davis with contempt and 
sought to portray him as a media-hound, not as a conscientious whistle-blower. 
Davis was one of the unsung heroes of the Abu Ghraib saga, but was treated 
contemptuously for doing the “right thing” according to Parsonian theory. 
Finally, his disclosures to Congress and the media had absolutely no effect 
on instrumentally stopping the abuse, even though the abuse was successfully 
instrumentally reported.
The chain of command did not correct for the deviance that was (sometimes) 
reported surrounding the events of October 24-25, 2003, and instead the abuse 
continued in this poisoned social climate, and was photographed in future events 
at Abu Ghraib Tier 1A and 1B. 
The Pyramid Incident, November 7, 2003
On May 12, 2005, Special Agent James Boerner from the U.S Army Criminal 
Investigative Division took a voluntary statement from Sabrina Harman, and 
advised her of her rights. Boerner remembers that Harman said it was a standard 
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operating procedure for the detainee’s clothing to be removed, and that “she 
[Harman] did not think that this was right for the prisoners to have to do,” referring 
to the naked pyramid and that, “she [Harman] had a problem with that” (May 12, 
2005, SHCM). Additionally, according to Boerner, Harman stated “that she had 
not given any orders of any kind for any of the prisoners to do these sex acts” and 
“that she never physically abused any of the prisoners” (May 12, 2005, SHCM). 
These above statements were made in reference to the iconic photographic 
images of the naked pyramid of abuse at Abu Ghraib on November 7, 2003, which 
involved all of the initial seven “rotten apples” (Harman, Frederick, Graner, Davis, 
Ambuhl, England and Sivits), and where naked Iraqi male bodies were piled on 
and these prisoners were brought into the hard site because, according to Charles 
Graner, they had supposedly hit a female MP with a brick in the face and caused 
a riot. In Parsonian terms, some might argue that the photographed stack of naked 
Iraqi men in a pyramid served a function of expressive humiliation with an end-
goal, and is thus an example of expressive abuse (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008b). 
According to Graner’s testimony at the Lynndie England trial, he claimed that this 
was a tactic in organization to stop who they thought were dangerous prisoners 
from communicating and as an attempt to exercise instrumental control over the 
being used as a means to an end. After the pyramid, however, these prisoners were 
forced to masturbate and to simulate fellatio—something that was not explained 
as instrumental in any of the testimony. 
Says Jeremy Sivits, “Specialist Harman was standing back with me looking 
at the pyramid with a look of disgust on her face like she could not believe this 
was happening. SPC Harman did not appear to approve of this behavior, but she 
did take photographs … Based on SPC Harman’s size and nature she was not in 
a position to challenge CPL Graner or SSG Frederick” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). 
What is understood from Sivits’ comments is that Harman did not orchestrate or 
“go along” with the sexual humiliation and gender torture of prisoners, which 
would have constituted an instrumental action. (In fact, in Wisdom’s testimony 
about this night, he stated that Harman had not hit anyone.) Instead, and I will 
use Harman as an example here, she and the other “rotten apples” faced similar 
charges of conspiracy because she was present and taking photographs. According 
to the prosecution’s theory, and because there was more than one person taking 
photographs of abuse, this counted as the instrumental overt act of agreement 
necessary for conspiracy. In other words, the act of being present at the site of abuse 
and taking photographs of the abuse was the same in terms of legal responsibility 
as was a conversation about organizing and agreeing to participate in abuse itself, 
and thus counted as conspiracy. For Harman, testimony shows that she had an 
expressive-emotive reaction to the pyramid, and further the fact that both England 
and Harman only took and posed for photographs rather than organized the 
pyramid scenario shows their ultimate expressiveness towards the situation in 
general (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008b). It thus seems that female soldiers were 
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used for the humiliation of Iraqi male prisoners, where the cultural constructions 
of masculinity are unwillingly destabilized through gender and homoerotic torture 
in front of females, and further these female soldiers were framed as objects 
complying with male organized torture scenarios. In fact, Graner even “ordered” 
Lynndie England into photographs of abuse that she felt uncomfortable posing in, 
was described as having a compliant personality by several expert witnesses, and 
was also characterized by her fellow soldiers as naive and as having blind trust 
and faith in Graner.
When asked why he did not report the abuse he witnessed, Sivits replied, “I 
was trying to be friends with everyone and I did not want to get anyone in trouble” 
Parsons’ expressive role concern with group cohesion and amalgamation, and shows 
an overall emotional interest with group functioning and stability, a characteristic 
that Parsons associates with the female role status. This gender role permutation 
is outside of the limits and scope of Parsons’ current theories of instrumental and 
expressive, and thus requires a new and imaginative understanding of Parsons. 
concerned about the pile” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). Wisdom described the situation 
that evening as abusive, where MPs were running prisoners into the walls with 
sandbags on their heads, and that these sandbags were supposedly for “security.” 
Wisdom told the court at the England trial that Davis was stomping on toes of 
prisoners and that Graner was hitting prisoners in the face, but the detainees were 
hitting one [prisoner] in the side of the chest and after he did that he looked up at 
me and said you have to get some of this, referring to hitting one of the prisoners, 
sir” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). In an instrumental move to report the abuse up the 
chain of command and in terms of formal Army regulations, Wisdom reported the 
Wisdom’s perception was that this instrumental report of abuse would have an end 
result of terminating abuse. Says Wisdom, “I went to SGT Jones after this and I 
told him everything I saw. I told him because I thought it was criminal in nature. I 
wanted to be removed from the prison. I had a problem with everything I saw. SGT 
Jones said he passed the information up the chain. SGT Jones told me it was taken 
care of and I was moved from the prison the next day. SGT Jones told me it was 
taken care of so I believed him” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). Wisdom further added 
this statement at Harman’s courts-martial, which shows expressive emotions he 
felt in reaction to the pyramid events with these following statements, “I just told 
him [Sergeant Jones] everything that I saw and told him that I was upset about it 
and he told me that he’d handle the situation, sir” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). Further, 
when asked why he reported the abuse, Wisdom stated, “I personally did not think 
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it was right, what was going on, so I thought it was in my best interest to just report 
it as soon as possible” (May 13, 2005, SHCM).
Wisdom returned to Tier 1A, where Jones told him to go back to work, just as 
the prisoners were being forced to masturbate and to simulate fellatio. Wisdom 
observed these events in the hallway and stated under oath, “When I went back 
down [to the hard site] I saw a naked man masturbating into another man’s mouth. 
He had his mouth open and he was on his knees. The other guards there were 
Graner, Davis, Fredrick, Ambuhl, Harman and England. I remember Graner 
posing for a photograph like he was going to hit a detainee with a sandbag on his 
head and then he did hit him. I saw SGT Davis walking around stomping on the 
toes of the detainees. I saw SSG Frederick hit a detainee in the chest. The detainees 
were crying out in pain … I saw SFC Snider looking down on the pile so he did 
see what was going on. He was the senior NCO present at the time. He was in the 
position to stop it and take corrective action” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). Further, 
animals do when we leave them alone for two seconds (May 13, 2005, SHCM). 
(As a side, Frederick stated at the England trial that he was told by MI to allow 
the masturbation.)
Both the prosecution and defense asked Wisdom several times about what he 
did when he witnessed the events of this evening, and dutifully Wisdom answered, 
“I immediately went back out to Tower 5, to tell my team leader what had happened 
feeling—I didn’t—I couldn’t make sense of what was going on and I rushed out 
there to tell him what happened” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). Again, in Parsonian 
terms Wisdom is evidencing expressive-emotive reactions to the abuse. Frank 
had Wisdom reported the abuse, but also that he thought it was handled up the 
chain of command:
Q (Spinner): So you’re saying that with respect to Sergeant Jones you reported 
all of the things that you observed and you thought were wrong that night?
A: That’s correct, sir.
Q: And to your knowledge was any corrective action taken about that?
A: He reported back to me that the situation was handled.
(May 13, 2005, SHCM)
Wisdom’s team leader, Sergeant Robert Jones, took the stand next. Jones was a 
Wisdom had reported the abuse, and stated, “He [Wisdom] told me he witnessed 
a prisoner get his toes stepped on and some getting punched. He came back and 
reported to me that a detainee was masturbating into the mouth of another detainee. 
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He came to me twice in one hour” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). However, Jones sent 
Wisdom back to Tier 1 because he viewed Wisdom as inexperienced and perhaps 
in need of mentoring in his position as an MP—an expressive characterization of 
Wisdom. Said Jones, “Specialist Wisdom came to me … he was upset. I told him 
questioning about the incidents that evening reveled that Wisdom’s instrumental 
whistleblowing did have some effect and served a function, as Jones was aimed 
at both ending abuse and “rescuing” Wisdom from the abusive situation where 
torture was taking place—both instrumental and expressive characteristics in 
came back the second time about the masturbation … I went and got in SSG 
Frederick’s face and had a heated conversation. It was an uncomfortable position 
to have to get in a higher ranking soldier’s face … but I just wanted Wisdom out 
out what was going on. I did not hear anything about the abuse after that” (June 24, 
2004, SHA32). Expanding on Frederick’s response, Jones stated “Staff Sergeant 
Ivan Frederick ... I asked him over and over again whether it was true … He didn’t 
answer me, sir” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). 
The trial counsel further asked how Jones tried to resolve this issue and if he 
wished he had handled the situation differently. Jones replied he wanted to have 
Wisdom work directly under him, and that “Specialist Wisdom told me—he was 
very excited, very angry, he told me he would not work with those guys anymore, 
abuses sir ... yes, sir [I wish I had handled the situation differently]) (May 13, 
2005, SHCM). Indeed, at the England courts-martial, Jones claimed that Graner 
who were weak. Jones also expressed that he thought that Tier 1A and 1B was run 
poorly since it did not have enough military support. 
Several interesting Parsonian themes are evidenced in these exchanges with 
Wisdom and Jones regarding reporting abuse. First, that Wisdom reported the 
abuse because he thought it was his “duty” is in line with an interpretation of 
instrumental reporting of abuse according to the rules of the military itself, and 
especially since it can be assumed Wisdom thought something might be done about 
this abuse. Second, that Wisdom had emotional reactions to this abuse can be read 
as expressive in Parsonian language. Third, that Jones believed Wisdom’s reaction 
that what Wisdom really needed was a mentoring relationship of sorts, a new job 
position at Abu Ghraib, and to have Jones as his superior and “protector” speaks to 
how Jones viewed Wisdom—as expressively vulnerable and weak. This is further 
evidenced with Jones’ actions of screaming at Frederick (an expressive emotive 
trait) instead of reporting the abuse up the chain of command (instrumental); 
however, it can be argued that this was a volatile situation of torture and so this 
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kind of dual approach was warranted, where yelling is construed as an attempt 
at establishing instrumental power. After all, Jones did instrumentally report the 
abuse to SSG Elliott, and also instrumentally followed up on this conversation. 
Jones’ actions can thus be understood as both expressive and instrumental in 
terms of how he handled the situation of November 7, and therefore Jones can 
be understood as acting expressively protective of a subordinate, while also 
instrumentally responding to and reporting abuse, and especially since he did view 
allow for this kind of dual interpretation, and so a stretching and remolding of his 
theory is necessary here. What is so ironic is that Wisdom’s instrumental reporting 
of abuse comes to be interpreted as expressive weakness and lack of ability, 
thereby initially negating Wisdom’s entire whistleblowing function. Nonetheless, 
even Jones’ whistleblowing did not serve its purpose—that of ending abuse at 
interpretation of instrumental perceived reporting of abuse, yet with a failed goal 
outcome.
Private Ivan Frederick, a prison guard for eight years in civilian life and also 
asked why he did not report the events that he agreed he knew to be wrong he stated 
in court, “I was just afraid of repercussions and consequences” (May 13, 2005, 
or the military; however, in Parsonian terms this fear is described as expressive in 
nature. Frank Spinner, the civilian defense counsel continued to question Frederick 
and asked, “Did you raise questions through the chain of command … whether 
or not these things were authorized (re: sleep deprivation, standing on boxes, 
making people do PT and trying to keep them awake)?” Frederick answered, “Yes 
sir. I was told that’s how they do it and that’s for interrogation purposes and just 
to go ahead and go with it” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). Spinner continued, “What 
kinds of practices did you raise questions about?” Says Frederick, “[In general] 
The prolonged nudity, the conditions of the cells, putting them in cells with no 
ventilation, no toilet, no window, just complete darkness, the wearing of female 
panties, things of that nature” (May 13, 2005, SHCM). In addition, Frederick stated 
under oath that his chain of command was confusing, as he was not sure who he 
worked for since he took orders from three different places, and was confused 
of command? In this way, even if abuse was reported, it is unsure to whom these 
reports might have been made, and furthermore, it is unclear what counts as either 
abuse or a direct order. Frederick also said that he had given Harman permission 
to phone her partner that evening, during the abuse, such that she was not even 
present for the forced and homoerotic torture. In Parsonian language, and much 
like Wisdom is portrayed above, Frederick comes across as expressive in his fear 
regarding reporting the abuse he witnessed, although perhaps for different reasons. 
(Parsons does not seem to allow for rational, instrumental fear, such as the fear of 
courts-martial.) It is unclear why Frederick had fear since he did not elaborate on 
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that in court, but fear in itself is expressive according to Parsons. (Frederick was 
asked “Did you draw a line in the sand? Could you control Graner?” He answered, 
“No.” So perhaps he was fearful of his fellow soldiers after all.) Nonetheless, 
given the confusing chain of command and what seems to be a lack of clear 
standard operating procedures at the prison according to Frederick, it is obvious 
that both a rational and orderly instrumental means for prisoner care and a clear 
line of authority were not in place at Abu Ghraib. Although Frederick did mention 
fear, he also mentions disorganization and how he was told to “go ahead” with the 
interrogations that were taking place—all expressive actions. It thus seems that 
one interpretation that Frederick did not report abuse was for expressive reasons, 
and this is another example of expressive non-reporting. However, another reason 
could be the stated reason Frederick gave at Lynndie England’s trial, which was 
that reporting abuse up the chain of command had no results, which made him 
frustrated, stressed, and angry because he had no advice or leadership from above. 
Frederick disclosed these expressive feelings in response to a panel member’s 
question about why it was that he punched a prisoner in the chest. 
Instrumental Females, Expressive Males, and Everything In-between
There are many stories about Abu Ghraib that have not been told because they 
were not depicted in the photographs of abuse that were shown to the world. Some 
of these stories have to do with soldiers remedying instances of abuse such as with 
the testimony of Megan Ambuhl, a female MP with the 372nd at Abu Ghraib, who 
also worked the night shift at Tier 1A and 1B. 
Ambuhl stated in her testimony that in November 2003, she and Specialist 
Sabrina Harman reported to Sergeant Joyner that a detainee had been handcuffed for 
a long period of time. Both Harman and Ambuhl were concerned with the comfort 
of this detainee. When describing the incident to the assistant trial counsel, says 
Ambuhl, “Um, we—I was working on the tier with, um, Specialist Hubbard and he 
had—I believe he had three detainees that were on sleep management and he just 
decided to handcuff them above their head up to the cell door (hands above head 
crossed) rather than change the position of them during a time period and Specialist 
Harman came in to the tier and we looked at their hands and they were discolored 
and so we un-cuffed them and then we went and told … Sergeant Joyner at the end 
of the shift what happened” (May 16, 2005, SHCM). The assistant trial counsel 
then asked Ambuhl if she and Harman believed that they had seen inappropriate 
treatment of a detainee, and that by removing the handcuffs, if they were stopping 
maltreatment. Ambuhl answered, “yes, sir” (May 16, 2005, SHCM).
What is interesting about this exchange in Parsonian terms is that it has both 
expressive and instrumental qualities. Ambuhl and Harman’s concern for the 
detainee’s comfort is expressive in that it is based on empathy and a shared sense 
of compassion, while the understanding that they were stopping maltreatment 
from happening was seen as part of their job as MPs. For Parsons, however, it 
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is the male’s role to be instrumental within the social system, and so for two 
female soldiers to function in this way as self-correcting mechanisms for ending 
abuse, and in lieu of the male soldier (Specialist Hubbard) who had fastened the 
prisoner to the cell door as part of a sleep management regimen, is outside the 
limits of Parsons’ role theory. Additionally, Ambuhl and Harman did report the 
abuse they witnessed on the part of MI to a higher-up, namely Sergeant Joyner, 
which is instrumental perceived reporting (they thought Joyner would act on it), 
however, yet again this goals/ends report was made by two females, which Parsons 
cannot account for in terms of his gendered-role description of “instrumental.” 
Nonetheless, the maltreatment did cease this evening, for these detainees, and at 
the hands of two female soldiers—two of the Fallgirls.
Another testimony of a soldier remedying abuse at Abu Ghraib came from Staff 
Sergeant Joseph Darby, also an MP with the 372nd. The civilian defense counsel, 
Frank Spinner, asked Darby if he turned over the photographs anonymously 
because he feared retribution and retaliation from some of the people involved. 
Darby answered in open court, “Yes sir … and some people in the unit, yes sir” 
(May 13, 2005, SHCM). Revealed Darby about turning the photos of abuse over 
to CID on January 12, 2003, “It was a hard decision, because I had served with 
these people for so long, some of them were my friends, and we had been in Iraq, 
and there was camaraderie there, and I had a really hard decision to turn them in” 
(May 13, 2005, SHCM).
Figure 3.1 Harman giving stitches and providing instrumental care
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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Turning the photographs over was an instrumental action on Darby’s part as 
it ended the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib and can be seen as an example of 
the instrumental actual reporting of abuse. Nonetheless, Darby’s fear of other 
soldiers, as well as the fear expressed by other male soldiers discussed in this 
chapter, is not accounted for with Parsons’ understanding of the male’s role 
within the social system, and is instead an expressive trait. Parsons’ role theory 
of instrumental and expressive does not capture the kinds of experiences that 
took place for some of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib, which themselves allow for 
new interpretations of his gender roles. Further, what Abu Ghraib shows is that 
men can be expressive, women can be instrumental, and both of these roles can 
serve a multitude of functions simultaneously, and even within dysfunctional 
social systems. 
Conclusion
I have argued that the Parsonian distinction (1954) between instrumental and 
expressive roles served a multitude of functions within the dysfunctional social 
climate at Abu Ghraib when describing how the abuse was reported by some of 
the soldiers there. (Indeed, some of these soldiers were the “rotten apples.”) These 
Parsonian roles illustrated the hyper-masculine atmosphere at Abu Ghraib, where 
mostly male soldiers would act in stereotypical ways while abusing detainees, and 
would characterize those who did not go along with abuse as feminine “pussies.” 
Additionally, when focusing on the reporting of abuse, Parsonian language is 
helpful in comprehending not only the motivation for the reports themselves, 
but also why reports were not made to those higher-up the chain of command. 
Likewise, the theoretical discussion in this chapter brings to light how soldiers 
experienced fear at Abu Ghraib, how soldiers protected each other, how female 
soldiers corrected maltreatment at Abu Ghraib (even ones who were court-
I always found it interesting that the only female attorney in the courtroom 
at the Harman trial, Captain Takemura—who outwardly wore the persona of the 
expressive female—was the one who elicited confessions of fear out of male 
soldiers during their testimony. According to the masculine military “code,” the 
expression of fear in itself is stereotypically unmasculine; yet, she did this while 
wearing the masculine uniform of the military. (None of the soldiers made these 
confessions to any of the male attorneys or the judge.) It is for reasons such 
as the above example that I argue Parsonian stereotypes of gendered behavior 
are sometimes helpful in describing social and cultural patterns within the U.S. 
military, but that the events at Abu Ghraib and the surrounding courts-martials 
correcting and functional, and especially with regard to the reporting of abuse 
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to Parsons’ theorizing in order to make Parsons applicable to these cultural 
phenomena—where dysfunctions exists. 
 Social theory needs to move forward and recognize that some social systems 
are dysfunctional and fail to self-correct, as evidenced at Abu Ghraib. We thus 
arrive at a new framework for understanding structural-functionalist functions in 
social settings, namely: Expressive and instrumental dimensions still function in 
dysfunctional social settings, albeit, in the dysfunctional ways described above. 
The results at Abu Ghraib were various permutations of instrumental-expressive 
torture, reporting, gender roles, and other functions, which did not result in 
correction. The most profound irony of the Abu Ghraib saga is that the torture 
and abuse continued even after the publicized courts-martial, and they continued 
not only at Abu Ghraib but also at Guantanamo, black-hole rendition sites, and 
other detention facilities related to the War on Terror. 
Evidence: Sabrina Harman’s Letter to Kelly 
Bryant, Sabrina Harman Courts-Martial
Note: In the court-martial, the government’s position is that the letter applies to 
Harman’s state of mind and emotions only, and not as evidence of Sabrina Harman 




too far. I ended your letter last night because it was time to wake the MI prisoners 
and “mess with them” but it went too far even I can’t handle whats going on. I 
cant get it out of my head. I walk down the stairs after blowing the whistle and 
to his window naked with his underwear over his head and face. He looked like 
a picture. One of the guys took my asp and started “poking” at his dick. Again I 
thought, okay that’s funny then it hit me, that’s a form of molestation. You can’t do 
that. I took more pictures now to “record” what is going on. They started talking 
He claims he’d never try to hurt US soldiers that he picked up the wrong people. 
Then he stopped talking. They turned the lights out and slammed the door and 
left him there while they went down to cell #4. This man had been so fucked that 
when they grabbed his foot through the cell bars he began screaming and crying. 
After praying to Allah he moans a constant short Ah, Ah, every few seconds for 
handcuffed for maybe 1 ½ -2 hours until he started yelling for Allah. So they went 
back in and handcuffed him to the top bunk on either side of the bed while he stood 
on the side. He was there for a little over an hour when he started yelling again for 
Allah. Not many people know this shit goes on. The only reason I want to be there 
is to get the pictures to prove that the US is not what they think. But I don’t know 
if I can take it mentally. What if that was me in their shoes. These people will be 
our future terrorist. Kelly, it’s awful and you know how fucked I am in the head—
Both sides of me think its wrong. I thought I could handle anything. I was wrong. 
Sabrina (May 16, 2005, SHCM)

Chapter 4 
Gender Hyperreality: American Military and 
the Case of Abu Ghraib
The simulacrum is never what hides the truth—it is truth that hides the fact that 
there is none. The simulacrum is true.
Ecclesiastes 
What does it mean to be real? If something is said to be real, then it is important, 
an understanding of identity is valued on the large scale within society only if 
realness is in terms of some valued and existing citationality, such that what is 
and named categorically. Successful cultural identity claims require the adherence 
to cultural and symbolic instantiation, where the claiming of invisible or culturally 
incomprehensible categories for existence result in the social exclusion of the 
identity claim itself —quite literally the non-formation of the socially valued 
subject (Caldwell 2009). 
Both Jean Baudrillard and Judith Butler have theories that address the issue 
of gender “realness,” and both of these perspectives outline gender as something 
that are on the one hand categorically simulacra in construction, but on the other 
hand real in their consequences—that is there are prices to pay for doing gender 
in a certain way.1 This is an especially important perspective with regard to the 
experiences surrounding Abu Ghraib, as usually postmodern conjecture ends up 
in a theory of implosion and chaos. At Abu Ghraib, however, the imploded and 
deconstructed meanings surrounding gender are functional in terms of describing 
gendered understandings of the events at the prison, and the U.S. military in 
2 I use the 
1 In fact, sometimes, lives are complicated, choices are made, suffering exists, and 
the outcome of one’s existence (what they gain, lose, reward, and authenticity) depend on 
how they decide to do their gender.
2 Understanding how power works when aligned with gender allows individuals 
to be critical of existing structures, and as such renders it possible to question and even 
destabilize existing gender schema, as the “code” for gender value can be, in this way, 
deconstructed and altered. Unlike some other feminists, I do not hold the opinion that 
deconstruction results in the meaningless and powerless platform for impossible feminism. 
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terms simulacra gender code, power simulacra, and rule by simulacra of reality 
to describe these gender processes and consequences. Examples I use here to 
illustrate gender and its postmodern consequences are as follows: the metrosexual 
soldier, that all soldiers (including Harman) wear the drag of military uniforms, 
the idea that “drag-techniques” were used to torture, and that gender simulacra and 
seduction played a role in the courtroom, among other examples.
Power-Simulacra”: Baudrillard’s 
Maps and the “Metrosexual Soldier” 
If once we were able to view the Borges fable in which the cartographers of 
the Empire draw a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory exactly 
(the decline of the Empire witnesses the fraying of this map, little by little, and 
its fall into ruins, though some shreds are still discernible in the deserts—the 
metaphysical beauty of this ruined abstraction testifying to a pride equal to 
the Empire and rotting like a carcass, returning to the substance of the soil, a 
bit as the double ends by being confused with the real through aging)—as the 
most beautiful allegory of simulation, this fable has now come full circle for us, 
and possesses nothing but the discrete charm of second-order simulacra. (Jean 
Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations)
Jean Baudrillard, sometimes called the high priest of postmodernism, develops a 
theory of postmodern culture, which postulates that culture itself is now dominated 
referents, and no ground or foundation upon which to locate meaning.3
In Baudrillard’s above citation, he concerns himself with abstractions of a map 
and the delineation of boundaries. He leads us to a contemplation of how lines 
of demarcation, even in the metaphorical and theoretical sense, are established. 
conception of the “real,” and therefore instigates thought about how this “real” 
is constructed or located. Is the map of written boundaries “real?” Is the territory 
itself bounded in some way that allows for the production of a map? Simulation 
is the term that Baudrillard uses to induce the project of locating the “real.” 
However, for Baudrillard, simulation is the notion that what is referred to as “real” 
is without origin or reality. This means that what once might have referred to 
some “referential being or substance” now holds no identity apart from the actual 
simulation itself (Baudrillard 1983a: 169). The distinctions between object and 
Instead, I view the process of deconstruction like an exploration, where a new venue for 
the insertion of perspective and voice can be found, and where the discovery of how power 
functions is made. 
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representation, “thing and idea,” according to Baudrillard, are no longer valid 
relationships (Baudrillard 1983a). 
Consequently, for Baudrillard, locating the “real” becomes a perpetual game of 
referential referents, both pointing toward and away from “truth,” as “truth” itself 
is shown to be only a phantasm or spectacle. Says Baudrillard, “Today’s abstraction 
is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no 
longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by 
models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard [1981]1994). 
Thus, Baudrillard uses the term “hyperreal” to denote the so-called “reality” 
that a simulation refers, a world of self-referential signs (Baudrillard 1983a). (A 
simulacrum is when the distinction between representation and reality—between 
the signs and what they refer to—break down.) In a hyperreality, “reality” itself 
has collapsed, and only image, illustration, or simulation is left. Additionally, in 
a hyperreality, the model of “reality” is more real than the reality it supposedly 
represents (Rosenau 1992). In a postmodern culture, it is this hyperreality that 
comes to function as the “real,” or a simulacrum of reality itself. Thus, for 
Baudrillard, “It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even 
of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself” 
(Baudrillard 1983a: 170). 
Again, considering Baudrillard’s map, it is neither the territory nor the map 
order simulacrum of the “real,” that allow us to make sense of both the map’s 
territory and the map itself. Even though the map has eroded and the territories can 
no longer be depicted with any exactness to that of the map, a “real” still exists for 
Baudrillard. Indeed, what is being made sense of is neither the map nor the land 
boundaries of territory. Instead, what Baudrillard seems to suggest is that notions 
of “real” are constructed in such a way that these notions themselves dictate 
“realness.” In this way, the map is “real” in terms of the theory of “realness” itself. 
Considering identity in a postmodern culture, it follows that realness is about 
hyperreal tags of identity such as gender. This grabbing of signs, where the signs 
serve as the demarcation of the self, is philosophically a radically different way to 
understand identity, as this conception has nothing at all to do with the individual 
self, creating identity from within, body versus soul or mind, etc. Instead, 
simulations of identity are something to be consumed and produced. This is the 
case with the hyperreal simulacra tags of gender identity, which exist because 
we as a culture have socially constructed these as correct ways for understanding 
and categorizing our experiences of gender—they function as Baudrillard’s map, 
providing a theory of the “real.” Nonetheless, these tags for gender identity have no 
reality behind their signs, and are thus hyperreal in that they function as canopies 
for thought—they are theoretical simulations—ultimately constructed categories 
themselves. Thus gender categories for Baudrillard are only phantasmic creations 
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symbols that individuals in a postmodern culture latch onto as a means for identity 
construction.4
referent or origin to which they attach themselves with regard to meaning, and 
are representations of identity that are illusory, as for Baudrillard, once something 
Considering both Baudrillard’s map and gender, what is “real” is the 
construction of “reality.” Both the map and gender are thus self-referentially 
validated in terms of some constructed theory of “realness.” What is “real” in this 
construction is the construction of the “real.” Within these constructions of the 
the ability to grasp gender identity-signs. Nonetheless, these tags of identity are 
However, the power behind these gender tags is that they function as simulacra 
gender code
a sense, like Baudrillard’s map, simulacra gender code is thus the postmodern 
theory of gender “realness”—or “power simulacra” in that they are based on a 
construction of gender identity, informed by a cultural “code” for conception, and 
backed by this cultural conception for their very image-reality. 
For some postmodernists, gender meanings have actually imploded, such 
of metrosexual as an example.5 This category for identity is something that 
was socially constructed to describe a sexed male who is heterosexual, but who 
participates in copious and conspicuous ritualistic grooming that is stereotypically 
(although problematically) associated with both femininity and homosexuality, 
such that ritualized grooming is equated with hyper-femininity and “cultural 
gayness.” (Metrosexual is sometimes used as an insult, and is sometimes a 
of the decorated war hero soldier, who is polished in presentation, shoes shined, 
representing the many achieved medals and ribbons, hair molded in such a certain 
way as to conform to a “code,” and who ritually and vigorously performs the 
4 Nonetheless, in Seduction, Baudrillard [1979]1990 is complicated on this point as 
the “feminine” is very real for him.
5 Some may argue that this example shows the ultimate implosion of gender categories 
this way and that, towards stereotypes of both gender and sexuality for the cognition of the 
term “metrosexual.” However, this is exactly the kind of theoretical gender concept that I 
phenomena.
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identity “soldier” through production and consumption of an idealized image-sign. 
In this way, the military identity, like the metrosexual, can be understood as the 
one that is achieved through the imitation of the socially constructed code of 
surrounding the grooming rituals and uniform codes associated with the military. 
Indeed, the military has a rigorous standard for grooming and uniform to which all 
members must adhere. Again, in this way, “real” becomes a constructed simulation 
of reality, and is thus, according to Baudrillard, itself hyperreal given the variety of 
ways that the sign can be tagged. Says Baudrillard, “It is the real, and not the map, 
whose vestiges persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the 
Empire, but ours” (Baudrillard [1981]1994: 1). I argue it is the simulacra gender 
code, or the theory (of the map) that is “real” here. That said, it is not as if the 
meanings of gender associated with the discussion of metrosexual have imploded 
and are thus meaningless; instead, I argue that there exist rich interpretable texts 
see this as a possible door to new thought projects about gender. Indeed, what has 
changed is the way that knowledge and interpretation present themselves.
Flash back to Abu Ghraib prison. Like a map, one might think that when 
and demarcation was being made. However, the reality of Abu Ghraib prison 
is that it was not well defended from daily mortar attacks, where on a frequent 
basis the prison itself was bombed, thereby leading to the actual destruction of 
territorial boundaries. Additionally, a prison might be characterized as having 
a closed and bounded region, where the separation of prisoners and American 
military troops was distinct. However, the prison was itself porous, meaning that 
it was permeable to outsiders entering the prison grounds. One example of this 
selling cameras on the compound itself. Additionally, American military personnel 
actually lived in jail cells next to prisoners. In this way, like Baudrillard’s map, the 
boundaries of the prison and its rigid instantiation were themselves simulacra, yet 
functioned in a rhetorical way so as to allow for reference. “Realness” was thus a 
Heterosexuality and the “Rule by Simulacra of Reality” 
Contemporary feminist, gender theorist, and rhetorician, Judith Butler, has a theory 
of identity categories that can be applied to further explain Baudrillard’s notion of 
simulacra. This coupling of Baudrillard and Butler is unique and is not something 
that either postmodernists or critical theorists readily expand upon. Butler’s 
critique of identity categories, however, is important to consider when discussing 
notions of “realness” in that she also shows how categorical “realness” and value 
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are relationally constructed with regard to gender categories, and in terms of sex 
and sexuality categories. Like most feminists and social scientists, Butler’s project 
speaks to the separation of the categories of sex, gender, and sexuality, such that 
these categories are understood as distinct, and unlike stereotypical understandings 
of gender, where male=masculine and female=feminine, and both associations are 
conceptually heteronormative (or associated with heterosexuality).
Butler’s discussion of relationally understood categories demonstrates two 
important things: the relational power that each binary has on the other, and 
the limiting options for identity construction given the conceived of categories 
for identity itself. Butler’s argument is that theoretical binary pair relations 
(such as male/female and masculine/feminine) are both unstable and incoherent 
foundations upon which to construct theoretical paradigms, yet nonetheless are 
used in wider normative and dominant culture for gender value and instantiation. 
Butler considers the relationship between binary pairs, and uses the theoretical 
tactic of destabilizing the dominant binary in order to challenge its dominant 
status. This, in turn, questions not only the elevated status of the dominant binary, 
but also questions the entire binary relationship’s categorical claim of coherence. 
Binary relations result in problematic understandings of gender for Butler, and as 
it turns out, Butler shows that it is the subordinate binary that actually challenges 
the status of the binary relationship. Additionally, this project is important with 
regard to gender categories in that it destabilizes both the association of male/
masculine and female/feminine in terms of gender and sex categories, showing its 
ultimate socially constructed connectedness. 
Consider as an example gender constructions in the American military. 
One way that gender has been constructed within the U.S. military is through 
the masculinist system of the military itself, where masculinity functions as the 
dominant power-simulacra with regard to gender hierarchy. (Remember, for 
Baudrillard this “power-simulacra
Butler this is a juridical law for gender value.) In this way, the masculinist economy 
functions as the “real” with regard to judging and policing gender expressions, as 
this “realness” allows for understanding gender value within the military context. 
This power simulacra, for Butler, functions as, “The cultural matrix through 
which gender identity has become intelligible” (Butler [1990]1999: 17). Hence, 
one way that the dominant simulacrum of gender has been conceptualized within 
the military is as masculine, and this is its hyperreality, as this description of 
masculinity as a standard culminates in an understanding of a “power-simulacra” 
that is constructed within this cultural context. 
This is a text of gender that is socially constructed with regard to value, among 
other things, and therefore has no reality apart from the system within which it 
is pieced together. Hence, this is a discourse of gender that is simulacra at its 
foundations, where power can be understood as compliance with these simulacra 
formations. For Butler, and unlike Baudrillard, actual power is associated with this 
account of gender, as bodies are policed and given value in terms of legitimation 
with regard to the rules of this system itself. 
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Additionally, Butler is especially concerned with heterosexist frameworks for 
understanding sex and gender, such that male/masculine and female/feminine are 
understood in heterosexist opposition, and she calls these “exclusionary gender 
norms.” Says Butler about gender, “Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, 
a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over 
time to produce the appearance of substance, or a natural sort of being” (Butler 
1990[1999]: 33). Hence, for Butler gender is something that is discursively and 
performatively constituted by “the very expressions that are said to be its results” 
(Butler 1990[1999]: 25).6
Consider Sabrina Harman and her military courts-martial in terms of 
the military’s masculinist simulacra identity and also Butler’s heterosexist 
“exclusionary gender norms.” It came out in the Harman courts-martial that 
Harman is a lesbian soldier. The social construction of gender has historically 
equated both femininity and masculinity with heterosexuality in that femininity 
and masculinity are seen as opposite binaries, thereby mimicking assumed 
heterosexual lived-relations. The social-construction of the military follows 
this gender characterization in that it is conceptually a heterosexist institution, 
where homosexual individuals are not welcome per membership as homosexual 
individuals. Instead, homosexual military personnel are required in accordance 
with military’s “exclusionary sexuality norms” to render their identities secret. 
This is the consequence of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that has been 
implemented by law into the armed forces, thereby constructing a standard of the 
“real” for identity. 7
Nonetheless, it remains that there are indeed homosexuals within the military, 
yet they are closeted in their identities. This is a perfect example of Baudrillard’s 
notion of the “code” as instructing “reality” in that “reality” is not represented, 
and only formed through the simulation of heterosexuality, thereby culminating 
in the simulacra of reality in terms of the “power-simulacra” of heterosexuality. 
Harman’s identity thus functions as a simulacrum identity of heterosexuality in 
that she is understood in terms of a military “power-simulacra” of heterosexuality; 
yet, she is also subversive of this identity given her actual status as lesbian. 
Additionally, this is an example of a subversive repetition of forced military 
heteronormativity, which subverts the very system that attempts to control the 
soldier’s body through compulsory heterosexuality. This is exactly the kind of 
subversive practice that Butler is concerned with, which shows the “status” of 
6 This term ‘performatively’ is to imply a culturally sustained temporal duration of 
gender performance.
7 As of this writing, DADT has been overturned, yet many stories exist in the news 
that show prejudicial attitudes against homosexual soldiers. I argue that simply because 
laws are overturned does not mean that long standing practices of discrimination and 
attitudes of prejudice will disappear within the military. Hence, the military can still be 
characterized as heterosexist unproblematically. Additionally, during the trials discussed 
within this book, DADT was for sure still in place. 
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heterosexuality as a discursive characteristic of militarized gender. Nonetheless, 
even though these signs of gender can be destabilized, homosexuality is still 
a crime in the U.S. Army once it is disclosed, and thus has a consequence. At 
Harman’s courts-martial, soldiers stated privately that they thought that the Army 
was killing two birds with one stone at this courts-martial, Harman was being 
punished for the following: being a lesbian in a heterosexist military, a female 
within a masculinist military, and as a scapegoat for detainee abuse given her 
various minority statuses.
Butler’s project also shows the socially constructed notion of gender itself to 
be a hyperreality in the sense that Baudrillard employs, as gender is shown to be 
which is itself “real.” Remember Baudrillard’s map, where what is deemed “real” 
is in terms of the theory of “realness” itself. For Butler, gender categories are thus 
“real” in that they are self-referentially validated in terms of this theory of gender 
“realness”—or what can be understood as Baudrillard’s “code.” 
Butler’s critique of heterosexualized identity categories thus rests on the notion 
that the polarities of what is included in a category and what is not included are 
category. When individuals conform and contort their identities to the hyperreal 
categories of gender, or when gender identities are conceived of in terms of these 
categories, what has taken place is the rule by simulacra of reality. Says Butler 
commenting on normative sexuality identities, “gay is to straight not as copy is to 
original, but, rather, as copy is to copy” (Butler [1990]1999: 41). This statement 
echoes Baudrillard’s claim about simulacra as being “a copy of a copy, for which 
there is no original” (Baudrillard [1981]1994: 169). Interestingly, since gender 
categories are socially constructed and understood in terms of a context, there is 
no original understanding of gender, and only a hyperreal doctrine used to control 
actual bodies. Perhaps the claim should be that gender is a simulacrum—a copy of 
a copy for which there is no original.
It is important to remember that Butler thinks that the identity category that 
instructs heteronormativity is itself rallied against at the site of these identity 
productions and categorical power struggles through the use of parody and 
mimicry, “through repetition of the law [of heterosexuality] into hyperbole” 
(Butler 1993: 122). This is very Foucauldian with regard to understanding power, 
and Baudrillard argued against Foucault’s theoretical conceptions of how power 
operated. Nonetheless, for Butler, through contesting the dominant category (the 
theoretical act itself) the ideal of heterosexuality is subverted, thereby culminating 
in the questioning of the theoretical primacy of the category heterosexual (Butler 
1993: 123). Think here of Harman’s lesbian identity as a member of the heterosexist 
army. The message about the “rule” or “code” of military heterosexuality is that it 
is only a simulacra code, as plenty of closeted soldiers exist within the bounds of 
the American military system, and thus subversion of the “law” has taken place. 
The heterosexual doctrine of the military is thus shown to be a rule by simulacra 
of reality in that it does not represent any reality in its conception. Again, there 
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are after all plenty of gay and lesbian soldiers who would attest to this if sanctions 
would not be taken against them, and hence this is the consequence of the simulacra 
code. Interestingly, many former military members speak out against the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy once they exit the military itself, and are currently in 
support of overturning DADT. For the military, then, a hyperreality exists with 
regard to the simulacra of heterosexuality that is required by the “code.” 
Seduction and Drag
Interestingly, Baudrillard develops a thesis on gender with his understanding of 
seduction as belonging to the order of sign and ritual, and as that which removes 
a dimension from real space (Baudrillard 1990). Baudrillard says of seduction, 
“The only thing truly at stake is mastery of the strategy of appearances, against the 
force of being and reality” (Baudrillard [1979]1990: 9). Baudrillard’s seduction 
shows what Butler is concerned with making clear, namely that legitimating 
systems and conceptual schemes (political, libidinal, etc.) inform and provide 
the “code” behind ways of thinking. It is important here to point out that I read 
Baudrillard as attempting to get out from under theoretical canopies that instruct 
ways of conceptualization. But, what Baudrillard does not account for is that even 
his descriptions of gender seduction considers real bodies, such as transvestites, 
that are envisaged in terms of power-simulacra, or the simulacra of gender that has 
Consider Baudrillard’s account of transvestites. Baudrillard gives an example 
of seduction, namely that of the Barcelona drag queens, who wear women’s 
makeup and clothing, but keep their moustaches and hairy chests in full view. 
Again, there is an excess of appearance for Baudrillard, as there are more signs 
than “reality,” again pointing to the irony of too much reality or hyperreality. 
Uncertainty is the greatest in the play of femininity, such as with transvestism. 
With the transvestite, the signs are not duplicated with biology—they don’t 
match up. This is the seduction of the signs themselves. Perhaps the transvestites 
ability to seduce comes straight from parody—a parody of sex by its over-
Thus for Baudrillard, there are too many signs of gender, both masculine and 
feminine, thereby providing a dilemma with regard to categorization of either. 
For Baudrillard, this is not production, but the seduction of the signs themselves. 
Baudrillard articulates the complexity of the relationship between production, 
seduction, and drag queens when he says that “The signs of the drag queens make 
the claim that femininity is naught but the signs with which men rig it up … It is a 
challenge to the female model by way of a female game” (Baudrillard [1979]1990: 
14). This is the strength of seduction, the implication that a category is actually 
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is greater than the reality, and that “the feminine exists in the signs but there is 
no reality behind the signs” (Baudrillard [1979]1990: 14). In this way, the signs 
themselves suggest a challenge in terms of integrity of the category feminine, 
and for gender categories in sum. Hence seduction is an ironic, alternative form 
[1979]1990: 21). This is a theoretical dual of sorts, according to Baudrillard, since 
seduction is above all a strategy of displacement—it is seduction that prevails in 
the long term because it implies a reversible, indeterminate order (Baudrillard 
[1979]1990: 22).
Consider Sabrina Harman as an example of Baudrillard’s seduction. In 
numerous photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib, she is shown displaying military 
masculinity in her dress, in her membership as a military soldier, while wearing 
the masculine drag of a military utilities uniform (a t-shirt and fatigues), and as not 
evidencing stereotypical femininity (in keeping with Baudrillard’s example) in her 
appearance. In this way, Harman was wearing the “drag” of the military. Harman 
was a military soldier who existed as female within the masculinist “code” of the 
military itself, thereby further evidencing the use of forced “drag” for identity, 
as Harman’s identity was “made sense of” in terms of this code. It is through the 
consideration of the below photograph, of the female in the bikini experiencing 
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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and the drag of femininity are best juxtaposed against each other. 
In fact, we can understand all soldiers as wearing the “drag” of military 
uniforms, as these uniforms are gendered and are forced upon the bodies of 
soldiers, and without choice or regard for their own gendered performance or 
is clearly another version of the military’s drag in that it hides the reality of both 
applied to the face. This face “make-up” is comparable to an individual wearing 
feminine lipstick, eye shadow and the like to “capture” her prey (male or female), 
yet in this case, the soldiers are out to hide, seduce and trick, etc. “the enemy.” 
What is more, the soldiers at Abu Ghraib Prison (and at most military bases in 
existed beyond the prison walls, and thus it seems that the soldiers inside the 
prison are seducing each other with the drag of their uniforms.
Considering gender and sexuality, Harman actually existed as both a female and 
a lesbian within the heterosexist and masculinist “code” of the military, and this was 
most evident when her wife took the stand on her behalf during her courts-martial 
as a character witness. (As a side note, nobody said the word “wife” in Harman’s 
entire courts-martial. It was one of the many elephants in the room.) There was a 
seduction (an excess of appearance) with Harman as a member of the military, as 
a lesbian, and as a female, and these identities rendered the military’s masculinist 
and heterosexist “code” unintelligible, thereby showing its ultimate constructed and 
simulacra nature. By the very virtue of Harman being female within the masculinist 
military, and as a lesbian with a (semi-)closeted heterosexual identity within this 
military, these identities seduced the military’s code of constructed masculinity and 
all of the following: a military “power-simulacra” of heterosexuality, a homosexual 
given her lesbian identity, and a female in the masculinist military. This is a subversion 
of the “code” into oblivion, which makes Harman’s identity a “seduction,” according 
to Baudrillard. Additionally, by remaining under the radar of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” requirement of the army, Harman subverted the very system that attempted 
to control her by being gay and wearing the drag of the military uniform openly. 
This is subversive of the military’s heteronormativity and is an example of troubling 
signs, masculine and feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, thereby leading to this 
seduction. 
According to Baudrillard, the “feminine” is not just seduction; it also suggests 
a challenge to the male, in that the status of the categorical male cannot be 
understood as the inversion of the feminine. With this example, and in accord 
with Butler, Baudrillard questions the connectedness of gender and sex categories 
and shows their ultimate disassociation, as he did with the Barcelona drag queens 
example. Even so, says Baudrillard, “Every structure can adapt to its subversion or 
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inversion, but not to the reversion of its terms. Seduction is this reversible form” 
(Baudrillard [1979]1990: 21). This is evidenced with Harman’s inversion of the 
sexuality and gender signs of the American military “code,” thereby showing 
its hyperreal nature. Hence, Baudrillard understands seduction as an ironic, 
alternative form, one that breaks the referentially of sex and provides a space of 
This is similar to Butler’s project of destabilizing binary pairs and showing 
the dominant binary to be a faulty construction of power over the subordinate, 
yet Baudrillard takes it one step further and claims that an implosion of meaning 
has occurred given the displacement of symbolic referents. For Baudrillard then, 
seduction represents mastery over the symbolic universe, while power represents 
only mastery of the real universe (Baudrillard [1979]1990). Butler is concerned with 
this “real universe” (and the consequences for embodiment and actual bodies), where 
narratives of gender exist and structure reality in terms of power. Although it is true 
that Baudrillard renders gender meaningless via seduction and the displacement 
(read “implosion”) of symbolic referents, Butler basically does the same with her 
these power systems, and especially since gender cannot be understood as apart 
from these normalizing systems themselves.
Both England and Harman seemingly offended the masculinist military collective 
through their actions depicted in the media of the photographs of abuse, and this 
was pointed out in both courts-martial cases’ closing arguments. The prosecution in 
both cases was quick to point out that the actions observed in the photographs was 
offensive to the military, and this point became gendered when at the England trial 
the prosecuting attorney looked at the all-male panel and stated “she has tainted our 
army. Her actions have made us look badly, has harmed the image of the army, and 
it is she who is responsible for more violence done against American soldiers in Iraq 
because of these photographs.”8 This seems to be a clear delineation of boundaries 
in terms of gender such that a theoretical “us /them” rhetoric is used to distinguish 
between good and bad, masculine and feminine. Obviously England was not in the 
good-old-boys club of the military and did not count as a fellow soldier anymore. 
She was now evidence of the feminine irrational symbolic code. Nonetheless, this 
interpretation is in favor of the hyperreal rhetoric of gender simulation, as both 
England and Harman were shown not to have participated in the physical abuse of 
detainees, and thus this is an example of Baudrillard’s implosion of reality itself, as 
these women were not part of the “them” and instead are Fallgirls.
The Simulacra of Gender at Abu Ghraib and the Courts-Martial
If all gender is power-simulacra, in that it is a self-perpetuating and reifying 
category of the “real,” then Baudrillard and Butler would agree that gender 
8 This is a paraphrase from the trials themselves.
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performances are understood with regard to their socially constructed system or 
“code” for reference. For postmodern identities, it is this code or model of reality 
that is more real then the reality it is supposed to represent. In this way, I argue 
that gender is a simulacra identity in that it is real only as a “consequence” of its 
performance within contexts that have created a narrative of gender “realness,” 
albeit ones based on image or power.
Both Baudrillard and Butler independently argue for a deconstructed 
understanding of gender, and one that culminates in simulacra of gender reality. I 
argue that it is possible that Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra can come to function 
as a kind of postmodern policing technique, where what are being enforced are 
power-simulacra power-simulacra are what the 
collective conscience has come to regard as “real,” albeit this notion of “reality” is 
unstable and could change at any time. Hence, this notion of “power-simulacra” is 
theorizing, where “power” is understood as the legitimation of certain, yet unstable, 
it is possible to show how power-simulacra can be attached to the body in terms 
power-simulacra function as the policing 
mechanism for gender itself.
For Butler, unlike Baudrillard, gender performances have direct consequences 
for bodies, where gender is realized through power and the policing/surveillance 
of norms. On the other hand, Baudrillard would critique these norms in terms of 
simulacra norms, as gender for Baudrillard is only a game of seduction, and not 
about the production of identity in terms of power. Nonetheless, both Baudrillard 
and Butler show that systems of “realness” are themselves constructed, and then 
itself, or what I call “power-simulacra” and the “rule by simulacra of reality”—all 
informed by the overarching “code” of gender signs and rules.
Again, consider the gender narrative of the American military, where gender 
is understood in terms of power-simulacra based on the code of constructed 
masculinity. This account informs a conception of gender, where the text itself 
is what is deemed the standard from which to measure, thereby functioning as a 
decoder, translator, and informer of the “code.” In this way, the code becomes the 
rule by simulacra of reality.” This code lies 
in the symbols that represent, legitimate, and celebrate the order of the code itself. 
uniforms, where bodies are given military legitimacy. Only certain dress is 
appropriate for certain events in the military, and options exist for women with 
regard to military uniforms that “feminize” them using the drag of military 
uniform. Not only do these uniforms control the body in terms of identity, but 
to function as drag in that they allow for a gendered understanding of identity 
that is in terms of a normalizing ritual and code for dress. Additionally, uniforms 
are worn in accordance with the “law” or rules for dress. For example, pins and 
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medals must be worn in a certain manner and in a certain order on the uniform, 
occasions, and then never in buildings, etc. Hence, both identity and gender are 
constructed and performed through the use of uniform as well as repetition and the 
ritualized style of both the body and code itself. 
Nonetheless, at Abu Ghraib, soldiers did not consistently wear uniforms, salute, 
or follow other military protocol, thereby providing evidence that this “code” is 
at its base conceptualized simulacra. These facts made me think that perhaps drag 
could be about something larger than just gender and sex—perhaps it could be about 
simulacra identity in general. So, I expand the notion of “drag” and include more 
than just imitation of masculinity and femininity, or male and female, because at 
Abu Ghraib it seemed that individuals were all mimicking some simulacra identity 
that was “drag-like.” For example, testimony at the courts-martial showed that 
uniforms did not always function to police bodies, as prisoners were kept naked, and 
without any bounded identity markings. Additionally, American soldiers removed 
their actual lack of functional identity. So here we have unmarked soldiers and 
prisoners, yet in order to mark prisoners, and because of a shortage of supplies, 
it was stated in numerous testimonies that Iraqi women’s panties were purchased 
for “clothing.” What is interesting is that a simulacra understanding of “clothing” 
appears in the images of detainee humiliation, as male prisoners were shown being 
shamed through the act of putting women’s panties on their heads for punishment, 
and clearly not as clothing, as panties are not worn on the head. In fact, it could be 
argued that “drag-techniques” were used to humiliate prisoners, as femininity was 
literally disguising masculinity, where female panties were forcibly put on male 
prisoners faces, as shown in the photographs of abuse. Yet, this is not a traditional 
notion of drag in the sense that femininity or masculinity is being performed in 
order to instantiate the subject, and instead “drag” is used here to abuse prisoners. 
I think this association of prisoners and “drag-techniques” can best be seen in 
Colombian artist Fernando Botero’s latest works on Abu Ghraib (Botero 2006), 
which depicts some of the prisoners being abused at Abu Ghraib literally in drag. 
In Botero’s latest works entitled “Abu Ghraib,” he depicts the prisoner abuse at 
Abu Ghraib through a series marked 1-50 of drawings and paintings (50 oils and 
sketches—170 paintings total) that depict pain, degradation, and torture—and 
more. He shows the juxtaposition of masculinity and femininity within this series, 
where in some pieces the male body is hyper-muscular, yet is also wearing the drag 
of lingerie—sometimes that of a complete red bra and panty set and other times 
panties alone. This image can be read as making the exact point I am discussing, 
that prisoners were tortured through the use of “drag-techniques,” which highly 
offends the cultural sensibilities of Iraqi constructions of masculinity. This could be 
Botero’s point about the torture of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib—that humiliation 
and gender were both used as weapons. There is the added humiliation for Muslim 
religious beliefs that forbids nudity and males dressing as females—the separating 
of stereotypical cultural feminine and masculine practices (although not queer 
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ones). The very use of the term ‘humiliated’ has a direct link to men being treated 
as women, and thereby offends the socially constructed ideals of masculinity, both 
Iraqi and American. 
Civilian contractors were also present at Abu Ghraib and they were abusing 
prison imitating the military and giving orders, and some of them wore uniforms 
(as “fake soldiers”), yet some of them imitated civilians. In this way, there was a 
seduction of appearances taking place, where the strategy of both the contractors 
and the OGA was to master the symbols associated with their identity. I argue this 
is a kind of “drag,” although not the kind that Butler and Baudrillard discuss with 
regard to gender. Additionally, we see this mimicry of identity when we consider 
that the MP soldiers were not doing work associated with the job of a military 
police person, but were being coerced by MI to assist in “softening up” detainees, 
and thus were imitating the torturer’s assistants. In addition, MIs were surely not 
doing military intelligence work, as the prisoners did not have any actionable 
intelligence to give them. Instead, MI was imitating some NCIS (Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service) simulacra of what it means to be in an intelligence position 
within the military. In these above ways, it seems like everyone was doing a form 
of drag at Abu Ghraib, although not completely and always in the ways that Butler 
and Baudrillard understand. In reality, even the prisoners were supposed to be 
terrorists, yet most were common criminals arrested in street sweeps. So what 
was “real” in these situations? I argue the consequences of abuse, the fact that the 
blame for this abuse fell onto the shoulders of low-ranking soldiers, as well as the 
gendered and homoerotic interpretation of abuse. 
Using the narrative that couples the military and masculinity as a frame 
for conceptualization, an analysis of gender and power within the Fort Hood 
courtroom emerges. Interestingly, during the England trial, an expert witness for 
the defense makes this point about gender identity and military uniform clear. 
psychology for the prosecution. Her name was Lang, and she argued that England 
was not suffering from depression, even though England had been on Zoloft (and 
anti-depressant) for 10 months now. It immediately seemed logical to me that 
England was not suffering depression or anxiety at the moment because of this 
medication, as the purpose of the medication is to alleviate these symptoms. Lang 
gave England a mental status exam and claimed that England displayed below-
average intelligence, and labeled England a “follower.” What is interesting is 
that Lang did not give England any objective tests for measurement of either 
intelligence or depression and anxiety, and argued that England had adjustment 
disorder with mixed anxiety and depression. Additionally, Lang did not consider 
any family history or context for England’s previous diagnosis of anxiety and 
depression, which is typical in psychiatric diagnostics. 
Although her testimony was interesting, her gender was made clear in the 
courtroom and in terms of an oppositional relationship to the masculinist economy 
of the military symbolic. Lang was the only female (other than the defense 
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attorney during the Harman trial) who wore a skirt version of the army uniform, 
referenced her male mentor that she worked with as a legitimating tool for her 
degree and was new to Fort Hood. In this way, she was evidencing (feminine) 
weakness as an expert (her role at the trials) by referring to another male expert in 
the greatest evidencing of femininity made by this expert was her act of knitting 
a long yarn project in the middle of the courtroom, and in full view of the panel 
(jury) and other military peers. (Literally, her yarn project was unrolled into the 
isle of the courtroom for display.) This is an important, if not genius move, by 
the prosecution because it served to legitimate and reify the masculinist code 
of the military through an oppositional subordinate relationship of femininity. 
Additionally, it was an all-out statement that this expert knew her place and would 
happily occupy the subordinate feminine role through her actions, or use of craft as 
a feminine symbolic narrative. In this way, the prosecution expert was succumbing 
to rule by simulacra of reality.
These actions can be read as making the following claim: “The military 
accepts femininity so long as it is subordinate to masculinity.” After all, this was 
the courts-martial of a female soldier, and the gender message here is that this 
“rotten apple” was “rotten” because of her lack of ability to interpret and reify the 
code of military constructed masculinity correctly. After all, this is the hyperreal 
code that England was being judged in terms of, and even though this code of 
gender simulacra was itself constructed, it indeed functioned as power-simulacra 
in that it was considered to be “real” with regard to understanding gender within 
the military.
doctrine of gender division, namely the association of masculinity and the public 
to be a female expert witness in a room of alpha military males, the performance 
of femininity that Lang gave served to comfort masculinist positions in the room 
full of masculine subjectivities, it might have been the best legal strategy to 
legitimize the phallus so that the phallic order was not questioned. Consequently, 
this interpretation is about the authority of the power-simulacra of masculinity 
within the military, functioning as the policing mechanism for gender itself and the 
hyperreality of gender category simulations.
Another example of gender performance (at the Harman trial this time) that 
can be understood in terms of the masculinist code of the military was that of 
Captain Takemura. Consider both defense attorneys, the female and soft-spoken 
Takemura versus the tough, rational, and hard-edged civilian attorney Frank 
Spinner. Repeatedly, when Harman was described as a maternal caregiver it was 
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by Takemura in a soft voice and through the use of photographs showing Harman 
doing service activities and making friends with Iraqi families and children. 
During closing arguments it was again Takemura who pled with the panel in her 
soft voice, sometimes so soft one could not be sure what she said, as she motioned 
to maternal-Sabrina and the pictures from Iraq that showed Sabrina performing 
stereotypical feminine roles. 
In the courtroom, it was a telling site that the only female attorney in the 
Harman trial was the one who elicited confessions of being afraid out of the male 
soldiers. In this way, Takemura wore the persona of the motherly caregiver who 
could empathize with fear, and who could make it a safe place to address this 
fear, even in the courtroom which was itself doused plentifully with the military’s 
simulacra code of masculinity. I argue that she could elicit these confessions 
because she understood the military code, and inserted herself as a role acceptable 
with regard to this masculine symbolic narrative. According to the code itself, 
the expression of fear is stereotypically understood as unmasculine. Interestingly, 
Takemura elicited these confessions while wearing the masculine uniform of 
the military. What is telling here is that none of the male soldiers made these 
confessions to any of the male attorneys or the judge, and only to the “mother 
power is evidenced in the form of a code that sets up power-simulacra as the 
self-reifying standard of the code itself, and namely masculinity. Interestingly, 
with regard to gendering Takemura, she is both feminine and masculine in this 
example, thereby showing gender constructions to be simulacra identities because 
with masculinity, and this is Baudrillard’s point about the simulacra nature of 
postmodern identity categories—they cannot signify themselves in any stable and 
with regard to coherence. 
Consider the above example in terms of Baudrillard’s seduction. Male 
soldiers admitted under oath that they were scared to stop the abusiveness of 
other American soldiers towards the Iraqi detainees because they were in fear 
of retaliation. The male soldiers admitting to being scared in a military court 
shows the seduction of gender identity in that these males are shown to evidence 
both military masculinity and feminine fear. This was an important point in the 
courts-martial with regard to gender identity, as these admissions of fear were 
being made to the only female attorney associated with the trial, and to one who 
embodied femininity as she was wearing the skirt-version of the military uniform, 
or exhibiting the feminine persona-fascia while in military “drag.” As a further 
testimony of Takemura’s performance of femininity, every day in court, Takemura 
showed up in full make-up and with her hair immaculately styled. She even was 
concerned with re-applying make-up throughout the day, and visibly during 
court recesses. Takemura’s gender performance was thus the seduction of gender 
signs, as Takemura displayed the signs of both masculine power and femininity 
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in the courtroom as well as within the masculinist military. Likewise, the male 
soldiers who displayed fear in their testimonies evidenced both the masculinity 
associated with the military by virtue of being a soldier, but also the vulnerability 
of femininity in their claims of fear. Takemura thus both displays the powerful 
masculine subjectivity while also wearing her feminine persona identity, and the 
soldiers display femininity while also maintaining their roles as soldiers within the 
masculinist military.
This same use of gender simulacra was further evident in the Harman trials 
when Harman was sold to the panel as a maternal caregiver. The archetype of 
“maternal Sabrina” was vivid in the life-sized photographs of Harman at Al Hilla, 
another military compound in Iraq. Again, Harman was not seen as a soldier in 
the courtroom or in Iraq, and instead was repeatedly described as a caregiver, 
motherly individual, and even a social worker who cared about the experiences 
of Iraqi children.9 Instead of being an equal soldier in the courtroom to other 
9 Interestingly, the job of social worker can be understood as a caregiver occupation 
and thus symbolic of femininity itself and allowable instances of femininity in the public 
sphere.
Figure 4.2 Harman tattoo, “rotten apple 6” 
Note: Some of the soldiers charged with abuses at Abu Ghraib marked their bodies with 
variations of the “rotten apple” tattoo as a means literally to embody resistance. 
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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male soldiers, Harman was cast into the role of the female symbolic narrative that 
masculinist military itself. Unlike Takemura, however, Harman was not inserted 
into the code of masculinity because she did not evidence the simulacra gender of 
masculinity. Instead, her identity as a soldier was stripped from her, and possibly 
given her characterizations as a feminine soldier, which subverted masculinist 
military ideals. 
Perhaps this is why she, and other soldiers who faced courts-martial, obtained 
the tattoo depicting a rotten apple and their trial number. (Most of the “seven 
rotten-apples” had tattoos of rotten apples on their bodies with their courts-
martial number.) In an attempt to claim an identity in a postmodern culture, where 
their bonds to each other, but also their bond to the military. Nonetheless, and 
ungrounded. However, given the permanence of a tattoo, I argue that Harman 
embodied in a lasting way her identity as part of the masculinist military, and 
despite her gendered descriptions in her courts-martial as a “feminine” and “care 
giving” soldier. In this way, Harman subverts her gendered characterizations in the 
soldier within a heterosexist military, and as accused in the Abu Ghraib scandal. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have shown that what is considered theoretically “real” instructs 
the formation of conceptual and organizational paradigms with regard to sex and 
gender categories. I use the theories of both Baudrillard and Butler to discuss gender 
“realness,” and argue that gender is a simulacra category for identity. Although 
the categories of gender are simulacrum in their construction, there are real 
consequences for offending the “code” of gender with regard to conceptualization. 
One way that Baudrillard and Butler are different is that Baudrillard thrives 
existing in “reality.” For Baudrillard, this gendering of reality serves as reality 
hyperreality that comes to function as the “real,” or a simulacrum of reality, as 
signs have been substituted for the real itself, and gender identity in this case. 
Although for Baudrillard, there is no reality apart from the signs, he provides a 
Additionally, Butler points out that gender is under surveillance and can only 
be understood with regard to its very own policing practices based in power itself. 
In this way, gender performativities within the military can be understood with the 
concept of gender power-simulacra, where masculinity becomes the regulatory 
Fallgirls132
frame and policing technique for understanding legitimate citations of gender and 
value. Says Butler, gender is thus an act of “doing,” where the socially constructed 
standard is neither a representation of reality, nor a description of reality, as 
“reality” can only be found in its simulation, or the code for surveillance itself. 
This means that “realness” is constructed in the military through the conformity 
and surveillance of norms, such that the actual space of the military is characterized 
in terms of this code. Apart from this code there is no understanding of “realness,” 
and only the rule by simulacra of reality. Through the continual performance of 
gender within the military, the “doing” of gender becomes a means to naturalize 
the self in terms of the conformity to and surveillance of “masculinity.” Thus, 
the sustained performance of masculinity becomes a means for military cultural 
Throughout this section, I have been concerned with gender and what was 
“real” at Abu Ghraib and the associated courts-martial. At a private dinner, one 
soldier told me, with tears in his eyes, that he pleaded with his wife to leave 
him and to take their children. This pleading was in an attempt to “protect” his 
family from his continued experiences of the “realities” of Abu Ghraib, which still 
violently run through his mind and dreams, manifesting themselves in physical 
outbursts and emotional distress. Although this tearful confession was made by a 
male soldier who was still clearly feeling vulnerable given his experiences of Abu 
Ghraib, and was thus a violation of the code of military masculinity showing the 
ultimate simulacra nature of gender constructions, this confession evidences both 
the trauma and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder that were the “realities” 
of Abu Ghraib. Daily destruction, followed by post-traumatic stress disorder, is 
how soldiers described in interview and in testimony their experiences at Abu 
Ghraib, as well as their current state of existence. There was chaos at Abu Ghraib, 
and this was real. 
Testimony of Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Expert 
Witness in Sociology, Sabrina Harman 
Courts-Martial
Stjepan G. Mestrovic, civilian, was called as witness on May 17, 2005 for the 
Questions by the Civilian Defense Counsel:
 … 
A: I specialize in what is known as structural functionalism, it’s the dominant 
paradigm within sociology. It talks about how society is held together, and our 
obedience, the breaking of norms also occurs.  …  
Q: … First of all, what investigative types of reports have you read regarding 
the Abu Ghraib incident?
A: I read the Taguba Report, the Schlesinger Report, the Faye Report, the 
Herrington Report, and the Church Report. I read a number of the sworn 
statements, for example, all the material pertaining to the Article 32 for—in 
the England case. Um, I read Field Manual 34-52, both the 1987 and the 1992 
versions----
Q: ----what—I mean, when you reference that number, tell the members what 
that is?
A: It’s the Authoritative Army Doctrine on Interrogation Methods. 
Q: Have you observed these proceedings?
A: Yes, I have. 
 …  
Q: Now, did you already—were you provided a copy of any kind of Psychological 
Evaluation that Specialist Harman underwent?
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A: Yes I was.
Q: And what were you provided and what all did you read in that regard?
A: I was provided the psychiatric report by Dr. Donovan and I was provided the 
MCMI, which is one of the many psychological tests, a very authoritative one, 
Q: About how much time have you spent with Specialist Harman preparing?
time one hour. 
Q: So is there anything that we’ve missed that you’ve either read or looked at or 
considered in forming the opinions that you are willing to express here today?
A: Well there was more material, for example, there is a sociological study about 
the disaster of the Space Shuttle Challenger at NASA, which blew up, which I 
think is directly relevant to this case. I’ve read the sociological study of that, 
which won an award in sociology. And I read Akbar Ahmed, who was a well-
known Muslim Scholar about Islamic culture because that’s one of the issues 
that was raised in the Schlesinger Report, the insensitivity to Islamic Culture. 
So I’ve prepared on that. And I also read Mark Daniels book Torture and Truth, 
which includes a number of documents pertaining to Abu Ghraib. Among other 
material that was relevant. 
Q: Okay. Let’s then begin by looking at some of the terms that you used before 
we get into your actual opinions. You referenced Functional Sociology?
A: Yes. 
A: It’s an assumption that society, rather you’re talking about a family unit, 
whether we’re talking about a courtroom, an Army unit, school, whatever, has 
a certain component that are called norms, beliefs, values, and sanctions which 
have to synchronize together for it to work in a safe, healthy way. And also an 
implication, when those norms, sanctions, values, and beliefs are sync, then you 
have deviance, then you have a break in the norms which can include anything 
from being late, dirty looks, to suicide, murder, and the most extreme sort of 
things. 
Q: How does that relate to social disorganization?
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A: The way that it relates is that every social system has always operating 
within a certain expectation, certain preferences, certain ways to enforce those. 
Every class, every courtroom, every school, every hospital there are norms and 
expectations about what will be done, how it will be done. So that when a system 
is disorganized it means that those expectations, the ways of the force, and all the 
beliefs and structures that go into that are out of sync and we call that deviance. 
Q: Are you familiar with the term Normalization of Deviance?
A: Yes I think that’s an extremely important concept. I mentioned that book 
about the disaster of the—of Challenger. The sociologist who studied it found 
that NASA knew ahead of time that the o-rings, which eventually led to that 
disaster, were eroding, there were problems. By normative of standards, and 
deviance was occurring because the Engineering Standards, the Aerospace 
Standards, the other Normative standards that NASA was supposed to be 
using were ignored. Instead of NASA saying the o-rings are not deforming, the 
standards were changed. The parallel that I see here very directly is that the 
standards for interrogation and also in FM 34-52, which is Authoritative, and 
also the standard to keep MI and MP functions separate, which all the U.S. 
Government Reports type, they were merged. That was a breaking of norms. 
That was a breaking of expectation and I think that the explosion, if you will, at 
Abu Ghraib is as inevitable as the explosion of Challenger. 
Q: Okay, well we’re going to go into more detail in that regard. How long have 
A: 25 years.
the things that you have viewed and you have examined, do you have an expert 
opinion pertaining to how social disorganization relates to the Abu Ghraib 
Prison situation and in particular as it relates to Specialist Sabrina Harman?
A: Yes. It’s right in the United States Government’s own reports, they cite the 
fact that nobody was certain who was, in fact, in charge of that prison. Was it 
inadequate. They cite that the low expectations, what people were supposed to do 
were confusing. They cite the fact that MI roles and MP roles, which used to be 
kept distinct, were, in fact, merged. They cite tremendous problems with just the 
basics of knowing when the prisoners would be released. They cite of numerous 
problems with social chaos which the reports directly call, in fact, a “poisonous 
atmosphere,” that’s a direct verbatim quote from the Faye Report at Abu Ghraib 
and an unhealthy mystic. So that is the equivalent of that sociological state of 
social disorganization that I spoke about which results to deviance. 
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Now the second part of your question, how that relates to Sabrina Harman? Is 
that I think any person who is caught in a situation which was that disorganized 
in which rules are not clear, which has got confusing, is going to be disoriented. 
is right and what is wrong. And that’s for the healthiest a person be. 
Q: This—how does this relate to the term Role Confusion?
A: While most of the time we know what’s expected of us. As a professor I 
know what my role expectations are, to prepare for lectures, to give my lectures, 
to give examines. The students know what’s expected of them, be on time, 
listen, take notes, don’t party too much, so forth. When those role expectations 
become confused, when, you know, you’re doing a job that you’re not trained 
for, that you’re not prepared for, when you don’t know who your boss is, when 
you don’t, let’s say, enforce the fact that people shouldn’t come late to class or 
can’t turn in papers, you’re going to have disorganization and you’re going to 
have deviance. Well, like I said the government’s reports decided a number of 
confusing, disorganized aspects to Abu Ghraib and this will have an effect on 
performance, on what a person feels is expected of him. 
ago, but what is the deviance that occurred or existed at Abu Ghraib?
A: Well, deviance is sociologically as the breaking of norms. Now, what the 
government reports say very clearly are words to the affect that the nudity and 
the humiliation, and I’m paraphrasing here, but it’s almost verbatim, led to or 
condoned or opened the door to more serious abuse. In other words, that’s that 
normalization of deviance. If you don’t stop the breaking of norms early on, if 
it becomes normal, like the eroded o-rings. You say oh, it’s just a nudity thing, 
it’s no big deal and that makes the next breaking of norms easier and the next 
breaking norms easier. Another way we put it is, sociology we speak about 
primary deviance versus secondary deviance. Now, sometimes in their youth 
almost everybody has played hooky in school or may have gotten drunk or may 
have sexually been promiscuous, once, you stop there okay you broke a norm, 
you learned your lesson. But, if you continue like that then it’s easier to do the 
next thing and the next thing and the next thing, I mean that’s the principal here 
of the normalization of deviance and then you have somebody who ends up as a 
drug addict or as a criminal, as a kind of quote, career. So in that sense it’s very 
it is sanctioned, and that is corrected. 
Q: Well, as you look at the Abu Ghraib situation and what happened there, 
weren’t there safeguards in place to keep this deviance from coming about?
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A: No, I mean, the Taguba Report especially is crystal clear Geneva Conventions 
were not posted. The Schlesinger Report is even more critical and says that there 
was confusion about whether Geneva Conventions applied. In principal they 
were supposed to apply in Iraq, but they did not apply in Afghanistan and some 
of the people who were at Abu Ghraib, the MI, were coming from the----
 … 
A: ----the Schlesinger Report explicitly states just that, that practices which 
Afghanistan. 
Q: And did you see evidence of these practices at Abu Ghraib based on the 
reports that you seen?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, can you identify what some of those things were that were—are these 
violations of the norms that existed in the Army?
A: Yes, and here I have to go in to FM 34-52, which is the Authoritative 
Normative Standard still for the Army----
Q: ----okay----
A: ----that’s the thing that’s interesting about this?
Q: Please explain?
A: Well, FM 34-52, the Geneva Convention apply. It tries to establish report 
between the interrogator and the detainee. And it works on willing cooperation. 
Practices were put in place in Afghanistan where the Geneva Conventions did 
not apply and the Schlesinger Report says the problem—the confusion stemmed 
from the fact that these practices migrated, that’s exactly what they used, into 
Iraq, and therefore caused confusion for the soldiers. The other sources of 
confusion was the merging of the MI and the MP functions. This created this 
climate, this poison atmosphere, which led to further abuse. 
just said? Nudity of detainees in Tier 1A?
A: Nudity is a violation of Geneva Conventions. It was not seen as such as the 
reports themselves state. It was seen as routine, common place, and accepted. 
Now I can take that statement from the government reports and put it in the 
Fallgirls138
sociological language, deviance became normalized. When you have a situation 
in which deviance is normalized, the normalization of deviance, then like I said 
any other further deviance is not going to seem that deviant because they’ve 
already broken so many norms along the way, it makes further deviance easier.
Q: How does this balneology—you mentioned NASA before, can you relate this 
question of nudity to the NASA situation?
which are tied into the Engineering Community, the Aerospace Community, and 
NASA’s own Bureaucratic Community. They have certain standards, you know, 
there must not be so much erosion, there must not be so much burning. Those 
them, let’s go back to our standard, they just changed the standards. They just 
kept making deviant standards until it got so bad that it led inevitably to the 
disaster. So that’s the parallel that I’m drawing here. FM 34-52, Authoritative 
Version, keep the roles distinct. Authoritative Version, the government’s 
reports are saying those two roles were mixed which already broke a norm and 
interrogation techniques that you will have put in with our safeguards which 
went beyond FM 34-52. Instead of seeing that as deviant, it led to the fact—it 
became normalized and led to further deviance. 
Q: So with respect to nudity and the MPs when you talk about this blurring of 
MI/MP roles, what evidence did you see that the MPs knew what the norm was?
A: I don’t think they did know, but they were put into a situation—it’s the 
same thing as the NASA situation. They didn’t know, but they did know that 
the stuff was going on and that it was common place and it was accepted, it 
became organized, that’s the thing. It became origination of deviance. So when 
you see nudity, when you see humiliation, when you see yelling, when you see 
coercion, when you see intimidation, all of which are violations and these things 
are accepted as normal, then I agree sociologically with the reports by the U.S. 
Government that this leads to further abuse. It opens the door to it. 
 
… 
Q: … There are signs up in one part of the prison that say treat detainees with 
respect or words to that affect. And then a guard, forget who—you know, any 
guard—a guard goes and works in Tier 1A and sees that detainees are being put 
in stress positions while they’re nude with women’s underwear over their head, 
do those things appear to be treating people with dignity and respect in terms of 
the Geneva Convention as you understand it?
A: No.
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Q: Okay, so what problem would that create for a guard who sees a posting in 
one part of the prison and this kind of treatment in another part of the prison?
A: The sociological term we use for that in any situation is cognitive dissidence. 
Dissidence being that the mind has to reconcile the two opposites. One can be 
like a father, whom you respect and love, who beat you mercilessly and abuses 
you, that will create cognitive dissidence in a child. So I can get out of the Abu 
Ghraib situation and use this as a metaphor. It will create cognitive dissidence, 
it will create a child who will feel helpless, it will create somebody who feels 
invalidated, and again opens the door to further abuse. Cognitive dissidence is 
what it would cause. 
 … 
Q: What safeguards did you see that were in place at Abu Ghraib to keep 
something like what happened at Abu Ghraib from happening?
[Pause]
Q: Did you see any safeguards in place?
that comes to mind is the U.S. Government reports did not talk about safeguards, 
in fact, the Taguba Report is very critical about the lack of safeguards, in fact, 
the Taguba Report is very critical about the lack of safeguards, the lack of 
standard operating procedures. That the Geneva Conventions were not posted. 
done. I mean they had a long list of criticisms of failure to safeguard. So your 
questions throws me off, I cannot think of anything immediately that reports say 
here are the safeguards. 
Q: Well let’s look at another aspect of this. I mean we had testimony from Ken 
Davis on the 25th of October he basically shows up in Tier 1A, he sees some 
abuse, and he says—he reports it to a lieutenant the next day. On the night of 
November 7th a Specialist now, he sees abuse and he immediately reports, I 
think it was to Sergeant Jones, I’m not sure his rank, but—and of course we 
now have Specialist Sabrina Harman who was in this environment, saw these 
abuses, and she has now been found guilty by the court members of dereliction 
of duty and of maltreating detainees. From a sociological standpoint is there an 
explanation as to why those two individuals would report what they saw, but 
someone like Sabrina Harman who was in the midst of this for a number of 
weeks would not report what she saw?
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A: Yes, it’s the concept of learned helplessness. With the—in the case of 
Sergeant [Kenn] Davis, he was not actually assigned to Tier 1A, he was doing 
transportation----
 … 
A: ----yes, Kenn Davis, it’s my understanding his primary duty was transporting 
prisoners to Baghdad from Abu Ghraib. He was outside the situation. So 
coming in from the outside situation which is more normative, coming into a 
deviant situation, yes, you’re going to see the deviance and you’re going to 
do something about it. Similarly in the other—with Wisdom’s case, but when 
you’re immersed in it it’s kind of like, you know, if I could use a metaphor an 
from the beginning, I mean there’s sociological studies in this, you’re less likely 
to get the coach or somebody to break it up than if you come in from the outside 
and see it. I mean there’s many cases of this and one of the most famous cases 
is the Kitty Genovese Case, which is often used in sociology, where this woman 
was screaming for help because she was being attacked. It was an apartment 
building, it was full of people, nobody called the police. Subsequent studies 
show that everyone in the apartment building thought somebody else would call 
the police. The responsibility is diffused. People are helpless in that situation, 
it’s a kind of conical thing. But when you come in from the outside and are fresh 
to it, the deviance hits you in the face and you’re more likely to do something. 
Q: And focusing then a little more closely on Specialist Harman and given that 
you’ve had access to her psychological evaluation, apart form what you’ve 
described from a sociological standpoint, what can you say as an expert about 
her particular psychological make-up and whether or not that was a factor here?
on the 23rd of October she did report along with Megan Ambuhl a case of the 
person who was handcuffed so tight, but she was still at that point fresh into this 
situation, so the learned helplessness had not set in. So going to the other part of 
your question about the psychological report, the diagnosis that she was given 
by Dr. Donovan is Post-Traumatic----
Q: ----and Dr. Donovan is a military doctor?
A: Yes. It’s Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome and also she has what are known 
as dependency personality traits. Dependency personality, I want to explain 
opinion, it’s a kind of personality which is the opposite of sadistic. The opposite 
of a person without a conscience. The opposite of a person who is aggressive. 
In other words, in psychology we have what are called character or personality 
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disorders, Narcissism, Sociopath, Sadists, she scored way below the norm of 
those. There’s just no way that she’s any of that. Those are the people who we 
in ordinary language refer to as morally corrupt. Instead she scored above the 
average person in standing up and defying authority because basically she goes 
along with whatever else is going on. In a good way sometimes too, because 
one of the other interesting things about dependency personality and I think 
this jives with everything I seen about her helping with children and so forth. 
In a good social environment they are very helpful because they want to make 
people happy. 
Q: And did you—does that—how does that relate to the testimony, I think 
worker than a soldier?
A: Yes, that struck me very powerfully when Sergeant Jones said that because 
I agree with that. In the psychiatric literature somebody with a dependency 
personality traits, because they want to please others, because they want to make 
people happy, because they basically go along with things, I mean they would 
be perfectly suited for trying to bring joy and happiness to others. But they’re 
unsuited when the situation is deviant because they don’t have that something 
them. I think it was easier for her in the beginning, but then becomes even more 
Q: As an expert then you are able to give any insight to the court members with 
respect to the picture, which they have in evidence that shows the pyramid with 
naked bodies and Sabrina Harman smiling in that situation?
A: Yes. Basically it’s not a sadistic smile. It is not the smile of somebody 
without a conscience who is enjoying it and I’m basing this on my knowledge 
of psychology. It is a smile of somebody who is pretending to go along because 
they are afraid. 
 … 
A: … based on my knowledge, based on the test, based on the circumstances 
interpret that smile as one of learned helplessness and dependency …
 … 
Q: Dr. Mestrovic, I want to go back and rephrase some of the questions that I 
asked you a moment ago. 
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A: Okay.
Q: First of all, as an expert—can an expert—based on—can as psychological 
test of a particular individual whether it was Sabrina Harman or not and then 
having the type of photo that we have, that existed with this pyramid and the 
context of what happened at Abu Ghraib, what are the range of possibilities to 
explain why a person might be smiling such as Sabrina Harman is smiling in 
that picture?
A: There’s a full range, ranging from sadism to random smiling, to feeling 
helpless to other possibilities. 




A: Because those test results are unambiguously clear that she does not have the 
character disorder of sadism.
Q: Now as an expert you can’t sit before these members and say what—in fact, 
why she was smiling or what was going on in her head at that time, can you?
A: Correct, I cannot. 
Q: Could it be consistent also with this learned helplessness that you described 
earlier from a sociological standpoint?
A: Yes.
Q: And why do you say that?
A: Because what, again, what those tests showed is that she scores very high 
in anxiety, depression, and dependency, all of which would be consistent with 
—whether we’re talking about her or anybody else, with somebody smiling in 
a situation that is very uncomfortable as a way to try to please others or to just 
get along. 
Q: And in terms of this concept of learned helplessness you—I mean we’re 
talking about a very short timeframe. And you talked about how she did report 
something on the 23rd of October and now we’re down to the—just the 7th of 
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November. Is it possible for something like learned helplessness to develop in 
such a short period of time?
A: Yes, learned helplessness can occur almost immediately and it can sometimes 
take months or years depending on the situations and also depending on the 
personality and temperament of the individual. 
 … 
(May 17, 2005, SHCM)

Chapter 5 
The Fallgirls of Abu Ghraib:  
Feminist Analyses and the  
Importance of Context
I believe that SPC Harman is in one photo. It is more serious to kill someone than 
to take a picture. 
Civilian Defense Attorney, Frank Spinner, June 24, 2004, SHA32
assaulted any detainees.1
Major Gary L. Carson, 89th Military Police Brigade, Victory Base, Iraq, 
appointed as Article 32 Investigating Officer
Fall.girl (noun . slang)
1. A fallgirl is a person of feminine gender who is used as a scapegoat or easy 
victim to take the blame for someone else’s actions. 2. An individual said to “take 
the fall” in terms of responsibility for someone else’s actions.
Some of the resent feminist scholarship surrounding the abuse at Abu Ghraib 
examination unfairly and without evidence, and only mere speculation, blame 
Lynndie England. We are all familiar with the now infamous photographs of abuse 
of prisoners under the care of American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq of 
2003. Some of these photographs did indeed show both Harman and England. 
Given these images, it is easy to jump to conclusion and to assume that these 
women are guilty of prisoner abuse, which is what much of the larger culture did, 
as well as the military, which leads to additional cover-ups of power structures 
and forces at work here. However, it is always best to remember that images 
themselves have contexts within which they are taken, and rarely do photographs 
capture entire settings and situations.
When preparing for the separate trials of England and Harman, I read many 
reports and one of them was the Fay report. In this report there was mention 
of gender as a means for analysis, and this is the only government report that 
1 This was stated in response to the government’s attempt to charge Harman with 
OPS, July 7, 2004)
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does make this a descriptor for examination. In fact, there are several places 
where it is pointed out that gender is used as torture when certain acts of 
interrogation take place in front of females, or that female soldiers did certain 
acts to prisoners. Sjoberg (2007) rightly points out that the Fay Report does 
show that gender matters when discussing sexual torture and this is evidence 
that our government considers gender partially important when analyzing war 
crimes—a connection that I think is both relevant and critically important when 
discussing and understanding the events associated with Abu Ghraib. Indeed, 
“The absence of gender in the policy response to the torture at Abu Ghraib is in 
itself a gendering of international policy” (Sjoberg 2007). I have been perplexed 
about this same lack of concern about gender within government reports as well. 
However, I am worried that many are quick to judge both England and Harman 
in terms of the Fay report, forgetting that this report was written before the trials 
as a means of “looking into” what was going on at Abu Ghraib. Wording such 
as “may have been involved” and “could have been involved” are used, and it is 
possible that some viewed these as fact, immediately making the leap that these 
women are guilty, or that the reports were referring to England and Harman 
simply because they mention the word ‘woman.’
Additionally, all of the pictures of abuse were shown at the trials and made 
available to the defense council, and under no circumstance were there any 
photographs of abuse showing either of these women physically abusing prisoners 
(jumping on, forcing masturbation, hitting, etc.) as the Fay Report seems to indicate 
with the conjectures “may” or “could.” Furthermore, if this were the case, as the 
Fay Report maintains, then surely the prosecutor would have mentioned this in 
his arguments in either of these trials, as he was the same prosecutor (Christopher 
Graveline) for both Lynndie England’s and Sabrina Harman’s separate courts-
martial. He did not mention this report in terms of either of these women abusing 
prisoners, nor did he refer to any photographs of abuse that this report mentions. 
Additionally, reading through the entire court transcript, the prosecutor did not 
refer to the Fay Report as evidence for his case at all.
Some of the feminist analyses of abuse claim that most of the leaked 
abuse photographs were taken on Sabrina Harman’s camera (Sjoberg 2007), 
of argument fails to consider the fact that many of the images of abuse from 
Harman’s camera and from other cameras at Abu Ghraib were not and have not 
been released to the public. Indeed, after viewing the images from the cameras 
at the trials, many of the cameras captured exactly the same images of abuse and 
at the same identical times, as explained and shown in the courts-martials by 
an expert military forensic analyst. What is more, this could have been part of 
Harman’s plan given her letter to her wife, a trial exhibit, which disclosed that 
she was documenting everything she could of her experiences at Abu Ghraib so 
as to be a whistle-blower to this abuse. Additionally, the images on all of these 
reaching and opposed to abuse at all—things such as pictures of children in the 
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everyday functioning—not just torture, and not just Tier 1A and 1B.
Many do not know that Harman and some of her fellow soldiers demanded 
that they took photographs at Abu Ghraib in order to document the abuse that 
they were experiencing and also to protect themselves (see Harman’s letter to 
Kelly, an exhibit in her courts-martial). In this way, the act of photographing 
abuse constituted whistle blowing, and even though the media and prosecution 
framed this as abuse and torture. Although it is true that the very act of taking 
photographs of prisoners violates the Geneva Conventions, this human rights 
standard was not used at the trials to understand the deviance. Instead, prisoners 
were considered PUCs (persons under control) or called “detainees” at both 
Abu Ghraib and the courtroom at Fort Hood, and were not called prisoners 
of war, who would be protected by law under the Geneva Conventions. The 
Army, as an alternative, used the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 
as the standard by which to interpret the abuse legally, and thus “framed” the 
photography and other prosecuted acts at Abu Ghraib in the following ways: 
dereliction of duty, maltreatment, and conspiracy.
What is more, the government did not use the word “torture” at the courts-
contradicted both the Geneva Conventions and also the Convention Against 
the very least problematic, confusing and inconsistent as a concept (see Falk, 
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
Fallgirls148
Figure 5.2  Harman with Iraqi family
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
Figure 5.3 Children in Iraq
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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Genzier and Lifton 2006). Instead, there was a social construction of reality 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966) with regard to the deviance, crimes, etc. that took 
place at Abu Ghraib, and the government used the term ‘abuse’ to capture what 
others might term “torture” (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008).
Maternal Sabrina and Friendships
panel (jury) as a maternal caregiver
testimony, she had not hit anyone, she did not yell at anyone, she did not engage in 
any behavior that was termed “sexual and physical abuse” (forced masturbation, 
forced sexual positions, assault, etc.) at Abu Ghraib. (In fact, she pled not guilty 
to all charges at her courts-martial.) Instead, she made sure that prisoners had 
their eyeglasses and medicine, she got some of them blankets and food, and she 
reported some of the abuse she saw, albeit to no avail (Caldwell and Mestrovic 
2008). Many people do not know these facts about Sabrina Harman.
Within the courtroom, the archetype of “maternal Sabrina” was vivid in the 
life-sized photographs of Harman at Al Hilla, another military compound in Iraq, 
Figure 5.4 Harman with women and children
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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where she was shown with families drinking chai tea and always surrounded by 
Iraqi children. 
Says Captain Reese, Commander of the 372nd Military Police, “A lot of the 
Iraqi kids liked her and she was very well known by the Iraqis. We would go to the 
substation that she was working at and I would see her with the kids. She had a good 
relationship with the Iraqi national. The locals would be happy to see her, yelling 
‘Sabrina, Sabrina, Sabrina.’ If she was not there, they (Iraqis) would ask where she 
was” (June 24, 2004, SHA32).
Harman was not seen as a soldier in the courtroom or in Iraq. Testimony revealed 
that her “job” at Abu Ghraib was to be a “gofer”—to get coffee and sandwiches 
for male soldiers, and to carry out menial tasks with regard to prisoners. Instead, 
Harman was repeatedly described as a caregiver, a motherly individual, and even 
better suited as a relief worker as opposed to being a soldier … because she was 
concerned with the children and their living conditions and getting along with them 
as opposed to being a soldier” (May 13, 2005 SHCM). 
Master Sergeant Bryan Lipinski echoed Jones’ sentiment regarding Harman and 
stated that the local Iraqis would “never forget Sabrina.” Lipinski spent quite a lot 
of time with Harman when she was a gunner driver at Al Hillah, and further claimed 
in testimony, “It kind of surprises you how, you know, certain individuals really 
people knew her, they recognized her, they called her by name. She would, you 
Figure 5.5 “Sabrina! Sabrina!”
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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know, stop the truck or if she was to stop the truck children always come around 
her and she’d give them candy or stuff and it was just—you could tell that she had 
been in the community quite a bit … If they saw Army trucks … you‘d hear them 
holler Sabrina, Sabrina, just when they saw trucks going by … She helped out, you 
know, families and I know she would take like some of them, you know, health and 
supplies we had from care packages that came in, she was distributing them to the 
families. You know, there’s, you know, lots of pictures with her with, you know, poor 
families, Iraqi families, just trying to do what she can make life a little more blessing 
… It was a very credible impact. She presented a very positive impact, a very caring 
image, one that I’m sure that, you know, they were a country in need and they still 
the gaps to say this is, you know, I’m an individual that is here to help you and I’m 
sure she did whatever she could” (May 17, 2005, SHCM).
Even Megan Ambuhl, another MP in the 372nd, commented about this theme of 
“maternal Sabrina” within her testimonies: 
Figure 5.6 Harman and Iraqi female friend
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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any time we’d stop the kids would come just—you wouldn’t see anybody on the 
streets and then they come like from I don’t know where, just the people, the adults, 
anywhere from the smallest kids to the oldest person. If it was a time when she 
wasn’t around they would be Sabrina, Sabrina from the—you know the farthest 
stretches of our area that we … know. They were wondering how she was doing or 
why she wasn’t with us, you know, where she was and how she was doing (May 
17, 2005, SHCM).
In fact, referring to a family that lived right outside of the substation that Harman 
was close to, Ambuhl stated, “It was a great relationship. Their family would make 
her food even though they had nothing. Their house was like clay—something 
you’d see from ancient history books or something, it was almost like a clay hut 
with holes—their windows was like holes in the wall and there was no window just 
to speak of. They had virtually nothing, but they would make food to bring to Sabrina 
for lunch and whatnot and they just loved her. They adore her and, uh, they would 
bring their infant to her to hold and they would even try to drag her to the house to 
visit with their family … they just loved her. They always wanted to be around her 
and spend time with her. Just it was great to watch her play with the kids. When 
everybody else was tired and just wanted to sit in the shade she was out chasing them, 
you know, buying them sodas and buying them candy and just having a great time 
with them … she got with the interpreter that worked with us every day and found 
out through him what exactly their family needed because they were so poor and 
Figure 5.7 “Maternal Sabrina”
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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she went out with her own money she bought them a refrigerator and food, [crying] 
clothing. She bought them beds, beds for the kids and clothing for the kids, all with 
her own money” (May 17, 2005, SHCM).
As stated, there was no testimony at all during Harman’s trial that linked her 
to physical or verbal abuse of detainees in any way, whatsoever. All testimony 
at Harman’s trial substantiated the fact that at no time did Harman kick, yell at, 
punch, hit, or physically harm any Iraqi detainees. Consider the following samples 
of testimony as proof:
I did not witness Harman hit any detainees at any time. (SPC Matthew K. Wisdom, 
June 24, 2004, SHA32) 
I never saw SPC Harman put a hand on a detainee. (SPC Israel Rivera, B 
Company, June 24, 2004, SHA32)
I did not see Harman strike anyone. (PV1 Jeremy Sivits, June 24, 2004, SHA32)
Kenneth Davis, May 16, 2005, SHCM
Regarding October 25th event—Questions by the Civilian Defense Counsel 
Q: Did she [Harman] yell at the detainee? Shout at them? Handcuff them?
A (Davis): Not while I was there 
Megan Ambuhl, May 16, 2005, SHCM
Questions by the Civilian Defense Counsel
ever hear her [Harman] yell or scream at any detainees?
A (Ambuhl): Not that I recall, sir.
Instead, some detainees at Abu Ghraib said Sabrina was their sister and friend.
The translated deposition of Mr. Amjad Ismail Khail Kjalil al-Taie was 
presented at Harman’s courts-martial in Fort Hood, Texas in open court. There were 
connection problems with Iraq via telephone, and so there were several attempts 
at questioning and translation. Mr. al-Taie (via the translator) claimed that he saw 
Stated Mr. al-Taie, “It was good contact between Sabrina and the prisoners. It 
was a good relationship. She was very kind to them … the contact with Sabrina 
seems to be a good relationship between a guard and detainee ... we have a view 
of peacefulness of this woman … [she] did good things. They [prisoners] respect 
her and, in right, she respects them as well … one thing is the surgery. He must be 
taken care of … they used to give him two doses of medicine and two meals, but 
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she used to help them in giving more doses for the cure and more meals for him. 
She helps him. She gives him aid—she gave him aid. This is one of the facts that 
proved her peacefulness with him … for all detainees not only for him … she had 
such behavior for all detainees, yes” (A translated deposition of Mr. Amjad Ismail 
Khail Kjalil al-Taie, May 17, 2005, SHCM). 
Additionally, a second translated deposition from a detainee that Harman 
interacted with shows the same kind of relationship, namely a friendship, existed 
with detainees at Abu Ghraib. Mr. Al-Habasi Thame Abed Salah stated that he was 
in prison from October 2003 through January 2004, and that he knew Harman. Says 
Mr. Abed Salah, “She was good with me and other detainees … she didn’t abuse 
them in speech or talking to us rudely ... She was a peaceful woman. She didn’t 
abuse any of us … I tried to express her goodness with us because she has really 
good things with us. She used to treat us peacefully, kindly, and whenever we ask 
her for her to do us further, she did it with kind and with gratitude. For example, we 
asked her, you have somebody who is ill and in need of a doctor, she talked to them 
to call a doctor. If they are in need of medical, she helps them. If they have need of 
food or something, she helps them always. So this proves her kindness for us, being 
a peaceful woman … She used to talk with us … she starts to laugh with us, makes 
jokes with us … I feel relief, me and other detainees when she had her duty because 
she’s the only one who can hear—listen to us and she can do things for us. Really 
relief—we feel relief at that time … During her duties we can sleep … the reason 
behind this is because she’s the only one that had quiet treatment. She was quiet with 
us so we feel relaxed and we could sleep after … other guards do no[t] have such 
features, they do not have such kindly treatment … We [the prisoners] refuse any 
involved for her or any accusation or something because she is the only good woman 
or good guard with us in many things of her treatment. So I appreciate her treatment 
with us during that time. We refuse any accusing or any offense to her because she is 
a good woman” (A translated deposition of Mr. Al-Habasi Thame Abed Salah, May 
17, 2005 SHCM).
Further take into account the detainee nicknamed by American guards “Gilligan,” 
who was photographed with the bag over his head and was standing on a supply box 
naked, with electrical wires coming from his hands, as if waiting to be electrocuted. 
Defense Attorney Frank Spinner asked in open court, in an attempt to establish this 
friendship to the panel, and to further characterize the nature of the relationships that 
Sabrina Harman had with Iraqis, “Why was Gilligan standing on the box?” 
absurd, and especially since we were at a military trial that was looking into abuse of 
detainees. Spinner argued that Harman had struck up a “friendship” with “Gilligan” 
and that he was a trustee of sorts who was cooperative, and helped American soldiers 
clean the prison, among other things. Spinner stated in court that “Gilligan” and 
Harman were joking and being silly when he was standing on the box, and that 
because of the jovial nature of this “friendship,” there was no way to conclude that 
this incident constituted maltreatment on Harman’s part. Spinner argued that this 
was a “game” of torture, and was Harman’s attempt at complying with instructions 
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to keep the detainee awake all night because he was to be interrogated in the 
morning. Indeed, Gilligan received no electric shocks that evening, as the wires were 
not connected to electricity, and this entire tactic was aimed at sleep deprivation. 
What is more, Private Frederick claimed that he, and not Harman, put the wires on 
“Gilligan.” These were his responses when asked by the civilian defense counsel, 
Frank Spinner, about that event: 
Q (Frank Spinner): I believe in your direct examination you said that you put 
wire—or wires on Gilligan?
A: yes, sir.
Q: But you did not see Sabrina Harman put wires on him correct?
A: No, sir.
…
Q: The primary point of that was sleep deprivation, correct?
A: yes, sir.
…
Q: … With respect to Gilligan, he was a CID detainee, why was CID telling you 
to use sleep deprivation type procedures since this wasn’t MI?
A: I guess they wanted him stressed out so he could—he just wanted him stressed 
out so he could speak to him the next day.
Q: So CID felt that they could use these types of activities along with MI?
A: yes, sir (May 13, 2005, SHCM).
Nonetheless, the photo of the hooded detainee was described in the courtroom as a 
“joke” between friends, as Harman tried to make the situation as pleasant as possible 
under the circumstances for her friend, and under MI orders.
Overly Compliant England 
It is important to know about the initial trial of Lynndie England that took place in 
August 2005. At this trial, Lynndie England pled guilty to prisoner abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. In a dramatic move, Judge Colonel James Pohl, the same judge who would 
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preside over all of the Abu Ghraib trials and who is now a judge at Guantanamo 
Bay, declared a mistrial in August, in the midst of ongoing proceedings. This was 
due to the fact that England’s ex-boyfriend and convicted soldier, Charles Graner, 
be responsible for her actions of charged abuse. According to the judge, England 
could not plead guilty and have testimony that she was following unlawful orders 
England came into question. Among others of importance was the photo of England 
holding a leashed detainee who had been supposedly dragged out of the cell with 
a belt around his neck. This detainee was nicknamed by American soldiers Gus.
Several soldiers described “Gus” as a prisoner. At England’s trial Sergeant 
detainee in that he refused to wear clothing, and was complicated to take out of 
Joyner stated that he was highly disruptive and that he “just ain’t right.” 
of the belt to extract prisoners from cells was a legitimate technique for detainee 
handling, stating that it was he who used the belt to extract “Gus” from his cell. 
with his head by the cell door and that he wanted to get “Gus” out of the cell 
without entering the cell. (It was known by the soldiers that entering detainee cells 
was dangerous, as this was their environment. “Control, secure, and move.” This is 
how a soldier safely relocates a detainee, and MI needed Gus’ cell.) Additionally, 
Graner claimed that he made England and Ambuhl wait there with him incase 
he, not England, had 
actually looped the leash around Gus’ shoulders and body in an attempt to “coax” 
him out of the cell, and that it slipped up around the prisoner’s neck as he, not 
England, attempted to remove “Gus” from the cell. After the tether, which was 
of the cell on all fours and once out of the cell collapsed onto the ground. Graner 
after “Gus” was out of the cell, acting calm, and after he exited on his own accord. 
hearing that pictures he took of England holding a naked prisoner on a leash at 
Abu Ghraib were meant to be used as training aids for other guards. In this way, 
Graner wanted to document his use of the leash as an extraction tool (using the 
least amount of force possible) and means for controlling detainees in a chaotic 
environment. Graner stated at the England trial, as he cracked a smile, that as 
junior soldiers they “were on their own” and that “cell extraction was one of the 
things supposed to be covered in training”—training for MPs which they never 
received at Abu Ghraib.
One of the important aspects of this situation is how Graner used England as 
a witness to his abuse. Looking at the Abu Ghraib photographs, everyone thinks 
England was abusing prisoners, but really Graner was abusing England. Graner 
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said in his testimony that he asked England to hold the strap while he took photos. 
In typical expressive fashion, England “went along” with Graner’s request in order 
to please him—as this was her boyfriend at the time. 
Additionally, England described the events of that evening as follows: “CPL 
Graner and SPC Ambuhl had said that there was a prisoner named “Gus” in 
solitude. He was arrested for attacks on Coalition Forces and was telling the 
soldiers working at the Hardsite that he “hated Americans and wanted to kills us.” 
… CPL Graner then got out a tiedown strap and went downstairs to solitude. He 
opened the door got “Gus” out. “Gus” was not handcuffed, but he was naked. CPL 
strap. He then placed the tiedown strap loosely around Gus’ head and neck. He 
gave me the end of the strap and took a picture. At any time, I did not drag or 
pull on the leash. I simply stood with the strap in my hand. “Gus” started to crawl 
him and placed back in his cell” (January 14, 2004, Sworn Statement of Lynndie 
England).
Two expert witnesses, Dr. Thomas Denne and Dr. Xavier Amador, regarding 
this interpretation of England’s role in the infamous leash photograph, presented 
extensive testimony. The gist of this testimony, which considered the context at 
Abu Ghraib and also England’s psychological and social history, was that England 
dictate behavior. In this way, she behaved in ways that others wanted her to and did 
what she is told. Both Dr. Denne and Dr. Amador claimed England had language-
the meaning of questions. Additionally, Dr. Amador stated that England was 
clinically depressed and that the environment of Abu Ghraib would further trigger 
these kinds of depressed thoughts, such as worthlessness, depressed moods, 
suicidal thoughts, among other problems. Dr. Amador further compared England’s 
relationship with Graner to that of a battered wife or an abused child. Thus, the 
overly compliant and overly reliant England was a victim of Graner’s abuse, but 
not a perpetrator, and not even a co-abuser. Again, England was compliant with 
her boyfriend’s request because she viewed him with legitimacy and as an authority 
trait made her incapable of agreeing to conspire with Graner. She always looked 
to the social compass for direction … A compliant personality in a context of a 
relationship with Graner led to her to agree with a sadistic and abusive person.” 
It is this exact importance of social context that makes a difference here in that it 
the photographs of abuse. 
When Lynndie England took the stand at her courts-martial, she described 
feeling grown up, experienced and older around Graner. “He started smoking for 
me,” she said, “He made me feel good about myself.” She claimed that she felt that 
he would lead her to the right things. For instance, she never felt like she wanted 
to go out and that she had a social phobia; but with him, he wanted her to drink 
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and socialize and so she would go out to dinner. In fact, England told the panel 
had been on a plane, and that Abu Ghraib was a much bigger prison than she had 
expected—she had never been in a prison before. Said England, “I hung out there 
[Tier 1A] because I felt safe around Graner.” Once England became pregnant with 
Graner’s child, and even though Graner had all but forgotten her and moved on 
with his life and married someone else, England stated in her testimony that, “it 
made her feel good again because he [Graner] was taking care of her again.” This 
shows England’s ultimate and deep emotional dependency upon Graner, which 
Interestingly, in a recent analysis of the abuse at Abu Ghraib, Barbara 
Ehrenreich, in the book , 
uses an image of Lynndie England at Abu Ghraib to argue against the stereotypical 
characterization of women as caregivers, and instead for a conception of women, 
England in this case, as able to perform aggressive acts (Ehrenreich 2007: 2). 
However, what Ehrenreich did not realize is the situation under which the 
instead of as simply going along with Graner’s instructions. (In fact the irony of 
Ehrenreich’s statement is that England does act stereotypically as a “female” in this 
situation with Graner, and as stereotypically helpless and dependent.) Moreover, 
Ehrenreich seems to assume, along with most journalists, that the act of holding 
the leash in order to please her boyfriend is on the same order of aggressive abuse 
that England’s boyfriend exhibited by punching blindfolded prisoners. Ehrenreich 
and others jump to unsubstantiated conclusions based upon prejudgments made on 
the basis of photographs, without considering the social context that was explained 
by four separate expert witnesses at the trial. 
Feminist writer and activist Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the certain 
naive view of feminism, where women are depicted as caregivers and men as 
associated with cruelty and violence, has been challenged with the role that 
women have played regarding abuse at Abu Ghraib prison (Ehrenreich 2007: 4). 
I agree that this naive view that characterizes women as good and men as evil 
is shallow and needs revision, especially in feminist theory. Stereotypes are 
basically generalizations lacking in descriptive power and exactness. But, I might 
remind Ehrenreich (and other feminists) that what we see in photographs is not 
always the entire reality. Images have a context, and much like it is important 
to understand the context women face when formulating feminist and activist 
agendas, it is important to understand the context of a photograph to really know 
the truth of the matter. During the courts-martial, what was said in numerous 
testimony and deposition was that neither England not Harman were the abusers 
at Abu Ghraib. I agree with Ehrenreich that women can indeed be abusers, and 
in very small ways in comparison abuse did take place at the hands of women at 
Abu Ghraib. Nonetheless, this abuse cannot be equated with the perception of 
abuse given the photographs of detainee treatment at Abu Ghraib. 
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When England pled guilty on the stand, she told the judge she knew that 
the pictures were being taken purely for the amusement of the guards. She took 
responsibility for the photographs that pictured her smiling and thumbs-up, which 
basically made her the face of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Inside information from the 
defense attorneys was that she made these “admissions” in the hope of getting a 
lighter sentence, and that by pleading guilty the trial might be over sooner because 
of the immense stress it was causing to herself, her baby, and her mother. Although 
England did not abuse the detainee in the photo that shows her with the leash in 
her hand, and did not pile detainees naked or into pyramids, she was pictured 
alongside these detainees. She appeared to be guilty of these actions, but simply 
appeared in the photos themselves. 
Judge Pohl threw out England’s plea of guilty and declared a mistrial, and 
instead entered a plea of not guilty for England regarding a charge of conspiring 
with Private Charles Graner to maltreat detainees at the Baghdad-area prison. This 
Lynndie England. Conspiracy2 is one of the most serious charges in the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and carries the more severe sentences in contrast to 
dereliction of duty and maltreatment.3
Captain Crisp, the lead defense attorney, expressed strongly his opinion that 
the judge declared a mistrial so that England would be charged with conspiracy. 
Captain Crisp was also frustrated by the fact that “conspiracy” is relatively easy 
for the government to prove—any action that involves the actions of two or more 
persons can be interpreted as a conspiracy, even if one of the actors did not intend 
defense to disprove. To put it another way, “conspiracy” colors the commission of 
other crimes carried out during the “conspiracy” as being performed deliberately 
in terms of rationally chosen goals and means (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008).
2 One might argue that the notion of conspiracy to commit an offense requires an 
agreement (formal or otherwise), or an overt act, to show the covenant of conspiracy. 
The government must prove an agreement to commit an illegal act in an overt act in the 
furtherance of that agreement by one of the co-conspirators. The government’s theory was 
that if you were present you were part of this and that the notion of agreement is the joint 
maltreating of prisoners, which shows the common purpose agreement. According to the 
government, because there was more than one person taking pictures, this goes to show 
conspiracy, and an agreement (“overt act of conspiracy”) amongst various people, and not 
just one person.
3 The notion of dereliction is described as failure to protect the detainees from abuse. 
maltreatment in the Harman court martial, saying “Maltreated refers to treatment that, 
when viewed objectively, under all the circumstances is abusive or otherwise unwarranted, 
harm or suffering or reasonably could have caused physical or mental harm or suffering. 
Assault or improper punishment may constitute this offense. The alleged victim of 
maltreatment need not be aware of the acts allegedly causing the maltreatment.”
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the day after jury selection, there was much discussion about whether England 
participated in a conspiracy to maltreat detainees. The prosecution argued that she 
to be understood as culpable to this conspiracy. However, as the defense pointed 
out, England was not bound in any previous agreements to treat detainees in this 
manner (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008). For moral responsibility, it was argued by 
the defense that she did not have this previous agreement for action, also known as 
“intention” or “motive.” So how do we understand England’s actions? The answer 
is context. On November 7, 2003, a riot had just taken place and a detainee had 
just thrown a brick in the face of a female soldier. In fact, live ammo was used to 
quell this riot because of the lack of rubber bullets. What were assumed to be the 
instigators of this riot were brought to Tier 1A, and England and the rest of the 
soldiers were heated, vengeful, and in a word—vengeful! 
So how does context play a part in these events? Well, England did not make 
This does not excuse what she did—at all—but it does make it comprehensible 
seconds at most (that came out in Davis’s trial), and Davis and England did not do 
anything else abusive except lose it for 30 seconds, and out of revenge. (Note: this 
was the only event of physical abuse that England participated in actively at Abu 
Ghraib.) An additional context of these events is that this group of “detainees” was 
Figure 5.8 Military Intelligence Interrogation Shed, Abu Ghraib, Iraq
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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later abused seriously by Graner and Frederick with the masturbation, nakedness, 
homoerotic abuse, etc., and England neither gave these orders nor participated in 
have nothing to do with this night of abuse, but with the fact that MPs at Abu 
Ghraib were ordered to “soften up” detainees for further interrogation purposes. 
This is nothing compared to the real, brutal, premeditated torture techniques the 
CIA, OGA and civilian contractors were using daily at Abu Ghraib, not at Tier 1A 
or 1B, but in the wooden sheds outside the main building. 
After a lengthy discussion, Judge Pohl upheld his previous ruling that England 
had not made an agreement prior to these overt acts, and therefore could not have 
entered a plea of guilty, although she could still be tried for conspiracy to commit 
these acts. In this way, England’s “going along” with the actions of abuse led 
to her charge of conspiracy. Many journalists at the England trial found these 
lengthy, intricate legal arguments concerning responsibility and conspiracy boring 
and incomprehensible, and on many days of the trial were gone by lunch. As a 
rule, the journalists did not see England as a “conspirator,” or truly capable in this 
regard. However, journalists disliked her intensely—and made no effort to hide 
this fact—they labeled her privately as a “slut,” “bad girl,” “tomboy,” and other 
emotionally-based stereotypes (Caldwell and Mestrovic 2008). 
I am sure that these same kinds of stereotypes were used by the panel (jury) to 
describe England, although either behind closed doors or even within their own 
heads perhaps, as many of the photos that the panel saw of England and Graner 
depicted them in compromising sexual positions. Many photographs that were not 
leaked to the public included naked photos of England posing for Graner or of 
both of them actually having sex together. It could be for this “offensive” reason 
that England was given more time in prison than Harman, as the UCMJ rule of 
no sex in the military (something England was not charges with) was broken. 
England was not seen as a soldier, and instead was viewed as a sexualized object. 
(England was given three years and Harman six months, reduced to three months.)
However, it was not only England and Graner, and the prisoners themselves, 
who were photographed in sexualized positions in the unleaked photographs of Abu 
Ghraib. In reality, other male and female soldiers were also shown in sexualized 
poses, although not actually having sex and fully clothed, and joking around. 
Many unseen photographs depict soldiers humping each other, posing in positions 
similar to the ones the prisoners were forced into, with female guards simulating 
fellatio with male guards using fruit, or male guards simulating anal sex with other 
male guards. Other photographs show male and female guards in sexual position, 
or sleeping soldiers with other soldiers exposing their penises in silly pictures 
over them, as if to shock them once they are awake. The point of even mentioning 
these photographs is to show that the environment at Abu Ghraib, and I argue the 
larger social environment of the U.S. military, is hyper-sexualized in nature with 
more of the same kind of masculinist and homoerotic behavior throughout. I have 
even see this kind of behavior in other trials I have worked on, for example Jeremy 
Morlock’s trial out of Afghanistan, where photographs of men “tea-bagging” each 
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other were prevalent, or where the use of guns pointed at each other mimicking the 
phallus/power was seen in photos of soldiers. Hence, this kind of behavior seems 
to be widespread within the military and not just at Abu Ghraib.
Just the Facts, Ma’am
What is interesting when considering the torture at Abu Ghraib is that this torture 
was ordered and orchestrated by male soldiers in an attempt to reify the masculine 
role of power. The pyramid, simulated fellatio, nakedness, and the leash—all of 
these abuses can be understood as means to create the masculine position of power 
over detainees. In his testimony, expert witness Stjepan Mestrovic distinguished 
sharply between the “passive” abuse committed by England and Harman, who 
did not hit anyone and were guilty primarily of posing in photos and taking 
photos, versus the “active” kicking, punching, organizing of and physical violence 
exerted by male soldiers upon prisoners. In the one case where a female (Harman) 
wrote on a male, it was the misspelled word “rapist,” which in our culture mostly 
denotes the perpetration of male violence against women (although male rape 
is underreported, and lesbian rape is on the rise). This can be understood as a 
cultural message or symbolic, where war itself can be understood as an extension 
of rape—a theme that an American woman can easily identify with, given the 
nature of the crime against women.
However, at Abu Ghraib, there was some confusion about if writing on bodies 
constituted a crime. What is now known because of sworn testimony in the court 
cases concerning the detainee abuse is that the written on detainee actually did not 
commit the crime of rape, and was subsequently beaten as a result of this label. The 
defense counsel claimed, “Again the detainee was hooded, he didn’t know what 
was being written on his leg. Detainees were written on all the time, Your Honor, 
this was common practice. Detainees were written on—numbers were written on 
them, their acts or their convictions or allegations were written on them too … 
because it, in fact, could go to the protection of the female MPs … I would submit 
that because it was done for a legal reason it’s not maltreatment” (December 4, 
2004, SHCM). Private Ivan Frederick also agreed that the use of writing on the 
body was common for identifying crimes in his testimony, and stated that seven 
bodies with the word “knife” on their hands. Megan Ambuhl also stated that, “MI 
had written on different detainees to separate them so that we wouldn’t confuse 
them from each other” (May 16, 2005, SHCM). Finally, Jeremy Sivits stated that, 
“SPC Harman told me that she did not think it was bad to write rapist on the leg 
When we were coming back from leave SPC Harman told me that she was taking 
pictures of the detainees to document the abuse” (June 24, 2004, SHA32). In this 
way, the defense as well as the testimony at the trials established the commonplace 
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if it was “rapist” that was being written or not. In fact, one reason the defense 
attorney claimed that it might be necessary to mark on a detainee was to protect 
female MPs from violent criminals, and thus for legal reasons, and hence Harman’s 
actions would not count as a crime.
However, some feminists outright claim, “At Abu Ghraib, there were three 
women soldiers who sexually abused prisoners, and who appeared to take great joy 
out of that abuse” (Sjoberg 2007: 96). Further, that “these women are the prisoners’ 
enemy from whom they (men) need protection” and that it is “undeniable that 
they had some agency in their actions. At the very least, they chose to allow their 
pictures to be taken, to smile for the camera, and not to report the abuse” (Sjoberg 
2007). Again, this interpretation of the abuse at Abu Ghraib does not match the 
facts of the numerous testimonies at the trials of England and Harman, where these 
women were not characterized as sexual and sadistic abusers (in reality Harman 
did not abuse at all), and what’s more England and Harman did not ever participate 
in the homoerotic physical and gender/sexualized torture of prisoners. Case in 
point, there was no testimony at England’s or Harman’s trials that linked them to 
the abuse that many suppose they participated in because they see photographs 
of abuse in which they are photographed. This means, they were never linked 
to organizing a conspiracy to torture or orchestrating the forced masturbation, 
the pyramid, forcing naked men to roll around with each other on the ground, 
dragging prisoners on a leash, none of it. Now, this does not mean that they were 
not charged with abuse or found guilty of abuse. What I came to understand in the 
courtroom was that social-construction is alive and well, and that “facts” can be 
manipulated easily in a trial so as to “win.” In fact, even the judge was capable 
of allowing or disallowing certain ways that truth could be constructed given 
what was allowed as evidence and what was not. So in a way, this discussion is 
not about changing some stereotyped essentialized notion of women or men by 
looking at soldiers smiling in a photograph and deducing what happened without 
asking, well what happened ten minutes before?; instead it is a discussion of facts, 
pure and simple. (And mostly a discussion about the facts pertaining to questions 
about context.) Clearly, any feminist analysis of these events needs to take into 
consideration situational power permutations, facts surrounding the events, and 
not make speculations about behavior to the point of assigning moral and ethical 
agency. What is important here, again, is context.
I am also surprised that feminist, activist, and playwright Eve Ensler bought 
into the “reality” of the photograph of Lynndie England holding a leash that was 
tethered around a detainee’s neck without asking about the context of the picture. 
Ensler posits that England must have been sexually abused in her childhood and 
that this abuse must have hurt her in some fundamental manner to make her act 
this way now. Ensler states “She’s been robbed of her self-esteem and went into 
the military to get some of it back” (Ensler 2007: 18). Ensler argues that within 
this military, England was able to achieve some level of power and prestige, and 
that England felt that she had to prove herself within this masculinist atmosphere. 
Ensler even goes so far as to say, “women’s ability to empathize has been so 
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tragically damaged that we [women] are capable of torture” (Ensler 2007: 18). 
Ensler does not bother with the testimony of numerous expert witnesses who 
interpreted the leash incident in terms of England’s desire to expressively please 
Graner, and also the fact that she posed for a photo in which she held the leash for a 
few seconds, and that she did not drag “Gus.” Ensler asks the question “I still don’t 
get how you could put a leash on a human being … I still don’t see how putting a 
leash on someone and dragging them around and humiliating them could ever be 
right in your brain” (Ensler 2007: 18). First, England was not dragging the prisoner 
under the doctor’s orders because the prisoner was psychotic, and the medical staff 
had no medications or other means to normatively control the psychosis. Ensler sees 
England’s actions aimed at proving herself within the masculinist military cultural 
atmosphere and states, “She had to out-macho the most macho in order to prove 
that she was ‘one of the guys’” (Ensler 2007: 19). Ensler speculates widely, without 
investigating, facts, evidence, or testimony regarding this incident.
Regarding the sexual nature of the abuse, Ensler argues that England and the 
women of Abu Ghraib were acting out their aggressions with regard to abuse that 
must have happened to them. What is ironic is that only men were shown in the 
courts-martials to be the abusers with regard to the sexual and homoerotic nature of 
abuse, and thus Ensler’s analysis should be instead focused on the men doing abuse, 
and thus conversely, and according to Ensler, these male guards as having a history 
of sexual abuse. Moreover, there was no evidence at all that England or Harman had 
been sexually abused—and this is something the four expert witnesses in psychology 
and psychiatry automatically considered, and rejected as an explanation. 
What is more, Harman repeatedly reported the abuse she saw and to no avail. 
In this case, a woman did say “no,” it is just that her voice was not heard given the 
masculinist system of value within the military. In this sense, Harman and the other 
female soldiers at Abu Ghraib were not just passive “torture devices” as argued by 
Kelly Oliver (2007). 
What is important to remember is that assumptions regarding single images are 
dangerous and that images occur within contexts and should be understood in these 
that most of their own work provides this kind of pedagogical approach.4 What the 
problem here may be is that women are being shown in photographs doing things that 
are out of our conceptual association of women as caregivers—some feminists seem 
of image, and as feminists we are taught to know about the importance regarding 
frames of reference and how these are necessary for interpretation of the “facts” of 
women’s lives. Actions take place in contexts and interpretations of the photographs 
United Nations Decade for Women conference in 1975, where feminists around the world 
gathered and shared their varied contextual experiences.
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of Abu Ghraib should not be made without all of the contextualized facts. Otherwise, 
this is not responsible theorizing or feminist sociological imagining.
The Drive Home
I remember the drive home after both the trials at Fort Hood, Texas. At that point in 
my life I lived in College Station, Texas and the drive took about two and a half hours, 
so I had a lot of time to think about and process the events of the courts-martials 
themselves. I was drained to say the least.
One of the main concerns that I had after the trials was that it seemed that the 
military was placing all of the blame onto low level soldiers at Abu Ghraib—all of 
the blame for the chaos of prisoner care at the prison, for detainee “softening up” 
practices, for things that the soldiers had told me that they were ordered to do, in 
fact. After sitting in court and hearing that things like The Human Rights Watch 
Reports, Captain Ian Fishback’s famous whistleblowing attempt, and anything going 
on at Guantanamo (including how their head of interrogations had come to train in 
interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib) or Afghanistan was not relevant to these 
trials, the truth about Abu Ghraib seemed so controlled. In addition, when I saw that 
to expert witnesses speak, well I was concerned that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was 
not fully being investigated, and especially in terms of the chain of command and 
command responsibility. I mean, thinking about gender and power, some of the most 
powerful women in the Army were basically “in charge” of Iraq, and their names 
were not even mentioned at the trials. I kept thinking that these women surely knew 
something, or should be at the very least questioned at the trials about what happened 
at Abu Ghraib in terms of command responsibility: Lieutenant General Barbara Fast, 
Chief of all Interrogations in Iraq; Lieutenant General Dianne Beaver, Chief JAG 
in Iraq. All I could think of was Voltaire’s quote, “With great power comes great 
responsibility.” What had happened to the responsibility that these women had given 
their command roles and responsibilities for overseeing the training and running of 
Abu Ghraib? Didn’t the doctrine of command responsibility require that these women 
know what was going on, and require that these women were also responsible for 
the actions of soldiers below them? Weren’t these generals somehow “in charge” of 
overseeing the functioning of Abu Ghraib? I mean, especially given their job titles?
It was not until the Levin-McCain Report came out in December 2008 that I was 
sure that I was correct of my hunch. Basically, the Executive summary report on the 
treatment of detainees in U.S. custody by the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
headed by Carl Levin and John McCain stated the following:
Senator McCain said: “The committee’s report details the inexcusable link 
between abusive interrogation techniques used by our enemies who ignored the 
Geneva Conventions and interrogation policy for detainees in U.S. custody. These 
policies are wrong and must never be repeated.”
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Chairman Levin also said: “The abuses at Abu Ghraib, GTMO and elsewhere 
to pass the buck to low ranking soldiers while avoiding any responsibility for abuses 
use degrading and abusive techniques against detainees. Our investigation is an effort 
to set the record straight on this chapter in our history that has so damaged both 
America’s standing and our security. America needs to own up to its mistakes so that 
we can rebuild some of the good will that we have lost.”
In addition, Part One of this Committee’s Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees 
in U.S. Custody was completed on June 17, 2008, and one very interesting section 
about Lieutenant General Sanchez and the Secretary of Defense became apparent:
Joint Task Force 7 interrogation SOP. That SOP authorized interrogators in Iraq to 
use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military 
working dogs to exploit detainee’s fears in interrogations. In the report of his 
investigation into Abu Ghraib, Major General George Fay said that interrogation 
techniques developed for GTMO became confused and were implemented at Abu 
Ghraib. Major General Fay said that removal of clothing, while not included in 
CJTF-7s SOP, was imported to Abu Ghraib, could be traced through Afghanistan 
and GTMO, and contributed to an environment at Abu Ghraib that appeared to 
condone depravity and degradation rather than humane treatment of detainees. 
Following a September 9, 2004 Committee hearing on his report, I asked Major 
General Fay whether the policy approved by the Secretary of Defense on December 
2, 2002 contributed to the use of aggressive interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib, 
and he responded, Yes.
Yes to what, indeed? 
I knew that abuse had happened at Abu Ghraib. Obviously, that was clear. I am 
not trying to make excuses. But I am trying to show the importance of context, of 
taking a step back and seeing the bigger picture, of asking questions about things 
like the following: Who orchestrated the abuse? (What were the standard operating 
procedures and the rules of engagement?) Who gave orders and within what context? 
How does power operate within certain environments? How does obedience work 
within large institutions such as the military? What does a command structure look 
like? And additional questions about free-choice, and other important considerations, 
which include context when making analysis. 
Conclusion
doubt by even the prosecuting attorney and also the judge regarding the primary 
guilt of the “rotten apples.” 
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a prison, there were certainly leadership problems and other issues that you would 
expect to have—that you would expect to create problems in as far as a combat area” 
(May 12, 2005, SHCM). With this statement prosecuting attorney Gravelin seems to 
predict the outcome of the Levin-McCain report in that he basically argues for the 
defense by pointing to the fact that there was a lack of leadership at Abu Ghraib, as 
well as a lack of training.
The second telling quote comes from Judge Colonel Pohl, and was made as he 
was giving the panel instructions right before sentencing, and also at the Harman 
trial. Judge Colonel Pohl says, “Concerning all the charged offenses, there is some 
evidence the accused was acting under the orders of a superior. This evidence has 
raised an issue of these orders in relation to the offenses I just told you about. Such 
was given, would be an unlawful order. Obedience to an unlawful order does not 
necessarily result in the criminal responsibility of the person obeying the order” 
(May 16, 2005, SHCM). Even Judge Colonel Pohl seems to be arguing for the 
defense here with his statement, and by pointing out for the panel that Harman was 
following illegal orders, and orders from a superior. In this way, Harman was not a 
rogue soldier who came up with torture techniques on her own, who was conspiring 
with others to persecute detainees. In fact, looking at the Judge’s statement, even 
he seems to view at least some of Harman’s actions as under the direct orders of a 
superior, as the Levin-McCain Report conclusively determined. 
This narrative about “seven rotten apples” seems to be one of a plot—a 
conspiracy so to speak—to scapegoat the low-level soldiers of Abu Ghraib. 
Sure, some of them did commit torture, and they are serving lengthy prison 
sentences. But the women of Abu Ghraib, the low-ranking soldiers, England, 
Harman, Ambuhl, these soldiers were hardly the masterminds behind prisoner 
interrogation, sexualized torture, homoerotic abuse, and gendered punishment. 
In fact, court-martial testimony further substantiates these claims. Moreover, 
the Levin-McCain Report exposes the U.S. government of conspiracy, and even 
though they were successful in charging both England and Harman with crimes 
surrounding the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. What is more, even after the 
Levin-McCain Report, in appeals court these charges have not been overturned, 
as the Levin-McCain Report has been deemed “irrelevant” within the courtroom 
and thus not admissible in court as evidence for appeals trial. In this way, and as 
for abuse at Abu Ghraib, the Fallgirls continue to be framed as scapegoats by the 
U.S. government, media, and some feminists.

Chapter 6 
Conversations with Sabrina Harman, 
Summer 2007
These conversations between Sabrina Harman and myself took place during the 
summer of 2007.
Did you ever experience sexism or homophobia in the army? 
When I was sworn in I remember a large poster about homosexuals not being 
allowed to serve. I kept thinking I should back out now.
How did you feel when you saw that poster about homosexuals?
Very nervous. I knew I was lying by signing the paperwork saying I was not gay 
In basic training I found I wasn’t the only one, in fact there were a number of 
females that were gay so I didn’t feel too out of place. 
The commander in my unit came up to me one day and told me my girlfriend 
know that a soldier, gay or straight, it didn’t matter as long as they did their job. 
looked very gay but kept quiet about it. 
I felt sick because I thought I was going to be in trouble but he quickly made it 
into a positive conversation.
In Iraq I was out. I only had one soldier look down on me but it didn’t bother me. 
Can you tell me about this? How did this soldier treat you? 
He would tell me his views on homosexuals and why the bible says it’s wrong. 
It’s funny how people always turn to that when they can’t think for themselves.
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In basic training, were there any rituals that used sex or the idea that men 
are masculine or women are fragile or feminine to describe things? What 
about the opposite, that women are tough and men are fragile? How were 
men and women, gays and straights described in everyday life? What were 
the words and language used? What about in Iraq? Any experiences at all 
that you can describe?
Not that I can think of. I’m not very PC so stuff like this wouldn’t stick in my 
head. I do remember in the prison that the female MPs were watched and looked 
over. If I worked in 1A or 1B the handlers would go straight to the male soldier 
working. If I was to remove an inmate from the cell, I noticed SGT Snider or 
SGT Cathcart watching from the top tier. 
Ok, so would you say this is because females were seen as needing protection? 
Or as incapable? Or something else? 
Yes, it’s because males feel they need to protect the females. I really believe in a 
war zone females become a distraction and can be dangerous. 
Were you ever asked about your sexual orientation in the military? Did other 
soldiers know, for instance, about Kelly? Did you ever face discrimination 
from any soldiers or leadership for being gay? Were you openly gay to some 
and not others? If homosexual slurs were made in the military, how did you 
handle these?
Just by my commander, but he really didn’t ask anything he just made a 
statement. He was a good guy. 
I had a very small amount of soldiers that I was around all day long and yes they 
knew. No issues there. 
Gay slurs are always made and sexual comments and actions but it never 
bothered me.
So what kind of gay slurs or sexual comments? Were there cadences or 
anything like that which were sexist that you can think of? Anything like 
that? 
Oh no cadence that I can remember. All the drill sergeants were VERY careful 
about anything sexual including touching on the gay subject. Before I came in 
there was a drill sergeant under investigation for some kind of relationship with 
a female recruit (wanted or unwanted … not sure) but the drill sergeants were 
very cautious what they said or even being around us. I remember getting in 
trouble, almost daily because I showed “my grill” to one of my drill sergeants 
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it was considered fraternization but I wasn’t smiling at him I was breathing out 
of my mouth. After two months of being put down I found it funny, it was like 
a game and he became my personal trainer. 
Can you tell me the nicknames that prisoners were given at Abu Ghraib 
and why? Did you have any special relationships with any of the prisoners? 
Did you like some of them more than others? Why? 
Nicknames were given to the prisoners from different soldiers. Graner and 
Joyner gave them most of the names. Why? Good question. Looking back I 
now think it was stupid. 
Gilligan (Saad) was awesome, he was the prisoner on the box who was NOT 
electrocuted. He was my age and was involved in a mix up over a soldier’s 
death. He was just really funny. He was let out a lot to help around, just to get 
out of the cell. 
prisoner I saw being softened up so I think in my head I was helping him 
by giving him things without his handler knowing. I’m glad he turned out 
innocent! 
Shitboy, I think he was not crazy but wanted people to believe he was so he 
could get sent out of Abu Ghraib. He would smear poop on everything. Poop 
sculptures. Poop art on the mattress. Poop in bottles. Throw poop at prisoners. 
I caught him one day making a picture on his mattress with a turd and he 
looked at me and smiled and had it in his hand. He heard SGT Snider coming 
and he motioned like he was going to throw it at him when he got to his cell. 
I said, “No, he will kill you please don’t do it.” Snider got to the cell and he 
put the turd down and smiled at me. That’s the day I knew he was acting. He 
knew better.
Did any women prisoners or children have nicknames? What were these? 
Were any women prisoners raped that you know of? Or have sexual 
relations with soldiers that you know of? 
 I only remember one females name, which was Zarah and neither females nor 
children had nicknames that I recall. I remember being told when we took over 
and were following the unit we were taking over for that there was an incident 
with a female prisoner and a soldier in that area (1A/1B). She didn’t go into 
details about what had happened so I don’t know if it was rape or consensual. 
For our unit rape, not that I am aware of and consensual, only what I found out 
at trial about Frederick and that girl. 
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Can you tell me about your relationships with the prisoners in Tier 1B, the 
women and children? Can you describe some of these prisoners in detail 
for me?
I had a few that I favored, I would slip them food and cigarettes. Candy for the 
kids. Medicine for the sick. In detail, we had females. I didn’t really interact with 
them too much but they were allowed out of their cells and they sat in chairs 
and talked. The kids in the beginning were allowed out to play games until the 
prisoners with mental issues and prisoners who were to be interrogated piled 
into the tier. For the [women’s] safety they were not allowed out any more. 
What about special relationships outside of the prison, in the city near Abu 
Ghraib, and what was the name of that city or town? Kids? Families? What 
did they mean to you? Can you tell me about some of your experiences with 
them? What do the words Abu Ghraib mean, and who chose them?
Al Hillah. It was about 45 minutes from Abu Ghraib. The people there were 
amazing! The kids were awesome. They families would give the shirt off their 
back if you had asked them too. 
Figure 6.1 Harman with family
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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There was a family near the Iraqi police substation. The mother made me a lunch 
that was the best. I sat down with two of her boys and we shared that and the 
MRE I had. After we were done I walked them home to return the dishes and 
living indoors with them. They all slept in a tiny room with almost nothing. I 
saw no other signs of food, no refrigerator, oven, nothing. She had made me 
lunch and it looked as if she had nothing else to eat, and she had given it all to 
me. This is the type of people that lived around there. 
What do the words Abu Ghraib mean? It was the name of the town.
In Al Hilla, did you purchase a family mattresses and a refrigerator? Why? 
What did this family mean to you? 
Yes, because she made me that lunch and I wanted to return the favor. They were 
important to me and I was around them almost everyday for almost three months. 
I don’t know, it’s hard to explain without coming off as anti-American. They had 
nothing and were still happy because they had each other. Their situation seemed 
horrible but they made it work and never complained about it to me. If I got their 
kids clothes and small toys like a soccer ball they were so happy while kids in 
Figure 6.2 Harman with family and children
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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the U.S. would be so pissed if they didn’t get an Xbox. I don’t know, they were 
just amazing people that I learned a lot from.
What did the children mean to you? Did they stand for something in Iraq?
They made me want to wake up and go to work (in Al Hillah). All I did was play 
Stand for something? All the kids felt different for us. Not all liked us, so we 
had to win them over. When we were in the market parked and this kid threw a 
rock at me and hit me in the side (they have very good aim!), before I knew it 
Figure 6.3 Children in Iraq
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
Conversations with Sabrina Harman, Summer 2007 175
one of the Sergeants had a bat and was pushing his way towards this kid through 
with candy and said sadiki (friend) and pushed him away into the crowd and he 
and he grabbed my hand and walked me into the market. My little protector 
once assaulter. I think that they stand for what they believe or have been told by 
adults or how perhaps they are treated by the soldiers. They will be the future of 
Iraq, good or bad. 
Why in the world were there so many women’s panties at Abu Ghraib? I 
mean, they are in so many photos and they are continually referred to at the 
trials. What is going on here with women’s panties? 
The panties were there when we got there so I have no idea. Getting supplies for 
the prisoners was not easy. Soap, shoes, towels, Korans, you name it, it was hard to 
have the amount needed for all the prisoners that kept piling up. I don’t think they 
ordered them just to put on the heads of prisoners, but then again you never know.
What about animals? Kelly said at your trial … “She is the type of person 
that won’t let you step on an ant, or kill a spider. If there’s a spider in the 
car she will make sure it goes outside the car and let it out. There’s several 
hurt an animal, she takes it in, any stray dogs, cats, anything.” What is your 
relationship with pets? And animals? Dogs? And now?
Just because you are bigger does not give you the right to take its life. Pets are a 
form of therapy. I think they are much better to be around than people.
What does photography mean to you? Other than capturing images as a 
means to document and as a whistle-blowing strategy at Abu Ghraib … what 
other ways do you use photography? 
I think photography helps me remember. It forces me to remember. I use 
photography to help others now. 
What about tattoos? What do they mean to you? And, the rotten apple tattoo? 
My arm is a half sleeve of Iraq memories. Labeled a bad apple by Bush, I thought 
Can you describe some of the memories of Iraq that are depicted on your 
sleeve tattoos? Why did you choose these memories to have tattooed? Why 
are they important to you?
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of me in a straitjacket with tape over my mouth and eyes wide open, meaning I 
can’t talk about what I was seeing. The next one I got was during my trial was 
the bad apple. Thanks Bush! A skull with tape over the eyes, means trying to 
forget what I saw. Another is two girls facing each other hiding knifes behind 
their backs, meaning don’t trust. And two angels, one protecting the other, it’s 
from a string controlled by a hand, which is the government. And a peace 
dove riding a missile with the Iraq colors. Oh, and I did have a tattoo of Saad 
(Gilligan) on a box but I just had it covered with a gas mask because I didn’t 
want people asking what it was.
Have you experienced stress or depression since the trials and because of 
the events at Abu Ghraib? How have you dealt with this? How have you 
Do you have nightmares? Do you have anxiety attacks? Have you seen a 
doctor for anything like PTSD?
Oh god … yes. Depression, yes, but mostly fear. Stupid thunder, loud noise, car 
doors slam … crowds. I used to be a heavy drinker before I joined and it always 
I was upset at all the rich houses around me and that it wasn’t fair that the kids 
in Iraq were sleeping on dirt. 
I went a few months without drinking then went to a club. Crowds equal fear so 
I loaded up, I was doing good until some girl came up to me and said you know 
what, those prisoners got what they deserved. I lost it! Uncontrollable crying. I 
couldn’t breathe and trying to talk to her and make her realize she was wrong … 
Poor Kelly had to drag me out of there. Damn PTSD. I can’t even be a functional 
alcoholic anymore! 
I sleep like crap. I wake up easily. If there is going to be thunder at night I take 
sleeping pills so I don’t wake up shaking and crying thinking it was a mortar. 
I’ve woken up with my gun in my hand before. For this reason I keep it unloaded 
and pray my dogs will do the dirty work if someone breaks in. 
Anxiety attacks ... yes. I have seen a doctor and have gone to group. I have been 
diagnosed with PTSD. I was on meds for a very short time. They made it worst. 
Now I deal with it. No drugs. Some days I’m good, others not so good. Hoping 
one day it will just go away.
How have you made sense of your life since 2004? 
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What are some things that give you purpose now? Even if you think they 
are silly, like unicorns and stuff. 
I used to love unicorns. I will have to get back to you on this one. 
How has your relationship handled all of this? Seems like a strong couple.
It almost didn’t make it. I am 100% different than when I left. Somehow we 
made it. We’re going on 8.5 years married.
with your life since the trials? Like in public or anything like that??
I don’t know what people think of me and I think I stopped wondering a while 
ago. I know what is true, I know the things I witnessed and what the press said 
about me. I know the truth. The prisoners know the truth. That’s all that matters.
What do you think that the army is doing in Iraq? Have you kept in touch 
with anyone that would lead you to believe that prisoner care is different? 
What is the situation that you know?
Fucking ridiculous! My unit was sent to Bucca and the big thing now is no 
cameras or recording devices. You will be courts-martialed. I doubt anything has 
changed. What went on was policy. It was leaked to the public. Now they are 
trying to keep it so that will not happen again.
What is interesting is that in some of the cases that I am now working on out of 
Afghanistan, soldiers are given cameras to document “kills”—as in for what is 
called a storyboard for reporting to their unit the day’s events. This seems out of 
sync with what is going on in Iraq and the use of cameras.
How do you feel about the recent repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”? Do you 
think this changes anything in the military for gays?
Funny, I signed the paper when I went to pride to lift the ban. Do I agree with it? 
I’m not sure. I should send you some Facebook gay bashing I see all over one of 
my old Sergeants page. I mean, gay men will never be welcome in the military. 
My views on gays in the military and females in the military are not what you 
would agree with. But you know that, we think differently.
Do you ever march in pride parades?
I did my junior year of high school for SMYLE and the next day someone came 
up to me and said they saw me on the news marching in the parade. I told them I 
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must have a twin! No more marching for me. When I got back I have been kind 
of anti-gay, not into the whole gay scene like I was before ... I’m not sure why.
How did you handle prison? What was that like?
I did better than I thought I would. Everyone was on my side. The guards and 
inmates were nice.
Well, what was an average day like?
I was lucky and was chosen to pair up with one of the older inmates and sew 
nametags on uniforms. 
Wake up. PT for 15 minutes. Eat. Go to work. Free time (this is where my 
obsession for law and order started). One hour free outdoor time. Hello volleyball. 
Then indoors until it was time to sleep, so we would play games. This is also when 
I found out I was dyslexic, so no more making fun of Bush.
What do you think about Spinner and Takemura? Captain Graveline? The 
military?
Takemura is the greatest person alive! I love her to death. I see her once a year. 
Spinner did a great job. Now, Major Graveline … I refuse so say anything negative 
about someone … he did his job. I wish he did it a bit more professionally. 
The military … I’m glad I’m out. It’s not the place for me.
How did people handle sex in your unit? How does the army deal with that or 
respond to it? What about adultery? 
HA! Really! Very funny question. Sex. It is all the time happening with everyone. 
This is my main reason I think females should not be in the military really. 
Adultery, well this is basically a different zip code thing. The wife or husband 
doesn’t have to know. 
I was one of the few that did not have sex with someone over there. 
What does the Army do about either adultery or sex in the Army? 
Nothing, unless they don’t like the soldier. 
I found it a lot like high school. 
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I know at one time you wanted to work with children, and that there was even 
a boy in Iraq that you wanted to adopt, yes? Who was he? Has this career 
goal changed for you?
I wanted to be a cop. Yes this has changed, I never want to have a chain of 
command again. 
His name is Abdella, the greatest little man in the world! He was the cousin of the 
family that made me that lunch, he lived next door to them. I wanted to adopt him 
but his family was there. His dad wanted me to and I wish I could have. 
I started volunteering with a group that helps children with cancer, so I am kind of 
working with children.
Did you personally feel violated in any way while witnessing the abuse that 
was committed in front of you at Abu Ghraib? Like emotionally? 
Figure 6.4 Harman and some of her friends in Iraq
Source: Photograph provided courtesy of the author.
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Seeing what went on was draining. I remember laying down at night and tears 
would pour out until I fell asleep, but I wasn’t crying. It was weird. When I would 
wake up everything I saw and felt the day before was gone. 
How do you feel when you look at the photos from Abu Ghraib. Any of them. 
Regret. I googled my name one day and I saw an image of a woman and a young 
boy holding a picture. It was me over the body of Al Jamadi, the prisoner who 
died in the shower. I started crying. I didn’t stop to think this man had a family 
and now this little boy has this picture of me over his dad’s dead body. It was a 
horrible feeling. I still feel sick when I see that image. 
Why were you over Al Jamadi’s body? Did you have anything to do with 
his death?
I didn’t realize he had just been murdered until after I was in the photo with him. 
an idiot. I don’t regret going in there but I regret not being more respectful.  No, 
I did not have anything to do with his death.
After the experiences of Abu Ghraib, do you feel the same level of trust 
of the soldiers that were in your unit? Has that trust stayed the same or 
changed?
There are only a few I still trust. 
off? 
I force myself to trust. 
If I had it my way I would shut down and live somewhere with no one around. 
Closing Statement of the Defense  
Counsel, Sabrina Harman Courts-Martial, 
Captain Patsy Takemura, May 17, 2005,  
Fort Hood, Texas
Colonel Lynn, members of the panel, thank you for your attention over these last 
judge this case by Specialist Harman and not by the acts of everybody in those 
photos and everybody in this case. 
The government would like you to say that this case is based on these few 
photos, but there are many other incidents, many other photos that are involved 
in this case that the public hasn’t seen, that nobody else has seen, that speaks 
volumes rather who Specialist Sabrina Harman really is. 
You heard from Dr. Mestrovic, he explained to you the sociological conditions 
that existed for how a situation like this could have occurred. 
like this happen---
…
And many other people would have thought that also. You, yourself, might 
have thought that, how could something like this happen? Well Dr. Mestrovic 
today gave information as to how something like this could happen. It’s not 
pretty, it’s not something that we would like to admit, we don’t like to think that 
something like this could happen to any of us at a detention facility, but it did. 
We ask you to consider and carefully consider Dr. Mestrovic’s explanation. The 
government would like you to take part of his testimony and say yes punishment is 
necessary and yet they would like you to throw away all of this other testimony to 
you and not to consider that and do not consider that. Well we ask you to consider 
everything. 
As Specialist Sabrina Harman sits before you this afternoon, she offers you no 
this has been an emotional nightmare for her over the last year. That is part of the 
punishment that she has received in this case. What she has told herself, what she 
has been feeling the past year is unimaginable. That is part of the punishment that 
you should consider. She offers you no excuses. She doesn’t blame anybody. She 
has no hatred, no ill feelings towards her chain of command. This is a young lady 
that just joined the Army and was sent into a war zone. Imagine the fear. Imagine 
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the uncertainty. Imagine the danger that she had to experience every day. Yes she 
had a great time in Al Hillah. Yes, things were good there. But if the government 
wants you to, in fact, compare her behavior in Al Hillah and tell you that it was, in 
fact, the same conditions that dictated her behavior in Abu Ghraib, you know that’s 
not true. Conditions in Abu Ghraib were very, very different than the conditions at 
Al Hillah. The government wants you to look at these photos and just blame her 
for everything that occurred in this scandal. 
Well we’d like to share with you some other photos that we think really 
expresses who Sabrina Harman is. Obviously she went to basic training, this is 
a picture from her basic training . I’m going to share with you photos that she 
happily posed for and took at Al Hillah with the local Iraqis there. 
This is a photos of her and another soldier in her unit and two of the men, the 
local men that she got to know very well that—who made tea for her and she’s 
particularly fond of chai tea now because of the relationship that she had with those 
two men. Two men that she impacted greatly. Two men that—who still think of her 
still as Sabrina, and who had not changed. There are dozens and perhaps hundreds of 
photos we can share with you, but could only print up a few. Again, the impact she 
to her, people asked her—for her by name and that was her reason, that was because 
of the warmth and love that she has, that she still has for the Iraqi people. You heard 
from Megan Ambuhl, you heard from First Sergeant Lipinski, she could not go out 
Harman, an American soldier, made on the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people that she 
came to know and love and whom came to know and love her. The pictures in Abu 
Ghraib are not the only impact that she had in Iraq. They are not the only impact that 
she made with the Iraqi people and we ask you to remember that. 
She had a particular fondness for children because frankly in a lot of ways 
she’s childlike herself in naïveness, in her innocence, in her love, and she wanting 
She got more and more involved with the local Iraqis and more and more involved 
with the local children and this was, in fact, a peace keeping mission for her. And 
in fact a good image of the American soldier for her. 
Do you see all the smiles on these children’s faces, this is how she impacted 
them. And rather than only judging her for those pictures in Abu Ghraib, we ask 
you also to judge her with these pictures. Imagine the kind of impact she had over 
these children who will always think of her the same way no matter what. 
She was often invited into the local Iraqis’ homes because they trusted her. 
They trusted her with their safety. They trusted her with their children’s safety. 
They embraced her because she embraced them. 
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We all know about gypsies, gypsies existed and still exist everywhere, well 
there’s gypsies in Iraq. She again being nonjudgmental, being open-hearted, even 
embraced the gypsies and they embraced her back …
We all know how horrid conditions are in Iraq. These children, these families 
have nothing. She tried to give back, not in terms—not only in terms of material 
things, but of her heart and that’s what we Americans are. That’s what the American 
soldiers are. 
Again you see these young, bright faces, it tells you exactly what they’re 
thinking. It tells you exactly what they’re feeling for Sabrina Harman. 
be able to pronounce Sabrina, but they all knew Sabrina. 
Sergeant Jones said before you that, in fact, perhaps she was not such a soldier, 
that, in fact, she should have been a relief worker instead and that’s exactly her 
personality, a relief worker wanting to care for the underprivileged, the poor.
A sense of play with the children, which is why they responded so much to her 
and then her childlike innocence. 
And in a lot of sense, a sense of maternalism. This is the true Sabrina Harman. 
Specialist or Ms. Megan Ambuhl told you about the two that she got to know 
and their families. Abdellah was one of the boys that she got to know very well. 
And Amir, who heard Specialist—and or Ms. Ambuhl testify to you that she 
went out of her way and actually bought a refrigerator for the family, beds, clothes 
for the children. 
This is who Specialist Sabrina Harman is. 
Yes, Specialist Harman did very well in Al Hillah, she did well in representing 
the American soldier, but that was because she was in an environment where she 
could do so. Abu Ghraib was not an environment to do so for her. It was the wrong 
environment. 
She takes full responsibility. She gives no excuses. She doesn’t blame the 
chain of command. She does not blame the U.S. Army. She herself takes full 
responsibility. This young woman, so young, so inexperienced in the Army, takes 
full responsibility for her charges. She made a terrible mistake in judgment and 
she wishes she had the strength to have done things different. 
But also, she did a lot of good as you see in these pictures. And we ask you to 
take these pictures back and look at it. We ask you to look at her sentencing book 
there’s many more pictures in there. There’s letters from family and friends who 
could not be here at Fort Hood today before you to testify to you, their feelings 
for her and of her. 
At this point we beg for mercy. She has been punished. She had been in Iraq for 
over 19 months before she was let go and this case was moved to Fort Hood. Being 
in Iraq for 19 months is indescribable. That’s the only word I could say. 
Her lack of life experience was such—despite the fact that she’s not 19 or 20, 
she’s 27, but in essence she’s not really 27-years-old. She is very childlike. She 
doesn’t have much life experience. She was an assistant pizza—a Papa John’s 
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Pizza Manager. She hasn’t had a lot of college. She hasn’t been really out into 
in a farm, not that there’s anything wrong with that, but she—her life experience 
experience out there. A lot of contact with strangers; a lot of contact with authority. 
For her this is all new. 
Dr. Mestrovic explained a lot of conditions to you, we ask you to look at 
that. We ask you to consider that seriously. We ask you also to understand her 
personality. This isn’t, um, some 6 feet, 250 pound man who is afraid. This is 5 
feet 3 inches, 100 and some pounds Sabrina Harman with no life experience who 
before she went Abu Ghraib had this as her Army experience. This is what she 
knew to be her mission in the U.S. Army when she got in to Iraq, not Abu Ghraib. 
She certainly didn’t—she certainly wasn’t warned about what she was going to 
face at Abu Ghraib. It was very, very different from Al Hillah. 
You heard from Mr. Amjad Ismail Khalil al-Taie as I read the deposition for 
you. You heard from Mr. Thame Abed Salah Al-habasi as I read the deposition to 
you. They thought of her as a sister. Not just as a guard that was okay. Not just as a 
guard that treated them all right. Not even just as a friend, but as a sister. I submit 
to you that that speaks volumes. 
Despite what the government would like you to believe that she treated people 
atrociously at Abu Ghraib, she treated people very well at Abu Ghraib, and these 
two detainees, who are still detainees, stepped forward to share that knowledge 
with you because that is the true Sabrina Harman. 
The government talks about punishment and I submit to you the 19 months in 
Iraq was certainly punishment. The stigma of a court-martial conviction, which 
she already has at this point, is punishment. To be punitively discharged from 
the Army is a stigma that she will never get over. To have a federal conviction 
on her record at this age is something that she’ll never get over. To lose a chance 
of a career in our U.S. Army is something that she’ll never get over. To lose her 
earned at this point all gone, never a chance to get it back. Never a chance to be 
part of our U.S. Army, that is punishment. The punishment that she has basically 
given herself, in thinking about herself throughout this past year is punishment 
that none of us will ever understand. 
We ask you to look at everything. Look at her inexperience in life as well as 
the military. Look at what you are really punishing her for, two nights basically, of 
some photos. We ask you to look at that and give her an appropriate punishment. 
We ask you, if you want to, feel that it’s appropriate, give her a punitive discharge. 
Take some pay from her, give her a pay forfeiture, give her hard labor, if that’s 
what you feel is appropriate. Give her a letter of reprimand. But we ask you not to 
months that she had to live in Iraq and then the past year that she has to wait for 
this trial, and we ask you to not go back there only with pictures of Abu Ghraib, 
but we also ask you to balance that with the pictures of Sabrina in Al Hillah with 
Closing Statement of the Defense Counsel 185







Baghdad Correctional Complex, Abu Ghraib, APO AE 09335
January 14, 2004
Time: 0347
I, Lynndie Rana England, want to make the following statement under oath:
Around the end of October 2003, I went to the Hardsite to visit with the soldiers 
working there. When I arrived at 1A/1B Wing CPL Graner and SPC Ambuhl 
were the only ones there. CPL Graner and SPC Ambuhl had said that there was a 
prisoner named “Gus,” in solitude. He was arrested for attacks on Coalition Forces 
and was telling the soldiers working at the Hardsite that he “hated Americans and 
wanted to kills us.” CPL Graner has suggested he take a picture of me with Gus 
pretending to drag him on a leash type thing. CPL Graner then got out a tiedown 
strap and went downstairs to solitude. He opened the door got Gus out. Gus was 
and he made a big loop in the tiedown strap. He then placed the tiedown strap 
loosely around Gus’ head and neck. He gave me the end of the strap and took a 
picture. At any time, I did not drag or pull on the leash. I simply stood with the 
picture. We then took the strap off of him and placed back in his cell. SPC Ambuhl 
during that time was observing. On or about the 24th of October, I went back to 
the Hardsite to visit again. I got off work at 2200 and walked over to the prison. I 
arrived at about 2215. Shortly after I arrived SSG Frederick, SSG Elliott and SSG 
Davis had brought two prisoners from another block to 1A/1B. The two prisoners 
had supposedly raped a 15-year-old boy in the prison the night before. They were 
brought to 1A/1B to be questioned about the incident prior to this, MI had told us 
to “rough them up,” to get answers from the prisoners. When they were brought in 
the prisoners were handcuffed wearing their civilian clothes and had sand bags on 
their hands. SSG Elliott and SSG Davis had shoved the two prisoners at myself, 
CPL Graner and SSG Frederick …
On 08 Nov 03 at 2200 I went back to the Hardsite to visit because it was my 
birthday and I wanted to see the soldiers who worked at the Hardsite. When I 
arrived at 2215 SPC Ambuhl was the only one on the block. I stayed there with 
her then at about 2400 CPL Graner and SSG Frederick returned and said that 
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there was a riot at Ganci and they were bringing 7 prisoners over for initiating 
the riot. Then they arrived they were escorted by SSG Davis, SSG Frederick and 
SSG Elliott. The prisoners were brought in handcuffs, sand bags on their heads 
and wearing civilian clothes. They appeared to be exhausted from the riot. When 
they were brought in SPC Ambuhl and I stayed on the top tier. Everyone else 
was downstairs pushing the prisoners into each other and the wall. Until they 
all ended up in a dog pile. They just lay there because they were exhausted I 
guess. CPL Graner and SSG Frederick told me to grab the camera and get some 
pictures of them pretending to hit the prisoners. While I was taking the pictures at 
no time did they actually hit the prisoners. At that time, I went downstairs to get 
the paperwork. We started sorting through the dog pile of prisoners to match them 
with the paperwork. We’d get one at a time and stand them up, unhandcuff them 
and tell them to strip their clothes off. Once we had them all lined up against the 
wall naked with bags on their heads we decided not to PT them cause they were 
already exhausted …
During this whole time various people had stopped cause they’d heard about the 
riot in Ganci. I can’t remember who all stopped by, but they were only there for a 
few minutes at a time …
CPL Graner and SSG Frederick wanted me to get beside him and pose pointing 
at him masturbating for a picture. I really didn’t want to get that close him 
masturbating, but posed for the picture anyway. SPC Harman had returned at this 
time and she started taking pictures too. 
Q: Who is CPL Graner?
A: CPL Graner was the NCO of nightshift for 1A wing with the 372nd MP Co. 
Q: Who is SSG Frederick?
A: SSG Frederick is the NCO IC for nightshift at the hardsite with the 372nd MP 
Co. 
Q: Who is SPC Ambuhl?
A: SPC Ambuhl is the NCO of nightshift for 1B with the 372nd MP Co.
Q: Who is SSG Davis?
A: SSG Davis is one of the NCO’s for nightshift in one of the other blocks in the 
Hardsite with 372nd MP Co. 
Q: Who is SSG Elliott?
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accountability of all the prisoners with 372nd MP Co.
…





Baghdad Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq APO AE09335
February 2, 2004
Time: 1904
I, Sabrina Dawn Harman, want to make the following statement under oath:
Q: Why did you take the photographs?
A: To show what was going on?
Q: Whom were you going to show?
A: The media.
Q: Why did you want to give the photos to the media?
A: To show what was going on.
Q: What was your intent for the media to do?
A: Make it stop.
Q: Did you tell anyone in your Chain of Command?
A: My Chain of Command was there. CPL GRANER and SSG FREDERICK 
were there. 
Q: Did you try to tell anyone higher in the Chain of Command?
A: No.
Fallgirls190
Q: Why didn’t you report the incidents?
Q: Whom are you referring to when you said, “they already knew?”
A: People higher up.
Q: Did you let anyone other than the Chain of Command know about the incidents 
in this investigation?
A: My roommate back in the states.
Q: How did you tell your roommate?
A: I told her with letters. When something would happen I would write her.
Q: Where are the letters now?
A: At my house.
Q: At anytime did you attempt to stop the incidents in this investigation?
A: Yes, there was an inmate with a messed up hand, I would not let anyone get 
close to him because I felt sorry for him. 
 ... 
Q: Pertaining to photograph with an inmate who appeared to have wires connected 
to his extremities, who were present for that photo?
A: Myself, CPL GRANER, SSG FREDERICK and another inmate who had a 
deformity with his hand. 
Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A: Yes, I would like to add the following information that was not in my previous 
statements. An inmate was handcuffed to the front bar gate to the 1A side, behind 
his back so low that he was bending backwards. No pictures were taken. Further, 
the inmate known as the “Taxicab Driver,” was handcuffed to his bed, naked in 
his cell with a pair of underwear donned on his head. Another incident with the 
“Taxicab Driver,” was when he was handcuffed against the wall and an interpreter, 
named “Mike,” was doing some karate moves on him and kicked him in the head, 
which why “Taxicab Driver” needed stitches. “Mike” was not allowed in the Tier 
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again. Pictures were taken of “Taxicab Driver” getting stitches. In addition, a 
prisoner was handcuffed to his door for almost six hours straight. I uncuffed him 
with AMBUHL; HUBARD was removed from 1A for that incident. Pictures were 
not taken. I recall an occasion when two dogs were brought into 1A to scare an 
inmate. He was naked against the wall when they let the dogs corner him. They 
pulled them back enough and the prisoner ran to I think Addle and some else, 
cornered and a dog bit his leg. A couple seconds later, he started to move again 
and the dog bit his other leg. The guy ran straight for the door where they tackled 
came down and we gave him a stitch. Pictures were taken, but not by us. The 
dog handlers have copies. I know that CID went to my house in the states and 
picked up the CD, which contains the pictures that were downloaded from my 
computer in November. But, I also have letters and notes, which I sent home to 
my friend, which documents all the incidents that I saw. I know she still has them 
because when I went home on leave I saw letters addressed to her from me, in 
the nightstand in the bedroom. She keeps everything I send her. Also, if you go 
into 1A, there are tack marks on the wooden wall, which symbolized how many 
stitches inmates have received in 1A: Further, MI, CID, OGA, etc. have all been 
involved. Many of the inmates are now at Ganci/Vigilant that was there during 
these incidents. 
 ... 
Q: What was documented in the letters you wrote to your friend?
A: Whatever went on that day.
Q: Are the letters dated?
A: Yes.
Q: You stated MI was involved. What were the names of the MI personnel 
involved?
A: I don’t know names; I only know them by face. I’m pretty sure them went 
home by now. 
Q: How was MI involved?
A: They were there during incidents and even participated in a few. 
Q: How did they participate in the incidents?
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A: One of the MI guys took two of the inmates naked down to Tier 3. I saw 
an Iraqi Policeman who told the MI guy that it was an insult for another man 
to see another man naked like that. I think there was an interpreter with him.
Q: Who was the interpreter?
A: Not sure.
Q: You stated Other Government Agency (OGA) personnel were involved. 
Can you name them?
A: No.
Q: How were they involved?
A: They present during some incidents. And as soon as International Red 
Cross came in, OGA wanted the prisoners to have their numbers, mattresses, 
blankets and clothes back. 
Q: You stated CID was involved. What were their names?
A: Agent PIERON.
Q: How was he involved?
A: He was there during an incident. 
Q: Do you recall which incident he attended?
A: I believed it was when the dogs bit the prisoner twice, but I’m not sure. 
Q: What was his involvement?
A: He was just watching from the top Tier. 
Q: How long was he watching?
A: I’m not sure.





Abu Ghraib Prison Complex, Abu Ghraib, Iraq
January 14, 2004
Time: 1420
I, Sabrina D. Harman, want to make the following statement under oath:
Late October/Early November around 12:30 am I was the runner for the night. 
prisoners were escorted into 1A: They were handcuffed and bagged from Ganci 
taking a picture of CPL Graner posing for a picture. They went to the wall where 
they were stripped. I came back in when they were getting into the pyramid. 
Myself and Graner posed for a thumbs up picture. I went back to 1B, Ambuhl 
and I got ready to leave, came down the steps and saw one on his knees and 
the other standing. We left and she returned about 1 and ½ hours later. Nothing 
follows that night. A man was in the shower of 1B when nightshift arrived. They 
said he was dead and on ice. He started to defrost and melt outside the shower 
into the hallway. We got the key and took photos of him. Nothing follows that 
day. Two females were brought into 1B. I got a picture with both. Nothing 
follows that day. 
men to strip their clothes off?
A: I don’t remember.
Q: Is it standard procedure to have them remove their clothes when they enter cell 
block 1A?
A: Yes.
Q: Who ordered them into the human “pyramid”?
clothes. I walked upstairs to talk to SPC Ambuhl, and return CPL Graner’s 
pyramid. I then walked back down stairs with the digital camera but SPC 
Ambuhl stayed up stairs. I then took about two pictures of the naked prisoners 
in the human pyramid with CPL Graner and SPC England in the photos. I do not 
know who ordered the prisoners into the human pyramid as they were already 




Q: After you took the pictures of the pyramid what happened?
A: I went back upstairs to get SPC Ambuhl and when we walked back down 
stairs the second time, I saw one male prisoner, naked, on his knees with another 
prisoner, naked, standing in front of him. I was standing by the doorway and the 
two prisoners were in the middle of the cell block. They appeared to be about 6 
inches from each other. I do not think that was right for the prisoners to have to do. 
Q: Who was present at this incident?
A: SSG Frederick, CPL Graner and SPC England?
Q: Did you see any contact between the two prisoners?
A: No.
Q: Which dead prisoners did you pose for photographs?
A: One dead man that the “OGA” brought into the prison and one dead man at 
the morgue. 
Q: When did this happen?
A: The morgue incident was in August or September of 2003 and the dead OGA 
I can not remember.
Q: Did you ever give any order for any prisoner to do any sex acts?
A: No.
Q: Have you ever physically abused any prisoner?
A: No. 
Q: Other than what you have told me, have you ever witnessed or heard about any 
prisoner being physically or sexually abused?
A: SGT Jones entered the room talking about one prisoner on his knees and the 
other standing above masturbating in front.
Q: Who were the prisoners?
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Q: How do you know this?
A: SGT Jones just walked into the room I was in and told everyone. SGT Diaz, 
SPC Brown and myself were in the room. 
…
Q: What is the procedure to strip search prisoners?
A: If a female is being searched only female guards can be present. If a male is 
being strip-searched both male and female guards can be present and can conduct 
the search. 
Q: How do you know, it is standard operating procedure to strip-search all 
prisoners in cell block 1A?
A: I just heard it from different people. 
Q: Have you ever seen this in writing?
A: No. 
Q: Who told you this then?






I, Sabrina Harman, want to make the following statement under oath:
Q: At what point did you enter the prison area on the day that the seven detainees 
were made into the pyramid?
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A: I got there about the same time as the detainees. 
…
Q: Do you know who wrote the word rapist on the one detainee?
A: I did. 
Q: Where did you write this?
A: On his right side, and I wrote it with a marker.
Q: Why did you write this on his leg?
A: Because that is what his sheet said he was.
…
Q: Were there any other incidents you were present for when detainees were not 
treated correctly?
A: There was one event where someone had handcuffed a detainee and the cuffs 
were not double locked. The detainee was left handcuffed for about 6 hours. I went 
with AMBUHL to uncuff him. His hands were cold and there were marks on his 
wrist from the cuffs. SPC HUBBARD was the person who did this. He is in my 
unit. I think he was written up for this, but I know he was taken off the tier.
Q: Have you any seen other photographs of detainees?
A: I know of some with a female detainee and one of a detainee that is standing 
with wires on his hands.
Q: What is the incident with the female’s photographs?
A: There is one with her and me and I have my thumbs up. She was a thin and blue 
clothes. I believe she was in for prostitution. 
Q: Describe the incident with the detainee with the wires on his hands? 
A: He is nicknamed Gilligan, he is currently on tier 3. He was just standing in the 
MRE box with the sandbag over his head for about an hour. I put the wires on his 
hands. I do not recall how. I was joking with him and told him if he fell he would 
get electrocuted. 
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Q: Who took the pictures of this?
A: I took one and FREDERICK took one.
Q: Why did you do this to detainee “Gilligan”?
A: Just playing with him. 
Q: Do you feel it was allowable to do this to the detainee?
A: We were not hurting him. It was not anything that bad. 
Q: Was this your idea?
A: Just the wires part.
Q: Why did you have the detainee in standing on the box?
A: Just to keep him awake. 
Q: Did MI ask you to do this?
A: Not me personally. They were talking to GRANER. MI wanted to get the OGA 
to get these people to talk. I do not recall anyone from MI or OGA saying this. I do 
not recall GRANER or FREDERICK ever saying that MI or OGA had told them 
to do this earlier. 
Q: Do you have anything to add to this statement?
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